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ABSTRACT 
Despite the high prevalence of chronic kidney disease, renal narratives are under-reported. 
Much of what is written on kidney failure is written by health care professionals for health care 
professionals and about patients. While medical experts and health care practitioners have 
one type of knowledge, their patients have another type of knowledge acquired through their 
experience of their own condition. From within the disability and patients’ rights movements 
urgent calls have been made for the authentic voices of disabled people and patients to be 
heard without the mediation of professional lenses.  In response to this my dissertation 
combines personal and academic writing to explore my own experience of end-stage renal 
disease, dialysis, transplantation and the life after transplant.  
I have used autoethnography as a methodology. Autoethnography is a relatively new, 
somewhat postmodern form of inquiry that developed from the reflexive turn in anthropology 
and narrative studies in the latter part of the twentieth century. It is very useful in writing about 
the experience of illness and reflecting on illness narratives because, in autoethnographic 
writing, the observer and observed, the narrator and narrated, insider and outsider are the 
same person. This allows scope for exploring the problematics of representation and for 
finding alternatives to already existing ways of telling certain stories.  
Engaging with autoethnography’s postmodern aspects has allowed me to conceptualize 
experiences that, until I undertook this research, I have never been able to articulate, because 
the traditional (static) illness narrative forms did not speak to my experience or my 
understanding of my condition. The central issue in my dissertation lies in the question: How 
do I tell the story of chronic illness once I have had an organ transplant? Flowing from this are 
a number of sub-issues: Can my story change?  How do I describe myself: The well, the ill, the 
impaired, the disabled, the afflicted? Do I describe myself living in no man’s land? In my 
narrative, do I oscillate between being well and ill, or do I occupy another territory entirely?  
And if I do, what is it? 
My study shows that writing the story (or stories) of chronic kidney disease is complex, 
nuanced and dynamic and that, far from being an extended liminal experience, kidney disease 
is littoral. This distinction is important in coming to narrative terms with an identity that is not 
damaged so much as different. 
Through this I hope to demonstrate to both outsiders and insiders, who often submit to 
narratives that are forced on them, that more satisfying alternatives can be found.   
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OPSOMMING 
Ondanks die hoë voorkomssyfer van chroniese nierkwale word nierverhale nie genoeg 
aangemeld nie. Die meerderheid van dit wat oor nierversaking geskryf word, word deur 
gesondheidsorgdeskundiges vir gesondheidsorgdeskundiges en oor pasiënte geskryf. Terwyl 
mediese deskundiges en gesondheidsorgpraktisyns een soort kennis het, het hulle pasiënte ’n 
ander soort kennis op grond van hulle ervaring van hulle eie toestande. Van binne die 
gestremdheid en pasiënteregte-bewegings het ’n dringende oproep weerklink vir die 
outentieke stemme van mense met gestremdhede en pasiënte om gehoor te word sonder die 
tussenkoms van professionele perspektiewe. In reaksie hierop kombineer my verhandeling 
persoonlike en akademiese beskrywings om my eie ervaring van eindstadium- nierkwale, 
dialise, oorplanting en die lewe na oorplanting te verken  
Ek het outo-etnografie as metodologie gebruik. Outo-etnografie is ’n relatief nuwe, ietwat 
postmoderne vorm van ondersoek wat in die tweede deel van die twintigste eeu uit die 
refleksiewe wending in antropologie en narratiewe studies ontwikkel het. Dit is baie bruikbaar 
wanneer oor die belewenis van siekte en besinning oor siekte-narratiewe geskryf word 
aangesien die waarnemer en die waargeneemde, die verteller en dit wat vertel word, die 
ingewyde en die buitestander in outo-etnografiese skryfwerk dieselfde persoon is. Dit laat 
meer ruimte vir verkenning van die problematiek van voorstelling en vir die opspoor van 
alternatiewe vir reeds bestaande wyses om sekere stories te vertel.  
My bemoeienis met postmoderne aspekte van outo-etnografie het dit vir my moontlik gemaak 
om ervaringe wat ek tot en met hierdie navorsing nooit kon artikuleer nie, te konseptualiseer, 
aangesien die tradisionele (statiese) vorme van siekte-narratiewe nie tot my ervaring of my 
begrip van my toestand gespreek het nie. ‘Hoe vertel ek die storie van chroniese siekte nadat 
ek ’n orgaanoorplanting gehad het?’ is ’n sentrale vraagstuk in my verhandeling. Hieruit spruit 
’n aantal newevraagstukke voort: Kan my storie verander? Hoe beskryf ek myself: Die 
gesonde persoon, die sieke, die verswakte, die gestremde, die aangetaste? Hoe beskryf ek 
myself wat in ’n niemandsland woon? Fluktueer ek in my narratief tussen gesond wees en siek 
wees of betrek ek ’n geheel ander gebied? En indien wel, wat is dit? 
My studie toon dat, om die storie (of stories) van chroniese niersiekte te skryf, kompleks, 
genuanseerd en dinamies is en dat niersiekte glad nie ’n uitgebreide liminale ervaring is nie, 
maar eerder littoraal is. Dit is belangrik wanneer daar tot ’n narratiewe verstandhouding gekom 
moet word met ’n identiteit wat nie soseer beskadig is nie, maar eerder anders. 
Hierdeur hoop ek om aan beide buitestanders en ingewydes, wat dikwels voor narratiewe wat 
op hulle afgedwing word, moet buig, te wys dat daar meer bevredigende alternatiewe gekry 
kan word. 
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FOREWORD 
A time comes when one can tell a story. It may be immediately after an event or it may take a 
long time for the time to be right. In my case it took me nearly 20 years and a series of 
unfortunate events to be able to start telling the story of my experience of Chronic Kidney 
Disease (CKD), End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD), dialysis, transplantation and the life 
afterwards. Something changed to allow me to do this. What changed? Possibly me. Possibly 
having sufficient distance from some of the events allowed me to articulate a version of what 
happened. Possibly time and experience allowed an older me to have some points of 
reference to be able to explain or narrate some parts of the story.  
But I think it was largely fury. This is what set it off. This foreword is not the story itself, but the 
preamble to it and simultaneously, ironically enough, the sequel. A story is seldom linear. Like 
life, it is messy and recursive. Its end is in its beginning and vice versa. Its end and beginning 
might crop up in a variety of other places too. This is what I experienced when I wrote my 
story. I always seemed to be starting. And starting again. And again. But let us not get ahead 
of ourselves and instead sustain that illusion of narrative, that one thing happened after the 
other. Let us pretend this really is the beginning, because I need to show you where the story 
started for me. And it started long after I thought it had ended. 
To start this story properly I need to go back to an event in 2006, sixteen years after my 
transplant and 37 years after my kidneys were damaged by Haemolytic Uremic Syndrome 
(HUS). It happened like this. 
I had taken out a mortgage on my house and had been offered health insurance as part of the 
agreement, which included property insurance and other things. To obtain the insurance, 
which would have given me financial cover should I suffer from illness or injury, I had to 
undergo a series of blood tests. 
Friends my age, who have always had normally good health, are now being treated for spastic 
colon, hypertension and diabetes. I don’t suffer from these. I’m healthier than they are and less 
of a risk. I don’t drink or smoke or indulge in reckless behaviour. I’m a law-abiding driver. My 
family doesn’t have a history of cancer or other diseases of lifestyle. I am a good candidate for 
insurance – or so I thought. 
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The nature of these tests was not revealed to me, although I asked my broker what they 
entailed. I asked if I needed to fast before them and was told I did not. I assumed the tests to 
be some type of HIV test or a cancer marker test to determine risk. The results were not what 
the insurance company expected, so I was asked to retake the tests. My head spinning from 
fear and disbelief I returned to the pathology lab. The new tests confirmed that I was suffering 
from several disastrous (but unnamed) ailments and should seek medical assistance as soon 
as possible. 
No one would tell me anything. They would not tell me what was wrong with my blood tests. 
They would not tell me if I were in immediate danger. All they would tell me was that I didn’t 
qualify for health insurance. I was terrified. As an organ transplant recipient, the last thing you 
want to hear is that there is something wrong with your blood results – something so awful no 
one will discuss it with you or allow you any health insurance. Kidney function is monitored 
through serum creatinine. Blood tests tell you how well your transplanted kidney is functioning. 
Eventually I visited my doctor, who informed me that according to the insurance company I 
was suffering from severe diabetes, drastically elevated cholesterol and a malfunctioning liver. 
I retook the tests at my own expense and found that, when I fasted as I was meant to do for 12 
hours before them, my results were perfectly normal, even for a “normal” person. 
While my terror abated, my fury grew to such massive proportions that I found myself unable 
to speak. I could think of nothing other than the monstrous trick that had been played on me, 
how I’d been led to believe that I was dreadfully ill, but actually was quite well, how I was still 
not allowed any health insurance, despite my informing the insurance company about the error 
with the results. I was convinced that the real reason I had been treated so was because they 
did not want to cover an organ transplant recipient – that I would be considered high risk, but 
they had disguised this by sabotaging my blood results, because otherwise their course of 
action would be discrimination in legal terms. The last straw was when they offered me life 
insurance instead. I have no dependants.  
The only way I could relieve any of the pressure that was building up inside me was by writing 
compulsively and at length about something I had never before been able to articulate: how I 
experienced having had a transplant and what effect this had on my sense of myself, how I 
tended to see things through that identity, how I suspected that that identity was all others ever 
saw of me and, most disturbingly, how I did my best to keep that identity a secret. The 
insurance company that originally offered me the health insurance had not been aware of my 
medical condition when they offered it, because I had never in all those years discussed it or 
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mentioned it to my broker. Had they known, I doubt they would have offered me any. They 
found out only when I completed my forms. 
The pent-up feelings of nearly twenty years gushed out of my pen like the breaking of a dam 
or levee. I wrote about things I never knew I felt. It was as if I had found a secret self hidden 
inside me who had lived and experienced awful things without my knowledge as I went calmly 
about my day-to-day business for years. This being had escaped, had found a voice and was 
never going to be silenced again. 
I never found out to what extent my transplant had influenced their decision not to give me any 
health insurance. In time my focus shifted to expressing what I felt about my condition and its 
effect on my life. I declined the life insurance, as I felt I had paid quite enough for having had 
an organ transplant. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION - BORDERLANDS, THRESHOLDS AND 
THE LANDSCAPE OF LIFE POST-TRANSPLANT 
1.1 Introductory statement about the writing style 
At the heart of the questions I raise in this dissertation is the question of how particular stories 
are told. The research design is autoethnography, which allows me to narrate my own 
experience of chronic kidney failure, dialysis, transplantation and life afterwards. This will be 
carried out against a backdrop of illness narratives in general and renal-related narratives in 
particular to provide a context and, to some extent, a dialogue between my narrative and the 
others (Frank, 2010). While the autoethnography is central to the dissertation, it needs to be 
seen in the context of other types of illness narrative and will, indeed, talk to these narratives 
as it progresses. 
In my research I have used different types of writing as part of my autoethnographic process to 
examine and (de)construct the complex narrative of chronic illness and life post-transplant. 
Doing this is not, of course, unproblematic and I examine the issues around this methodology 
during the course of my dissertation. To remain true to the epistemological aims of 
autoethnography I have adopted a more personal style of writing from the beginning of my 
dissertation. This way I hope to avoid privileging the academic episteme over the personal. I 
have even framed my dissertation with personal narrative – the foreword and the last section 
of the conclusion. Both these pieces of narrative are essential for understanding my research 
journey and my story, but in allowing them to frame the dissertation I symbolically give them 
another sort of status: the first and last word. My story existed before my research, although it 
changed in the course of it. After my research is finished, my story shall continue.  
My dissertation is not written in a conventionally academic form. Instead I have played with the 
traditional structure of a dissertation in order to blend or blur two genres: qualitative health 
research writing and life story writing. I discuss my theoretical position in more detail in 
Chapters 2 and Chapter 3. In brief, my intention is to create a third type of writing that can 
express both academic and personal concerns, and can depict, describe and embody as 
accurately as possible a phenomenological research project about the experiences of an 
individual life.   
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In keeping with many of the philosophical concerns of postmodern1 research or research in a 
postmodern age, telling one’s own story as one’s research can allow a previously silenced or 
diminished subject a voice and power. Writing can be a means to knowledge, not an end. 
Writing is part of an on-going dialogue between writer and reader, writer and text, reader and 
text, and writer/reader and world. Reflexivity and treating the research explicitly as an iterative 
process is part of this. I have also chosen to refer to myself in the first person from the 
beginning for that reason.   
1.2 Background  
In 1997, at a scholarship interview, a medical doctor on the panel told me, “You look very well 
for a transplant”. I was filled with conflicting emotions. I was glad I looked well, but I was 
perturbed by two things: the underlying assumption that an organ transplant recipient should 
not look well and the realisation that I was seen as a medical procedure, not a person. That 
long-ago statement that so unsettled me, that wormed its way into my psyche, was, as I came 
to see, both true and false at the same time, both relevant and irrelevant. And yet I could not 
provide a counter-narrative (Nelson, 2001) that did not reduce me to a medicalised category of 
information or a malfunctioning body (Cook, 1996; McDougall, 2006; Shildrick, 2002).  
That throw-away remark by the doctor haunted me and seemed to follow me through life: the 
idea that I looked well, although I was clearly not meant to, and that by implication I should not, 
could not be well after having a transplant and that, having had a transplant, I could only ever 
aspire to be a transplant, not a person. Until then I had to a large extent seen myself as 
healthy after my kidney transplant. Now I felt as if my status had changed to something 
inferior. I left the scholarship interview feeling as if I had become much less than when I had 
arrived.  
Thomson (1997) explains that valorisation of uniformity and unity creates the binary of 
normal/abnormal. This results in “freak discourse” (Thomson, 1997, p. 29). So powerful is this 
discourse, as powerful as medical discourse and often deeply connected to it, that it would be 
years before I could see that “[t]he fissures, breaks, contradictions and indeed unexpected 
continuities in the received meaning of the monstrous are not then problems to be resolved, 
but opportunities to reconfigure first impressions” (Shildrick, 2002, p. 27). 
                                                    
1
 I use the term “postmodern” advisedly here and throughout my dissertation, aware that it exists as a 
concept in different forms across many disciplines. My intentions in using it as a lens are (metaphorically) 
post-colonial and transformative – I want to destabilise entrenched power structures and to restore some 
power and voice to vulnerable and disenfranchised communities. Narrative as a way of knowing remains to 
some extent displaced in research. My research challenges that, as it challenges the idea of an objective 
reality and unsettles traditional categories and genres. Through this I hope not to find new answers, but 
instead to open up new questions, to unsettle and to perturb. 
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Because I could not yet see this in 1997, I dysappeared. Dysappearance (Leder, 1990) is 
when the body causes one shame and becomes a type of visible and monstrous symbol of 
that shame. In doing this, one is rendered invisible as an individual and becomes a type. I fled 
from my diminished status and hid. I had grown up in Johannesburg, but had recently moved 
to the other side of the country. Here I knew no one and no one knew I had had a transplant 
(unless I trusted them enough to tell them). I went to clinic visits every three months, then 
every six months and finally once a year. That was the only time I had anything to do with 
other transplantees or kidney specialists.  
In Johannesburg I had been in regular contact with other transplantees, had helped promote 
organ donation, had advised people who were waiting for a transplant, had even been part of 
a patients’ group. Now, in the Cape, I didn’t join any groups, didn’t raise any awareness, didn’t 
speak to other people with the same condition as I had. I learned how to pass (Goffman, 
1963/1990) as healthy and normal and everything was perfect until 2006, when the insurance 
company (with which I started this story in the Foreword) denied me health cover and 
something in my psyche imploded. And so my research journey began. The Foreword to the 
dissertation outlines what happened and provides a way into my research for the reader, as it 
did for me. 
This research initially resulted in a document called “You look very well for a transplant: 
scenes from re(n)al life” (Richards, 2006). Its objective was to capture in article form an 
individual experience of surviving a life-long, chronic illness, having a kidney transplant and 
becoming well enough to lead a “normal life”. As I proceeded with my early drafts of the article, 
I found myself questioning what was normal about my new life and indeed examining what 
constituted that life. At first I meant to show how others viewed me, but soon I came to see it 
was really about how I viewed myself and how I had constructed my identity post-transplant.  
I discovered that the narrative kept changing shape and that it produced certain types of 
metaphors. It was extremely difficult to write because it was so personal and so complex. I 
learned a great deal about my self-perception and realised there was a lot more to learn. I also 
found that narrative does not simply describe. It interprets. It inscribes. It translates. It 
transforms. It controls. I wanted to pursue this narrative and to see where it led me. I began 
my doctoral research to explore this further, because I needed to provide myself with a better 
context against which to consider my narrative and to be able to theorise what I was seeing. 
In writing my story those first times, between 2006 and 2010, I saw that it did not fit into the 
patterns I had seen of renal narratives (Cojocaru, 2007; Etherington, 1991; Hermans, 2006). 
Was it unique? I wasn’t sure. But I knew it was mine at last. I also saw that my story needed to 
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be partly personal narrative and partly academic writing. For me to understand, I need to use 
an intellectual lens as well as an intuitive one. I had wanted my research to develop 
rhizomatically (Honan, 2006; Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005) – to produce a theory that 
develops from events. However, I was forced to see that I understood my events in the light of 
pre-existing theory too. I have, however, discovered that I need to unpack my life philosophy 
or philosophies to be able to talk about myself (or my self); hence I wrote this dissertation 
instead of only keeping a journal. 
Before I discuss the focal area of my research, I shall outline some of the concepts that both 
challenged and informed the development of my ideas. One of the questions raised by 
qualitative research is: What constitutes evidence? One of the resulting questions in 
researching subjective experience is: Who creates it, defines it or judges it? (Miller & Crabtree, 
2005, p. 613). Writers across disciplines are questioning epistemologies and their impact on 
the people who are being researched (Richards, 2008). This has led to different types of 
resistance and subversion by the subjects of research as well as by some researchers. 
1.3 Rationale: Challenges in writing about illness 
Representation is of immense concern in postmodern academia and in qualitative health 
research. In a postmodern age it is difficult to accept the idea of a transcendent truth or a 
purely objective writer or reader. In many ways, we are at present “between stories” (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1998b, p. 425). How things are represented and who represents them are crucial to 
understanding what one is actually seeing and this has implications for the thing being 
represented as well as for the representer. Every narrator is embedded in a cultural context (or 
contexts) and is part of a discourse, and so objective distance is never attainable in a human 
story. Representation of others can all too easily lead to their being colonised and objectified, 
being reduced to one part of a binary.  
Binaries do not accurately capture the lives of many of us who are (or were) ill or disabled – 
possibly none of us. For instance, as a dialysis patient, a time when I was both ill and disabled, 
I was not able to run marathons, but I was able to complete my Honours degree. So I was not 
disabled in every way. I was ill, but not as ill as I had been the year before dialysis, when I was 
barely able to manage one undergraduate course. I am quite well now, but not apparently well 
enough to qualify for certain scholarships or certain kinds of health insurance. Even the “well” 
are not always well. In discussing health and illness I find one needs a third option, an 
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alternative state, that may share qualities with “well” and “ill”, but that has qualities of its own 
too. Garber refers to this as a “third space” (1997); Glissant refers to it as métissage (2002).2  
I discuss certain aspects of illness writing and research in Chapter 2 and telling stories in the 
third space in Chapter 3. However, in order to provide context for my own research I briefly 
outline some of the key issues below. 
1.3.1 The medicalisation of vulnerability 
I tried to write my story in 1991 when I had my transplant, but could not because I was 
constrained by a normalising, medical narrative that was not my story. I could not get past the 
facts and figures, and so could provide nothing more than a tabulation of dates, pills and blood 
results to explain my experience. This medicalisation of narrative is extremely pervasive for 
reasons I outline below. 
Although medical science can prolong life and cure many ills, it cannot yet grant us complete 
invulnerability or immortality.  As Sontag (1978, p. 3) puts it,  
Everyone … holds dual citizenship, in the kingdom of the well and in the kingdom of the 
sick.  Although we all prefer to use only the good passport, sooner or later each of us is 
obliged, at least for a spell, to identify ourselves as citizens of that other place.   
Despite this, or perhaps because of it, Western culture tends to construct illness and disability 
in terms that are themselves disabling and “othering” (Frank, 1995; K & Duncan, 2006; 
Kleinman, 1988; Marks, 1999; McDougall, 2006; Sontag, 1978; Vehmas, Kristiansen & 
Shakespeare, 2009). This is because “[b]odily dysfunction is perhaps the most common threat 
to the appealing belief that one controls one’s destiny” (Couser, 1997, p. 9). Members of the 
dominant group can control, legitimate and normalise the lives of those who are different by 
writing stories about them. These types of narrative control and explain, as well as reconstruct 
identities to make the “deviant” more acceptable to the “norm”. These narratives tend to 
marginalise their subjects. One of the most common ways in which this happens to ill or 
disabled people is through depersonalising and generalising medical narratives that allow 
doctors to “reinterpret patients’ pasts and literally pre-script their futures” (Couser, 1997, p. 10). 
The biomedical perspective reduces the ill or disabled body to categories of knowledge (Cook, 
1996; Shildrick, 2002). Disabled (and ill) people are often “reduced to the status of 
malfunctioning bodies” and viewed as “lacking capacity to put forward their point of view” 
                                                    
2
 Garber is addressing gender binaries, while Glissant is concerned with postcolonial identities. Nonetheless, 
both writers are attempting to find spaces of possibility that can accommodate identities that may not 
completely fit the binaries that are available. Perhaps this third space can help us to reconsider the often 
accepted binaries. 
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(McDougall, 2006, p. 395). In addition, bodily dysfunction “is complex and demands a personal 
– and not always comfortable – response…. It seems, often, to exist beyond a barrier of 
thinking and seeing that encloses disabled people in silence and obscurity” (McDougall, 
Swartz, & Van der Merwe, 2006, p. ix). This is a problem for two main reasons. Not only can 
the biomedical perspective reduce people to objects and silence them, but it cannot yield 
certain types of information about the lived experience of illness or disablement that may prove 
extremely important in treating or supporting people. Moreover, there may not be space in the 
biomedical approach for the voices of the people experiencing medical conditions to be heard. 
After all, “the ability to relate one’s story depends on there being a relationship in which that 
story can be received, recognized, and responded to” (Carson, 2002, p. 175).  
1.3.2 The need for an insider voice 
Because of this, the insider perspective on illness is so important:   
Until the academic discourse of medicine is extended beyond the languages of 
molecules and drugs to include the language of experience and meanings…medical 
science will reinforce the profession’s resistance to the problems of illness rather than 
contributing to broadening its vision. Research that avoids the human side of disorder 
places the profession and its practitioners in the iron chains of restricted knowledge.  
(Kleinman, 1988, p. 266) 
This is becoming increasingly widely recognised, although not everyone would go so far as to 
say, “We recognize that individual sick persons and their families are the occasions for vision 
and insight for us all” (Charon & Montello, 2002, p. xii). Nonetheless, medical practitioners and 
researchers need to remember the human element of illness and disability because, 
“[a]lthough illness is, indeed, a biological and material phenomenon, the human response to it 
is neither biologically determined nor arithmetical” (Charon & Montello, 2002, p. viii). 
For reasons both ethical and practical, the subject/object dynamic is of particular concern in 
qualitative studies of illness and disability. If one represents another human being, particularly 
one who is already marginalised by society, what is one doing to them? Representation can 
lead all too easily to objectification and reification. Representation can erase uniqueness and 
allow generalisation. It can emphasise similarity or difference and, by so doing, elide 
complexities. 
Qualitative researchers tend to emphasise the importance of the insider’s view and experience 
in research into medical conditions (Charon & Montello, 2002; Frank, 1995; Garden, 2010; 
Garro & Mattingly, 2000; K & Duncan, 2006; Kleinman, 1988; Marks, 1999; Sullivan, 1986).  
While medical experts and health care practitioners bring one type of knowledge to their 
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patients, their patients bring another type of knowledge through their experience of their own 
condition.   
Medical practice has changed since the day of Parsons’s (1951) doctor-patient dyad, where 
the patient was passive and childlike, and the doctor the one who asked the questions and 
controlled the conversation. Carson, a medical ethicist, describes the necessity of a dialogical 
relationship between doctor and patient for treatment that is both ethical and medical, and 
adds that such communications “must strive to be radically egalitarian” (2002, p. 175). But is 
this possible? Jones (2010) asserts that doctor-patient dialogical narrative ethics should aim to 
be as non-hierarchical as possible, although she points out that even in Carson’s work the 
doctor is nonetheless still privileged.  
In response to these types of concerns, researchers have tried various social sciences 
approaches to explore the qualitative dimension of health care and the experience of illness. 
Nonetheless, in studies where researchers have involved patients, the relationship can 
sometimes be as non-egalitarian as with a medical doctor. These sorts of dialogues are not 
dialogical in the sense that each conversational partner speaks an equal amount and their 
words are equally valued. The researchers tend to decide what shall be researched and how. 
They ask the questions. They choose what to include in their articles. In some interviews and 
participatory action research, stories are part of a dialogue, but the participants might have 
varying social statuses (Allen & Hutchinson, 2009; Fontana & Frey, 2005; Hertz, 2006). This is 
of great concern in qualitative health research, where despite the best intentions of 
researchers, the people whose experiences are studied can all too easily become subjects or 
even objects, despite many researchers’ intentions of helping them be heard. 
1.3.3 Illness narrative and the need for a third space  
Illness narrative is a way of writing about illness that captures the insider’s experience without 
the mediation of formal research (Kleinman, 1988). Such narratives can take many forms, but 
they are all told by people who have experienced illness themselves. Examples include Bauby 
(1997), Broyard (1993), Cojocaru (2007), Grealy (1994), Hornbacher (1999), Klug and 
Jackson (2004), and Woolf (1930/2002). Their audiences include others with the same 
condition, family members of people with a condition, care providers, researchers and other 
interested members of the public. They can act as a form of advocacy and as a source of 
information about the experience. They can do more than this too. 
Many illness narratives “make sense” of the fragmented and fragmenting nature of illness as 
an experience (Mattingly & Garro, 1994, p. 771). Illness has been seen as a “series of 
disconnected shocks brought under control by narrative” (Broyard, 1993, p. 19). Through 
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stories people can make sense of a changed identity, piece back together a life and gain 
control. Sometimes this is known as therapeutic emplotment (Mattingly, 1994). “Making sense” 
and “controlling” are forceful terms that seem to suggest that some sort of struggle and 
resistance will be involved.  
More optimistically Brody (2003), like Bury (1982), finds that telling and hearing stories of 
chronic illness can be healing, allowing the teller to grieve an old story and write a new one. In 
a sense, if one is using a story to study an experience and gain an understanding of it, one is 
doing a form of action research, because one is making the story and living it as well as 
relating it. In addition to this, narrators want to make readers more aware of their condition and 
to transform the readers’ response to it (Garro, 1994). 
Paying narrative attention to the experience of illness “forces us to confront the problem of 
meaning and the human affinity to endow the human experience with meaning” (Garro & 
Mattingly, 2000, p. 269). In other words, a story of illness can be two things at once (Frank, 
1995):  
1)  A personal story, for instance, that of reconstructing a damaged self. Sometimes 
this entails making a new self that one can feel proud of, although it is different from 
the self one thought one was going to be; and  
2)  A social one. We reconstruct ourselves individually, but also in terms of the 
communities in which we live or to which we return after illness.  
Illness narratives – particularly those that have autoethnographic qualities – are more than 
this, however. An illness narrative is not just the story of illness; it is “a story of a life altered by 
illness” (Garro, 1992, p.101). This distinction is essential. A story of illness reifies and 
generalises (as medical discourse does), while a story of a life altered by illness retains the 
individual human experience, allowing for both uniqueness and generalisability. The 
complexity of that life and the individual self’s experiences have not been denied or 
suppressed. Illness narratives can help the story-teller ascribe meaning to the illness that can 
have significance for other people either suffering from the same illness or knowing people 
who do (Couser, 1997; Frank, 1995; Kleinman, 1988). Such stories express the interplay of 
body, mind and culture (Couser, 1997). These narratives act as testimony for people and 
thereby serve an ethical function for society: “Storytelling is for an other just as much as it is for 
oneself” (Frank, 1995, p. 17). They are not, however, unproblematic; I return to this in Chapter 
2. Some stories have yet to be told. The story of becoming well after a life-long kidney disease 
is one of them.  
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1.3.4 Liminality in illness  
Telling a story can create a type of metatextual landscape. Stories concern place, time and 
space, people and relationships (Clandinin, 2002). That storied landscape, however, is an in-
between realm. It is both in time and out of it. It is both here and there in terms of place, both 
inside and outside together, both nowhere and somewhere, always being, always becoming, 
alongside ceasing to be and not being. A narrative can be seen as a liminal space, a means of 
getting from an old identity to a new one (Sandelowski, 1991). Perhaps one must consider that 
illness narratives could instead be not mimetic, but ritual objects that stand in for something 
absent and that their performative nature enacts what is wished for or desired: order, clarity, or 
closure.  
Liminality is a ritual state that allows a person to move from one social condition to another, 
through an intermodality of socially imposed structure and antistructure (Turner, 1969; Van 
Gennep, 1960). It is a social construct that allows us to understand change. It is not a naturally 
occurring phenomenon. On the contrary, it is something people impose on naturally occurring 
phenomena or on changes in status within a community. 
Sometimes life after catastrophic illness is described as a type of liminal state. According to 
Van Gennep (1960), liminality is a temporary state in which you withdraw from society, 
undergo purification and then reintegrate into society in a new role. This reintegration is often 
seen as a form of rebirth. Illness often requires that a person be isolated from society to be 
healed. They must subsequently return to society, improved by their experiences, literally and 
figuratively to fulfil a new role. This is why illness can be seen as a liminal condition, although 
not a ritual one. 
However, the liminal state in catastrophic illness, such as cancer or organ failure, may not be 
temporary. Instead, people who have experienced catastrophic illness may continue to live in 
a state of sustained (Little, Jordens, Paul, Montgomery & Phillipson, 1998) or persistent 
(Crowley-Matoka, 2005) liminality, sometimes for the rest of their lives. Rather than re-
emerging into “a fully ‘normal’ life of health and productivity”, such people often experience 
“living between the states of ‘health’ and ‘illness’,’’ (Crowley-Matoka, 2005, p. 7). Kleinman 
describes this in-betweenness as a frightening no man’s land (1988, p. 181). 
Those of us who have had transplants are, and yet are not, seen as different from the 
communities in which we live. Sontag spoke of the domains of the well and the ill as being two 
domains so separate that they required, metaphorically, different passports (Sontag, 1978). 
Where does that leave us? Frank describes people who have recovered from a dread disease, 
but who still require long-term treatment, as belonging to “remission society” (1995, p. 8). This 
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suggests that the larger community in which everyone lives encapsulates a society, possibly 
“secret”, in which some of us function too. But we members always know each other and, 
when we meet, we communicate on a different level because we know each others’ stories 
too. 
Recursiveness and persistent liminality are linked. You cannot have one without the other. 
This may be why so many stories about liminality are ghost stories of one or other sort. Ghosts 
keep returning to the scene of their deaths or of their crimes. This is what haunting is. They 
have not crossed over to the other side. They are still here when they ought not to be. Usually 
in stories they are exorcised, banished, laid to rest. End of story. 
But we are not ghosts and our stories are not lived in books. And yet some of us, especially 
those of us who have been (or still are) seriously chronically ill, continue to hover between 
worlds, those of the living and the dead, the well and the ill, the able-bodied and the disabled, 
the normal and the abnormal. We cannot comfortably occupy either part of the binaries. It is as 
if our identities have become not in-between so much as doubled. This is why I find I need 
another term than liminality to describe my condition post-transplant. 
1.3.5 Littorality and the third space  
In illness, part of the difficulty is that we might value a ritual, but illness is not a ritual event. Nor 
is it tidy and bounded. The boundaries blur between states we like to keep separate 
(health/illness, patient/non-patient, life/death, etc.). Ritual might be part of social life and on 
some level we might require a ritual to allow us to re-enter society, but our very condition might 
prevent that ritual from being completed or even from taking place at all. Alternately, a ritual 
superficially imposed over a persistently liminal condition runs the risk not of providing closure, 
but of foreclosing (taking away your right of redeeming), because such “closure” is artificial. 
The feeling of in-betweenness is real. One is aware of not properly belonging to one or other 
state, like a person who has dual citizenship, but who pines for and visits “the old country”, 
while trying to adjust to the new one, but never truly feeling at home. 
My experience of a life-long illness can be seen as one of persistent liminality (Crowley-
Matoka, 2005) – or of periods of persistent liminality. These periods overlap, like Derrida’s 
palimpsests (Derrida, 1978). I cannot see one without having to look through another. My state 
of liminality on dialysis can only be read through my state of liminality in ESRD or even post-
transplant. My state of liminality post-transplant can only be understood in the light of the 
others. I am well and ill simultaneously and in different ways. Sometimes the different 
narratives of health/illness obscure each other. 
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Murray refers to this as “the doubleness common to all disability” (2006, p. 18), explaining that 
this is troubling to people because it exposes the “multiple nature of all humanity”. While this 
may be troubling to the non-disabled or the non-ill, I have noticed that it remains troubling to 
disabled and ill people as well. At any rate it does for me. I like to know where I am and society 
has not really provided me with a useful category for this, at least not a category that reflects 
well (so to speak) on me.  
Metaphorically I was issued with new documents when I had my transplant. I know enough 
and have seen enough of post-transplant life to know how easily those documents can be 
revoked because of rejection, organ failure or complications arising from the 
immunosuppressants we take to prevent loss of our transplanted organs. These documents 
might be considered a passport by some who would prefer to see one now as a citizen of the 
“kingdom of the well”, but really they are more like a visa. I have a residence permit in the 
“kingdom of the well”, not citizenship. And a visa can be revoked for the slightest of reasons. A 
person with an extended visa or a residence permit belongs and yet does not belong. Such 
people do not have the rights a citizen has. But they want to be naturalised. So they learn the 
language, the customs, the way to dress. They follow these very closely, slavishly, in fact. 
They dare not deviate. They do not want to be found out to be alien and sent home. Is this 
really liminality? 
I know how to pass in my new country. I know how to look well. But what if I am not living 
where I expected to live, either in the kingdom of the well or the kingdom of the ill (Sontag, 
1978)? What if I am living somewhere else entirely? I find the idea of occupying another space 
more empowering. When I began writing my renal narratives, I recognised liminality and 
wanted to end it through an acceptable plot. I came to see that forcing this type of plot onto my 
narratives prevented me from exploring my in-between condition and understanding it better. 
Despite myself, I was still adapting to a central, dominant narrative of “recovery” and health, 
whether I saw myself as passing as healthy or actually being healthy. I wondered if I was not 
simply marginalised, occupying a peripheral position near a border between well and ill. But 
this did not quite seem to fit either. 
If power can be said to reside in the centre, then its absence resides on the peripheries. The 
periphery is populated by the Other, whose life is primarily seen in terms of what it is not – “not 
like us”. This existence is characterised by “lack, fragmentation, partiality, imitativeness and 
unfulfillment” (Pratt, 2002, p. 31). The perceived liminality of illness can be seen in this way. 
Carson (2002, p. 180), for instance, sees it as “a place of ambiguity and anxiety”, something to 
be controlled and overcome, to be given a shape to through relationships, so that one can get 
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back on course. That may be what the periphery looks like to those in the centre. But what 
does it look like to those on the edge (so to speak)? 
The peripheral intellectual inhabits “the space between” (Santiago, in Pratt, 2002, p .32). This 
can allow people to reflect on how the centre and peripheries interact and to set change in 
motion. “Challenging the centre’s self-endowed interpretive monopoly involves asserting 
difference against false claims of sameness” (Pratt, 2002, p. 34). Perhaps by following the 
stories of displaced people and seeing how they experience their identities in the space 
between, one may find ways of escaping dominant ideologies. I was amused to see Elisabeth 
Mudimbe-Boyi, a post-colonial writer, refer to such people as “displaced or transplanted”, 
although she was not referring to organ transplants at all (Mudimbe-Boyi, 2002, p. xii). Like 
Glissant (2002), Lionnet (1989) and Spivak (1988), other post-colonial writers, her intention 
was to make space for new identities for such displaced people, identities that do not merely 
derive from colonial pasts, existing as a derivative patchwork of other people’s cultures, but 
instead new and vital identities with inherent value. Her work and that of other postcolonial 
writers got me thinking about the curious position of one who has had an organ transplant and 
made me start to understand that my particular sort of in-betweenness might have some 
advantages. 
As I came to terms with my disablement, my abnormality, my post-transplant identity, I came to 
see that my shame and my dysappearance were the result of my perception of myself in terms 
of the well/ill binary. I had previously persuaded myself that I was “normal” and the reminders 
that I was not (the health insurance debacle, the scholarship fiasco) caused me crises 
because they rocked my sense of myself to the core. The self is contained and its boundaries 
secured by separation from the “other”: “And yet time and again the monstrous cannot be 
confined to the place of the other; it is not simply alien, but arouses the always contradictory 
responses of denial and recognition, disgust and empathy, exclusion and identification” 
(Shildrick, 2002, p. 17). If this was the cause of my dismay, I needed to study it. If I was 
simultaneously both well and ill, able-bodied and disabled, normal and abnormal, I could not 
afford to deny parts of myself. 
I had to see that I did not belong to part of a binary (well/ill or normal/abnormal). But I could 
find this only by writing (Jones, 2005; Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005). By writing about my 
experiences and my condition I came to see that the space I inhabit may well be seen as 
liminal by some, but the liminality is not likely to be resolved. It is a type of third space (Garber, 
1997), an alternative to binaries of well/ill or normal/abnormal. I have lived with in-
betweenness for so long that I have realised while writing about it that for the most part I am 
not uncomfortable with it. On the contrary, it is who I am. I came to see, moreover, that what I 
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had understood as in-betweenness had other dimensions that took it beyond being 
somewhere on a continuum between binaries.  
I prefer to name this condition a littoral state or zone. A literal example of a littoral zone is the 
sea shore, where the waves roll in and out over the sand, so the edge of the sea and the place 
where the land starts changes all the time. It is a messy area that contains flotsam and jetsam, 
tracks that are made and erased and over-written. It is neither sea nor land. It is something 
else entirely and always dynamic and shifting. It is a blurred boundary. It can be a threshold to 
another realm, but it can also exist as a zone in itself. My lifetime experience of chronic illness 
more closely approximates this state than a state of liminality. 
1.4 One form of littorality: Kidney disease and how we write about it  
Kidney failure, dialysis and transplantation are widespread phenomena. For instance, the most 
recent large-scale research shows that annually there are now approximately 100,900 organ 
transplants done worldwide, of which approximately 69,300 are kidney transplants (WHO 
Global observatory on donation and transplantation, 2010). And yet there is no term for “life 
after kidney transplantation”. “Remission” – a term borrowed from cancer treatment – is the 
closest to be found. A possible reason is that kidney failure has a different and, in many ways, 
less symbolically resonant cultural significance than diseases that have their own 
“vocabularies”, such as cancer, heart failure or AIDS. Having borrowed terms to describe one’s 
condition affects the lenses through which one understands and writes about oneself. 
Some diseases, such as cancer and AIDS, have a social identity and metaphorical resonance 
(Couser, 1997; Sontag, 1978) that mark the sufferer permanently. Kidney failure does not 
carry the same burden of meaning. Indeed there is little symbolic value to kidney failure. This 
may in part account for the small number of published narratives on the subject. If an illness 
carries a metaphorical resonance, people who do not suffer from it can identify with its 
concerns. If it does not, they cannot so easily do so. Kidney failure is often a greater silent 
killer than cancer and has the same post-transplant success/failure rate as many cancers have 
after radiation therapy, but its name does not strike the same chord of fear as cancer’s does 
(Ries et al., in National Kidney Disease Education Program, 2005). As a result kidney failure is 
rendered less visible in society than cancer and therefore has an additional challenge with 
which to contend.  
Over the last 25 years transplants have become more successful and are lasting longer. As far 
back as 1989 (two years before my own transplant) transplant recipients were experiencing 
frustration because they did not know how to define themselves. Their transplants were 
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successful, but they had long-term medical complications, side-effects and readjustment 
problems of finding meaningful employment and returning to society (Reimer, 1989). How 
might people in such circumstances describe their lives? Are you well or are you ill – or are 
you something else? 
Transplantation is different from many other medical procedures, because it does not treat by 
recovery, but by replacement (Reimer, 1989).Transplant surgery is the focus of most people’s 
understanding of transplantation, because it is so dramatic (Clapp & Clouse, 1989; Reimer, 
1989), but for transplant recipients that is only the continuation of life-long medical care and 
the beginning of a different type of vulnerability. A transplant can suddenly fail or die and the 
recipient will be left facing organ failure, life-support and possible death. Because of this, we 
need more research on the different types and stages of in-betweenness after kidney 
transplant. 
Most research about organ transplantation is medical. Some writing is by people who have 
undergone transplants themselves. These narratives tend to have “comic plots” that end with 
them on the brink of, or enjoying, a second chance at life (Hermans, 2006; Klug & Jackson, 
2004). This type of narrative has conflict, but it is resolved and the ending is happy, as 
opposed to a “tragic plot”, where conflict is not always resolved and the ending is sad. These 
“comic plot” narratives tend to read like ‘how to have a happy transplant’ guides that justify 
suffering and explain a second chance at life. They are not very different from the medical 
narratives in that they tend to have a generalising, linear approach to organ transplantation, 
are focused on medical symptoms and pathology, and elide philosophical and ethical 
complexity. They conceal information in order to conform to certain expectations of society 
(Frank, 2010). A number of key questions remain unasked in these narratives. I aim to 
address some of them in my autoethnographic study of my own experience of kidney disease 
and its therapies. 
There is surprisingly little written about kidney disease by people who have experienced it 
(Nicholas, Picone & Selkirk, 2011; Richards, 2008). This is even more the case for stories of 
childhood experience of kidney disease (Darbyshire, Oster & Henning, 2006; Nicholas et al., 
2011). And yet these stories are so important to people living with the condition. Narratives 
can help children through kidney disease by allowing them to express their experiences and 
fears, to deal with them and to share them with care-providers (Nicholas et al., 2011). Not only 
that, but these stories are also important to care-providers, enabling them to help better, so 
much so that some researchers insist that paediatric research and health care ought to include 
patients’ points of view (Horstman, Aldiss, Richardson & Gibson, 2008; Sartain, Clark & 
Heyman, 2000). 
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In Chapter 2 I discuss the literature in the field of kidney disease by both researchers and 
people writing their own stories about it. What I shall demonstrate is that these two groups of 
writers very seldom overlap and that each group to some extent conforms to conventional 
ways of talking about kidney disease and its treatments that can limit the insights into the 
condition. There is a gradually developing trend in renal writing to include patients’ voices 
(Allen & Hutchinson, 2009; Nicholas et al., 2011). I wanted to go beyond that, as both patient 
and researcher, and to problematise issues of voice, narrative ordering and authority in renal 
narratives. 
1.5 The focal issue of my doctoral research  
The focus of my dissertation concerns the problematic of writing about my own experience of 
kidney failure, dialysis, transplantation and life afterwards. I have done this through 
autoethnography, a relatively new form of inquiry that developed from the reflexive turn in 
anthropology and narrative studies in the latter part of the twentieth century. In 
autoethnographic writing the observer and observed, the narrator and narrated are further 
problematised by being the same person. This creates complex challenges for questions of 
voice and authenticity in this study. In autoethnography the relationship between observing 
and being observed is difficult to unravel and presents new sets of questions about 
objectivisation and other issues of representation (Richards, 2008). Autoethnography tends to 
have an interpretive aspect to it that allows it to act as a means of examining and interrogating 
assumptions. 
Starting from the premise that each event of illness is unique (Hahn, 1995), I see each event 
of becoming well as unique too. Despite my academic and theoretical framework, my story of 
my experience of lengthy ill health and subsequent “wellness” is mine alone. My aim in writing 
about it is not to provide a generalisable pattern, but to attempt to understand and explain 
what happened to me. My story and the way in which I have constructed my narrative can 
show through thick description some of the complexities of the experience of CKD and post-
transplant life. An account of individual experience is very important for this, because this is 
one way of potentially bypassing common linguistic ranges and acceptable plots that can 
silence difference and stifle voices (Ezzy, 1998). These affect one’s identity (Denzin, 1995). I 
want to avoid normalisation and generalisation as much as I can. Through seeing more of the 
complexity of a narrative of life post-transplant, people living with organ failure and organ 
transplants, as well as people researching these states or treating them, may become more 
empowered. 
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I shall keep my narrative within the context of other illness narratives and the medical context 
in which I was treated, remembering that my story concerns the impact of becoming well for a 
person who has been chronically ill all her life, the reverse of the most typical pattern in illness 
narratives. My research, while being about how I see myself after these experiences, will also 
heed and explore the complex questions surrounding the extent to which an experience can 
remain unmediated when written about and whether an authentic voice is indeed possible. It is 
intended to act eventually as a form of advocacy by raising awareness of both outsiders and 
insiders, who often submit to narratives that are forced on them.   
How I tell my story once I have had an organ transplant is a central issue in my dissertation. 
Flowing from this central concern are a number of sub-issues. Can my story change? How do I 
see myself: the well, the ill, the impaired, the disabled, or the afflicted? Do I see myself living in 
no man’s land? Do I “zigzag between the kingdom of the well and the kingdom of the ill” as 
cancer patients in remission do (Kolker, 1996, p. 132) or do I occupy another territory entirely? 
And if I do, what is it? 
Furthermore, I want to discover if my narrative is indeed a predictable narrative, falling into one 
of the several patterns that Frank (1995) and Brody (2003) describe. McDougall (2006) 
discusses how outsiders impose these patterns on narratives about ill or disabled people, but 
my research has shown me that insiders often impose patterns on their narratives too. It is 
expected that one’s story will show an abstract meaning, such as “courage under adversity”, 
“tragic waste of human potential”, “heroic triumph” or “the making of a guru/saint/prophet” 
(Richards, 2008). Meaning(s) can be found, but in a postmodern world these may not lead to a 
“Grand Universal Theory”. If narratives are too simple and too containing or normalising, they 
can prevent understanding. Illness “embodies contradiction and multiplicity” (Good & Good, 
1994, p. 841).  
I chose an insider approach, because illness and disability are often observed from the 
outside. I wanted to show what it is like living the life, feeling the feelings, rather than taking 
notes about it. I wanted to show what it is like living in limbo, with an invisible “disability”. I did 
not want my voice mediated and nor did I wish to mediate the voices of others, because I 
wanted to avoid the “problems of appropriation that so often distort and undermine 
collaborations between nondisabled academics and ‘their’ disabled informants” (K & Duncan, 
2006, p.291). I did not want to turn myself (or others) into a subject again. 
I want to use my own story as a means to understand my own circumstances.  I know my story 
as an insider, although it is the story of being an outsider. I know my story intimately. And I can 
tell that one paradigm alone will not do it justice. I have found in writing my story so far that I 
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have nonetheless turned to literature to explain some of my narratives. I have also found these 
literary narratives only partially satisfying because they are not my own story. They have, 
however, helped me to articulate aspects of my own story or at least, in trying them out, I have 
seen that I need to find different paradigms. Hence I have chosen autoethnography, a 
postmodern approach that allows me to blur, blend or braid genres and to articulate something 
of the doubleness of identity and multiplicity of meaning that the experience of illness and the 
writing of illness create. 
1.6 Autoethnography as research design 
1.6.1 Why autoethnography 
Qualitative research should not be generalisable (a requirement of quantitative research); 
instead it requires thick description, critical analysis and reflection (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998a; 
Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Goodall, 2008). Mayan (2009) describes qualitative research as 
“primarily naturalistic, interpretive, and inductive” and “[b]y studying naturally occurring 
phenomena, qualitative researchers attempt to interpret or make sense of the meaning people 
attach to their experiences or underlying a particular phenomenon” (p.11). In qualitative health 
research, researchers need to go further, because of the overwhelming amount of quantitative 
research alongside which they must work (Thorne, 2011).  
It is especially important to remember that qualitative health research should show what 
quantitative research hides, or it should question assumptions and fill gaps in knowledge so 
that better decisions can be made for people in health care (Thorne, 2011). In a postmodern 
era traditional ideas of authority and genre have been problematised and no longer do the old 
divisions between expert and lay person, insider and outsider, academic and non-academic 
hold. Narratives or stories can be used in a variety of ways in postmodern research and 
especially in postmodern qualitative health research. 
This is not, however, unproblematic. It is important that such writing adheres to standards and 
to achieve this, various researchers (Goodall, 2008, Richardson, 2000, among others) identify 
certain criteria for using stories appropriately in research. These criteria generally concern 
making a substantial contribution to the field, being part of academic dialogue, impact on self 
and/or others, and reason for telling the story. Other criteria include aesthetics and reflexivity. I 
return to these in my final chapter. 
In a postmodern age it is difficult to accept the idea of a transcendent truth or a purely 
objective writer or reader. Because of this, I have chosen autoethnography as my research 
design and I discuss this in more detail in Chapter 3. Briefly, Lionnet defines autoethnography 
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as “the defining of one’s subjective ethnicity as mediated through language, history and 
ethnographical analysis; in short, … a kind of ‘figural anthropology’ of the self” (1989, p. 99). 
Autoethnography is a type of phenomenological research that derives from an individual’s 
experiences. This allows me to blend personal narrative and research in different ways. Not 
only can I blend different genres, but I can do this in a variety of ways and each of my chapters 
is a different way of blending them. As an autoethnography, my research is exploratory by 
nature and I have treated writing as a means of knowing and discovering (Richardson & St. 
Pierre, 2005). It is postmodern in that the way it is written has become its epistemology.   
Through the chapters of my dissertation I narrate my own experience of chronic kidney failure, 
dialysis, transplantation and life post-transplant. This will be carried out against a backdrop of 
illness narratives in general and renal-related narratives in particular to provide a context and, 
to some extent, a dialogue between my narrative and the others. While autoethnography is 
central to my research, it needs to be seen in the context of other types of illness narrative and 
will, indeed, talk to these narratives as it progresses, in this way showing my relationship to 
others in my situation, a type of meta-textual ethnography. 
Initially I wanted to show what my experience of kidney disease, dialysis, transplantation and 
life post-transplant was like, so that people who have not had it would understand (Mayan, 
2009). I discovered as I went along that I needed to understand the experience better myself. I 
also needed to understand myself better. And I needed to understand the experience of writing 
about it all too, because that experience is different from the lived experience, but very 
important in understanding it.   
As time went on and I did more writing about the transplant and related issues, my writing 
revealed to me constantly that I did not always know as much about my own experience as I at 
first thought. I was surprised to discover, for example, that I had two stories of the experience 
of dialysis that had existed alongside each other for nearly 20 years without my being aware of 
this. Another reason that I could not tell the whole story was because I did not know all of it. I 
shall never know, for example, what actually caused the Haemolytic Uremic Syndrome that 
destroyed my kidneys. It seems HUS usually (but not always) develops from e-coli, but not in 
everyone who comes in contact with it. You can come in contact with e-coli through a variety 
of sources, none of which I encountered (as far as I know).  
Some things I knew, but could not speak of them. You learn, as a person with a serious 
medical condition, to choose your audiences carefully (Weingarten, 2001). Other things I was 
not ready to discuss. Some parts of the story were other people’s stories. I so badly wanted 
the story to be all mine, but of course our stories are mosaiced with other people’s stories, the 
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stories of our culture, of our collective mythologies (Clandinin & Connolly, 2000; Frank, 1995, 
2010; Good & Good, 1994; Mattingly, 1994; Nelson, 2001): 
The ill body’s articulation in stories is a personal task, but the stories told by the ill are 
also social.…The shape of the telling is molded by all the rhetorical expectations that 
the storyteller has been internalizing ever since he first heard some relative describe an 
illness, or she saw her first television commercial for a non-prescription remedy, or he 
was instructed to ‘tell the doctor what hurts’ and had to figure out what counted as the 
story that the doctor wanted to hear….Whenever a new story is told, these rhetorical 
expectations are reinforced in some ways, changed in others, and passed on to affect 
others’ stories.  (Frank, 1995, p. 3) 
As the teller of my “own” story I add to, assimilate or create a counter-story (Nelson, 2001) to 
others’ plots. To what extent can my story be my own? Typically autoethnography concerns 
capturing or representing experience through writing in various ways, but I find that the act of 
writing itself is not examined enough. It is not an innocent act (Denzin, 1999).  
1.6.2 How I am using autoethnography  
My work differs from other renal narratives I have found in that it is longer and more 
descriptive. It deals with a longer period of life, not only the time leading up to transplant and 
the immediate period afterwards, but a childhood and adolescence of chronic illness and 20 
years of post-transplant life. It is about someone ill becoming well, while most illness narratives 
concern a well person becoming ill (Bauby, 1997; Broyard, 1993; Cojocaru, 2007; Cook, 1996; 
Etherington, 1991; Ettorre, 2005; Frank, 1995; Hermans, 2006; Klug & Jackson, 2004; Kolker, 
1996; Oakley, 2007, and so on). Most transplant stories end fairly soon after transplant 
(Cojocaru, 2007; Etherington, 1991). My illness narrative does not endeavour to resolve 
liminality and is recursive. Self-reflection is an important part of qualitative research, because 
the researcher’s role and influence in the research project can be substantial. The word 
research implies “to search again”, to go back over something, to return. It finds its most fertile 
grounds for searching in the liminal spaces, the unexplored areas in between, and the littoral 
zones. 
I wanted to escape the “academic voice” – that voice that takes an authoritative and 
omniscient stance, and that controls and organises information into a linear argument. And 
yet, here I am at the beginning of my dissertation, explaining how the argument will proceed 
and how my narratives will work.  
My only consolations are that (and here I must tabulate them academically for ease of 
reading): a) I can draw attention to the process I underwent and not pretend that my final (and 
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accidental) conclusion is an immutable truth of which I was always aware; b) I have told some 
of it; c) the complexity and messiness of narrative are like the complexity and messiness of 
life; d) the story can and will always change; e) no narrative is one narrative, all are plural; and 
f) I can put some of my conclusion into my introduction, making my text non-linear, because in 
academic writing you usually write the introduction last, but pretend you knew it all along by 
putting it in the beginning. 
I hope that my work will not unfold so much as explode. It should backtrack, jump about and 
cross itself out. By saying, it should unsay. It should omit and leave things unsaid. Only by so 
doing can it come anywhere near to capturing the contingency and messiness of life. I hope 
that whatever else it does, it will not remain static, but be dynamic, changing from sense to 
nonsense, and back, from one shape to another, because in so doing it remains alive. And 
when the text is alive, the reader is alert. I want my writing to argue with you and to perturb 
you. I do not want you to conclude about it, even though I must. I want my story to remain a 
thorn in your side, or at least a burr on your skin. It should chafe a little, not fit into familiar 
pigeonholes. Some of my stories will seem to negate others. This emerged in the telling of 
them and I have not changed this because the stories are all true and when taken together, 
the “whole” (as it exists) is true too. 
Recursiveness in illness narrative is not explored enough. We want life to be linear, but it is 
not. So we create narratives that are linear in the hope not only of “making sense” (Bury, 1982; 
Frank, 1995; Kleinman, 1988), but also of moving things along. If we can obtain closure, then 
we can close the chapter or even the book. However, life does not always work this way and 
especially not in chronic illness. In the course of one’s life one might find oneself in the same 
or a similar spot again and again. You might need more than one transplant. I find myself 
periodically returning to the sick role for various reasons (and I seem to adapt to it very well). 
One does not simply “get well”. If nothing else, after a serious illness there is emotional and 
psychological fallout to be dealt with. Forever after a life-threatening experience, you are left 
vulnerable. Unidentified fevers scare me to the point of making my heart pound with fear. 
Colleagues at work must find me melodramatic when I tell them breathlessly that I am running 
a temperature and am too alarmed to concentrate on my work. For them it is some or other 
bug. For me it could be the start of my transplanted kidney rejecting. This can happen without 
warning or provocation even years after an apparently successful transplant. Needles give me 
anxiety attacks. Not wanting to appear childish, I have learned to hide this from others. I have 
had to have so many. And I shall always have to keep returning to the blood room. Of that I 
can be sure. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
21 
 
1.7 Structure of chapters  
The introduction to my dissertation has given an outline of why the insider voice is so 
important in writing about illness and has situated my study in this field. It has also introduced 
the problematic concepts of liminality, littorality and dysappearance as important parts of 
dealing with chronic illness in a meaningful way. I have looked briefly at literature concerning 
kidney disease, because it provides a context for what follows in my autoethnography of my 
experience of kidney disease and organ transplantation.  
The literature review (Chapter 2) gives an overview of illness writing, with particular focus on 
writing about kidney disease. The field of illness narrative and pathography is vast so I have 
had to be selective. I want to achieve two things in this chapter: an understanding of how 
liminality, littorality and dysappearance are treated as part of the experience of chronic and 
acute illness, and specifically how writers about kidney failure, dialysis and transplantation 
address this. This will go part of the way to explaining why I have decided to write about my 
own experience of kidney disease, dialysis and transplantation, and why I decided to do it in 
such detail. My research aims to continue the insider voice tradition, but to approach the telling 
of the story of kidney disease, dialysis, transplantation and life post-transplant from a 
theorised, academic view that recognises the complexities and implications of liminality for this 
condition. My literature review will show why this type of research needs to be done. 
In-between spaces and “third” spaces (Garber, 1997) are where autoethnography flourishes 
(Denzin, 2009; Jones, 2005) and this is the topic of the third chapter. Autoethnography, the 
methodology I use to carry out my research, is a form of insider writing that can be produced in 
many ways and is particularly useful when understood in a postmodern framework. I discuss 
this largely in terms of liminality and littorality. The rationale behind autoethnography, its 
advantages and limitations and its relationship to writing about illness are discussed here. My 
approach to autoethnography is explained within this context. 
My own narrative is woven into the more theorized parts of my dissertation (introduction, 
literature review and methodology) in order to create a text that is autoethnographic, internally 
dialogical and not a study of narrative as data. Combining personal and academic genres in 
this way is intended to create a blurred genre that I hope is going to provide a more thorough 
exploration of how I tell the story of my illness experiences than would be achieved by using 
one or other genre alone. This is itself a third space that I hope will express the “third-ness” 
and changeability of my experience and the challenges of telling the story of this. This blurring 
continues through the dissertation to create different effects. Chapter 4 concerns CKD and 
ESRD, Chapter 5 dialysis, and Chapter 6 the life after transplant. 
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My experience of kidney disease could be seen to have taken years out of my life, but I 
struggle to conceptualise it this way. My illness began when I was eight months old. I finally 
went onto dialysis when I was twenty-one years old. Was I away from my life while ill? Where 
was I then? Compared with what? I didn’t know any other way. Illness writing often talks about 
illness as a rupture from normality, which is seen to be health. Little of this type of writing is 
about people who have been ill from early childhood, possibly because for them (us) normality 
is illness. Chapter 4 considers the different types of liminality that I experienced growing up 
with damaged kidneys during the twenty years of increasing impairment.  
Although I spent only 11 months on dialysis, the chapter on dialysis (Chapter 5) is of similar 
length to the one on the gradual slide into ESRD, because the structural integrity of the 
chapter represents the intensity of the experience. Dialysis was a life-saver. Nonetheless, I 
frequently had to admit while on it that it was not really a life style, but a test of endurance. It is 
intermittent life-support. For me it was also a type of limbo or liminal stage between life and 
death, but also between sickness and health, between having kidneys that didn’t work and the 
possibility of having one that did. Dialysis was itself a curious mixture of being well and ill. I 
wanted the chapter to show the complexity of the experience, but also its arduousness and 
repetitiveness. 
The section about transplantation is largely concerned with living with a transplanted organ 
many years down the line, because I want to show how the experience is about being “normal” 
and being a “patient” simultaneously, a truly littoral experience. I also wanted to demonstrate 
how experiences change over time. Most narratives about transplantation are medicalised in 
that they concern the period of having the medical procedure and what happens immediately 
afterwards, itself a medicalised approach to writing about the experience in that the result can 
be a story largely about a medical procedure (Cojocaru, 2007; Etherington, 1991).  
Most qualitative research about transplantation is about the ethical issues of transplantation or 
the change in status of the patient as they cross over (some examples are: Baines & Jindal, 
2003; Fox & Swazey, 1978; Fox & Swazey, 1992; Lock, 2002; Scheper-Hughes, 2007; Sharp, 
2006; Sque, Payne & Clark, 2006). I find much of the qualitative research a somewhat 
medicalised representation of the transplantation experience. While it does serve a function to 
inform lay people and people awaiting transplant and to show the importance of the donor, 
donor’s family and the medical team, it is a part of the experience in which the recipient is 
largely passive. Furthermore “having a transplant”, from my perspective of being a recipient, is 
largely about sustaining the transplant after surgery and living with the after-effects, side-
effects and issues of identity. 
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Liminality, littorality and dysappearance of different sorts are discussed here. I have been 
fortunate to have had (so far) a successful transplant. Twenty years later my kidney still 
functions as a normal kidney should and the side effects of my medication have been minimal. 
I can lead a normal life. I haven’t had to deal with complications, rejections or kidney failure. I 
am no longer ill. And yet I take medication every day to prevent my kidney from rejecting. I 
must remain vigilant about my health, because it is not guaranteed and there are things I 
should not do. I tire easily and I still don’t know what normal tiredness is. How long should I 
work before taking a break? How much sleep should I get at night? I have been able to find no 
other work about this stage of transplantation. Even today the ten-year transplant survival rate 
is only about 67% (McCauley, 2004; Stegall et al., 2011). Where does this leave a person who 
has had their transplanted organ for twice that length of time? 
Finally, in the concluding chapter, I return to looking at the challenges and tensions of 
autoethnography as a methodology and reflect on how I have used it in my research. My 
research has been an attempt to give a more than superficial look at liminality, an aspect of 
chronic illness that has not yet received the detailed attention that it requires, and littorality, 
which I consider a much more useful concept in post-transplant life. I hope in this way to add 
to the body of knowledge about the experience of CKD and ESRD, dialysis, and 
transplantation, as much more can be written about these experiences. However, despite my 
best efforts, my study is little more than a glimpse. A lot more work can be done here and 
should be done not only for kidney disease, but also for other forms of chronic illness and 
tertiary health care. 
1.8 How I am writing this dissertation 
In discussing what it means to tell a story, Crites (1971, p. 300) says, “But remembering is not 
yet knowing”. Remembering what happened is only part of story-telling and autoethnography. 
Telling a story is initially an act of memory, but for that story to be meaningful, for it to make an 
impact and to be reflexive, it cannot simply be a chain of events. For this reason I do not relate 
the story in one part of my dissertation and then analyse it in another. 
In the introduction, as with other parts of this dissertation, I attempt to show some of the 
textual workings behind the final version that you are reading. Sometimes this takes the form 
of explaining how an idea started and how it developed. Other times I might draw attention to 
myself in the text to remind you that I am not an omniscient narrator. Occasionally I might draw 
attention to how a piece of text can be read or how it can be contrasted with another piece.  
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The disclosure of rhetorical constructions is, in itself, an ethical act and can be an act of 
resistance against power structures. Instead of manipulation, disclosure is revelation and 
transparency. A different type of reading is necessary in a hybrid text, such as an 
autoethnographic writing of illness. The processes by which we as academics read and write 
are seldom referred to, unless the research is about writing or reading processes. These 
processes are certainly seldom referred to as experiences. Autoethnographic research 
functions as it does because of its textual nature, which I shall elaborate on in the course of 
this dissertation, but this nature is seldom unpacked in research, seldom explored and (in my 
view) seldom understood.  
My intention in writing the type of narrative I have written is to try to demonstrate something of 
the fragmentary and recursive nature of a lengthy illness experience as well as to show the 
ambiguities and changeableness of that experience. For that reason autoethnographic writing 
seems most appropriate. My various chapters are structured in a way that attempts to mirror 
the experience (ESRD, dialysis, post-transplant) itself. For instance, I experienced ESRD as 
chaotic and in writing about it I attempted to capture some of the messiness of the experience. 
I wanted my writing to reflect my emotional experience not only in what I said, but how I said it. 
By contrast dialysis was much more structured. The chapter on dialysis has a structure which 
reflects this. Life post-transplant was in some ways a return to chaos, but of a different sort. By 
choosing three narratives to consider, I echoed the structure of my fourth chapter where I 
considered three narrative “artefacts”. However, the narratives of the sixth chapter are more 
open-ended. In postmodern thinking, “[t]he way of saying is the what of saying” (Van Maanen, 
1988, p. 68). 
A narrative study is as much about the stories that are not told as the stories that are told 
(Clandinin & Connolly, 2000; Kermode, 1981). Silences are profound, but they might not be 
noticed by an outside narrator or researcher. Where possible I shall alert the reader to things 
left out, intentionally or otherwise. I shall not explore whether these remain silences once I 
have called attention to them. The challenge with this as with the rest of my narrative(s) will be 
to create a narrative that is self-reflexive, but that does not try to turn itself into data, but 
instead acts as a form of inquiry. 
In the course of writing my story I found I had many stories and interpretations, sometimes of 
single events. Telling the story or stories as narrative and interpreting the narrative could yield 
two quite conflicting versions of events. Rosaldo, while not explicitly writing autoethnography, 
explained the phenomenon like this: 
An act of mourning, a personal report, and a critical analysis of anthropological method, 
[my writing] simultaneously encompasses a number of distinguishable processes, no 
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one of which cancels out the others… the paramount claim made here concerns how 
my own mourning and consequent reflection on Ilongot bereavement, rage, and 
headhunting raise methodological issues of general concern in anthropology and the 
human sciences. (Rosaldo, 1989, p. 11-12) 
Can I claim something similar? My paramount claim concerns my own experience of a life-long 
chronic medical condition and consequent reflection on the nature and symbolic significance of 
this condition and my understanding of it. This raises methodological issues of general 
concern in medical anthropology and the social sciences. 
One thing Rosaldo’s and my stories have in common is a contemplation of perturbing in-
betweenness and how it plays itself out in one’s own life. Rosaldo makes the point that many 
ethnographic studies concern boundedness and rituals, but that mourning, for instance, takes 
place not only in ritual settings, but also informally. However, it is usually studied in highly 
structured settings where it can be observed repeatedly under the same conditions. Studies 
about dialysis and transplantation often occur in medical settings (Fox & Swazey, 1978, 1992; 
Joralemon & Fujinaga, 1996; Lock, 2002; Russ, Shim & Kaufman, 2005; Sharp, 2006), but 
people do not live there. Their families are not there and their inner lives are not there either. 
Structure imposed can be misleading (Good & Good, 1994). Or as Crites (1971, p. 310) puts 
it, “So long as the story retains its primary hold on the imagination, the play of immediacy and 
the illuminating power of abstraction remain in productive tension”. 
In order to provide a clearer context for the telling of my own story, I use the following chapter 
to examine in more detail illness narratives, as well as research that uses illness narratives. In 
it I address some of the intentions as well as some of the problematic issues of telling a story 
of illness to show some of the ways in which people approach this. My interest is in how they 
discuss what the events meant to them and how self-reflexive they are when doing this.
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CHAPTER 2: THE WRITING OF ILLNESS - REMEMBRANCE, 
REMEMBERMENT OR SOMETHING ELSE 
2.1 Introduction 
Ironically, in my postmodern dissertation, this chapter is a utopian project, much as Denzin 
describes his chapter on the practices of interpretation in Qualitative inquiry under fire (2009). 
Like Denzin, I am attempting to bring together “multiple discourses into a unified framework” 
(p. 117), much against my better judgement as a postmodern researcher. Doing this feels like 
a type of backwards deconstruction, where I go against the textual rules I set up in Chapter 1. 
Nonetheless, in order to give my research context and an epistemological framework, the most 
efficient way of doing this is to write an argumentative chapter in a traditional way. 
In this chapter I am looking at only at some general ideas about illness narratives and then 
specifically at illness narratives of renal disease. I shall examine these latter narratives as two 
categories, narratives as used by researchers and narratives as written by people who have 
experienced renal disease, because these are the two main categories for this type of writing. 
My divisions are artificial in some senses that will become apparent. What should also become 
apparent is that there are gaps and hiatuses in the writing about illness itself, particularly in the 
writing about renal disease. Liminality is not easily written about (Crowley-Matoka, 2005; Good 
& Good, 1994; Little et al., 1998). Littorality, it seems, is not written about at all. 
I have restricted my research to written documents that are in the public domain in the form of 
articles, stories and books. I have not explored electronic media such as blogs or video 
streaming, because this is a specific type of text that has its own characteristics and functions 
in a specific way for specific types of audience (Spyridakis, 2000). I do not have time here to 
explore this or the complexity of how it relates to more traditional textual types. This is 
something that could usefully be explored in future research, because the format of the 
document will influence the structure of the narrative(s) and this could have profound 
consequences for illness narratives in terms of more postmodern approaches to writing them.  
I begin my discussion of the literature with a section about the relationships of world and text in 
contemporary qualitative research. I have focused on postmodernism. My reason for this is to 
provide context for research on the experience of illness, where the overlap between the 
illness experience and the research occurs in a text and through writing. Through showing how 
postmodern qualitative research sometimes conceptualises world and text, I can position 
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illness research and illness writing in terms of a theoretical framework that allows room for 
messiness, ambiguity, fragmentation and even contradiction, all of which I consider essential 
for writing about the experience of illness. I shall also be able to show where my own research 
fits in. 
2.2 The context of qualitative research in the early 21st century 
2.2.1 World or text or both? 
A significant amount and variety of qualitative research into the experience of illness has taken 
place in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This area of research is a symptom 
of changes that have been occurring in qualitative research for some time. In the late twentieth 
century postmodern concerns led to a number of changes in the contexts in which research 
was conducted and this resulted in paradigm shifts for researchers, where perceptions of what 
constituted appropriate representation, legitimation and legislation were challenged (Denzin, 
2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 1998a; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Marcus, 1998). 
All qualitative work is interpretive to some or other extent (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). For this 
reason postmodernism has generated profound disquiet, because it changed the way we look 
at the world. This change was so rapid and so extreme that it has led some researchers to 
believe that all there is to postmodernism is theory and reflexivity, and that these 
conceptualizations of the world must be entirely text-based in the sense of existing only in 
documents. In the early part of the twenty-first century postmodernism has been seen by some 
to have been replaced by a new conceptual era that makes new demands on us as 
researchers (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005). One of the demands is 
that our research is part of the world, that “the social sciences and the humanities become 
sites for critical conversations about democracy, race, gender, class, nation-states, 
globalization, freedom and community” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 3). 
From my perspective this has always been part of postmodernism’s concerns. Deconstructing 
texts is a way of starting critical conversations about the issues Denzin and Lincoln mention in 
the quote above. It is not an end in itself. As Selden says in his book of more than twenty 
years ago, “Deconstruction can begin when we locate the moment when a text transgresses 
the laws it appears to set up for itself” (Selden, 1985, p. 87, italics in the original). But this is 
only a beginning. Moving from the text to the world is a complex process. One stage of it 
involves revealing through one’s research writing how one constructed one’s ideas and that 
the researcher is not omniscient as a way of adjusting the power relations in a research project 
or even in a field. The transgression that has begun in the text ripples out from there into the 
world: 
The realities of power and authority – as well as the resistances offered by men, 
women, and social movements to institutions, authorities, and orthodoxies – are the 
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realities that make texts possible, that deliver them to their readers, that solicit the 
attention of critics. (Said, 1983, p. 5) 
In postmodern thinking the discourse of power relations, including that of the researcher, is 
made explicit and decentred. For this reason postmodern research often involves allowing the 
voices of people on the peripheries to be heard, instead of speaking for them. Sometimes 
hegemonies cannot be unsettled by postmodern methods, but can ironically be re-entrenched 
(Buzard, 1999). However, rendering the power structures visible and problematising them 
might at least go part of the way to changing them.  
Postmodernism is born from a time of great change (Clandinin & Connolly, 2000; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005). It is a destabilising lens of a destabilised and destabilising period. It is not 
about certainty and answers, but about ambiguities, questions and pluralities. Postmodernism, 
in effect, is not about patterns, but about differences (Clandinin & Connolly, 2000) and each 
difference is unique. In addition, the co-existence of different perspectives is recognised, even 
to the extent of acknowledging that what is not said is as significant as what is said (Clandinin 
& Connolly, 2000). 
No longer considered to stand outside of their research, postmodern researchers are 
inextricably part of it, the idiosyncratic lenses through which the research is seen and the 
“tools of research” in various ways (O’Byrne, 2007, p. 1389). “Experience is the starting point 
and key term for all social science inquiry” (Clandinin & Connolly, 2000, p. xxiii). Experience 
changes who you are and, to an extent, to study experience is to study an individual’s 
experience of change (Clandinin & Connolly, 2000). “I” am not generalisable and nor are my 
experiences. The postmodern researcher is both researcher and researched (Hollway & 
Jefferson, 2000; Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005), both deconstructor and deconstructed. 
Postmodernism is critical of its subject matter, which includes itself and the researcher. Self 
and subject cannot be separated. 
2.2.2 Postmodernism and multiplicity of meaning 
Postmodern theories work from the premise that meaning cannot be fixed, because texts are 
splintered, many-layered and dialogical (Jefferson, 1986; Jones, 2005; Marcus, 1998; 
Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005; Selden, 1985). No text can have a final or single meaning. 
Even the “author” of the text is not the final authority. There is a “surplus of difference” that 
cannot be consumed or assimilated and, as a result “any interpretive framework must remain 
partly unresolved” (Marcus, 1998, p. 389). Something is always lost in translation between the 
cultures being studied and the research product. The researcher is no longer considered the 
authority or the owner of a (or any) truth. 
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So profound is the resulting destabilisation of paradigms and theories, even of texts produced 
during research, that nothing can remain unquestioned any longer. What emerges can be 
seen as “nearly unbearable truths that would make it difficult to lend special importance or 
justification to any practice of ethnography” (Marcus, 1998, p. 388). For instance, 
postmodernism does not find an external point of view possible. There is no external or 
objective truth in postmodernism. Instead, all of us, including researchers, are insiders with 
limited, local points of view. This is the reason that much contemporary qualitative research 
has become interdisciplinary, even to the extent of resorting to bricolage as a strategy of 
piecing together information, using parts of methods that seem most suitable to the situation 
being researched. Bricolage is the result of carrying out research in a world of blurred genres 
(Kincheloe, 2001), where every idea is compiled of other ideas combined in various ways 
(Derrida, 1978). It requires using methods that are appropriate to a particular study, even if this 
means adapting them, with a thoroughness that allows new insights to be derived from the 
new contexts (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Kincheloe, 2001; Lévi-Strauss, 1966). 
What emerges from postmodern thinking can be seen rather reductively as experimentation 
and messy texts that do no more than comment on form, or that have not yet led to any 
resolution of internal tensions that would allow a new type of study to be born (Marcus, 1998, 
p. 389). However, it can be argued that no text, including non-postmodern ones, is ever 
finished, ever resolved or ever free of tension – and that any text is a replication in some or 
other way of other texts. None can exist in a vacuum, with no reference to texts that produced 
it. Here is what I mean. 
Just as this literature review that I have been writing speaks to the conventions of literature 
reviews in its form and content (and to the expectations of its readers), so does it replicate a 
certain type of knowledge production – traditional, linear argumentation and documentation of 
citations to support the argument through references to other scholarly works. It is a 
phenomenological work (Randolph, 2009) of a certain sort that serves specific purposes, 
mainly that of asserting authority. However, my literature review exists in a larger document, 
my dissertation, which attempts to reveal and deconstruct the tensions that exist in the type of 
academic research from which it stems.  
Does this make my literature review part of a deconstructionist project? After all, I am 
transgressing the laws I set up for myself earlier (Selden, 1985). Or does it contradict or 
undermine the rest of my project by reverting to the very conventions I seem to be attempting 
to subvert (Buzard, 1999)? I could argue that if I seem to have adhered to academic 
conventions in this chapter, I am being ironic in true postmodern fashion (but, ironically, I am 
not). Perhaps I have fallen into the same trap that many others have by claiming to be using 
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postmodern theories, but doing so through forms that pre-date them and are not themselves 
postmodern (Marcus, 1998). Perhaps in order to situate my work in a certain context I have 
had to rely on these conventions. Possibly this is a messy area of my text whose tensions 
cannot be resolved. It might be a type of postmodern juxtapositioning or “blocking together 
incommensurables” (Lyotard in Marcus, 1998, p. 390). It might be a desperate attempt at 
dialogism, showing the “official” perspective against my own, although I assert my authority in 
my “own” text and choose what to include and exclude, what to privilege and what to ignore, 
as researchers often do. Or do I? Perhaps, as I am combining different methods and theories 
in order to escape a single paradigm, I can describe myself as a bricoleur (Kincheloe, 2001; 
McLaren, 2001; Spry, 2001). 
I think that because my literature review exists in a certain context, my dissertation as a whole, 
it must relate to the rest of its textual surroundings. It cannot be hermetically sealed off from 
them. It affects the rest of my dissertation, just as the rest of my dissertation affects it. It is 
subsequently postmodern in its self-reflexivity. It is part of a text, not the text as a whole. A 
picture changes when you see more of it and what you see depends on how you frame it 
(Barthes, 1981; Foucault, 1975/1991; Muncey, 2005). Not only this, but a text at any stage of 
production is always a palimpsest for subsequent texts, appearing ghostlike through the words 
that follow it (Derrida, 1980). Even a text that is not written or not included can be a type of 
palimpsest in another text, its very absence a presence, as I hope to demonstrate in future 
chapters. 
For some, text is a metaphor for experience (Ellis, 2009; Hollway & Jefferson, 2000; Marcus, 
1998); for me text is an experience in itself, an opportunity to reconceptualise events and to 
derive new meanings from doing so. A more reflexive approach to writing can usefully 
problematise the idea of text as metaphor or text as verisimilitude. The (as I see it) postmodern 
quality of autoethnography to allow the writer reflexivity in order to gain deeper understanding 
of his or her story, even if this renders the story messy, is a great strength. I discuss this 
further in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7. Autoethnography has the potential of treating narrative in a 
more sophisticated way than often happens. 
Marcus sees reflexivity as an ideological matter, instead of a methodological one (Marcus, 
1998). I see it as both. Fieldwork and writing are no longer the distinct categories they once 
were; one can even go so far as to say that there is “no difference between writing and 
fieldwork” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 19). Because of this and because of a postmodernist 
blurring of the distinctions between form and content, reflexivity must be both ideological and 
methodological. Methodology is ideology and ideology is methodology. You will choose a 
methodology that serves your ideological concerns and supports your values. An implication of 
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this is that methodology and ideology are the representation of the researcher’s biography 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). 
2.3 The ways in which researchers write about illness 
For much of the twentieth century researchers of illness tended to take a medical perspective 
or sociological perspective instead of one that showed illness from the phenomenological 
perspective of individual lived experience. For instance, Parsons’s (1951) role-based approach 
to the doctor-patient dyad was immensely influential in sociological research for twenty years. 
Illness was seen as deviance that was assessed and sanctioned by an expert (the doctor), 
while the patient was the passive recipient of care and knowledge about his or her condition 
(Parsons & Fox, 1952). 
As qualitative research encountered crises of representation, legitimation and legislation, no 
longer did researchers focus only on grand narratives, but they began to see that the smaller-
scale concerns of individuals and local theories were also important (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; 
Rosaldo, 1989). The perspectives of research into illness changed too. These developed 
alongside similar concerns in disability studies. Since disabilities and illness often overlap and 
co-exist, I have used some of the developments in the disabilities movement to explain in 
Chapter 1 how perspectives have changed in illness research. 
To recap briefly, recent developments in disability and illness research have made it 
impossible to ignore the insider experience and voice (Charon & Montello, 2002; Frank, 1995; 
Garro & Mattingly, 2000; K & Duncan, 2006; Kleinman, 1988; Marks, 1999; Sullivan, 1986). 
The insider’s experience of his or her own condition is a key to shifting paradigms concerning 
health research and even treating people with medical conditions. As health care enables 
people to live longer lives with medical conditions that not long ago would have killed them, we 
need to rethink our paradigms about what constitutes “normality”, “health” “illness” and 
“disablement”. We need to reconceptualise the idea of in-betweenness and liminality. We need 
to reconsider how we represent the Other. We sometimes have to see that most of us are 
Other at certain points in our lives.  
Nonetheless, the shift to abandoning binaries has yet to be completed and people are still 
sometimes misrepresented by research and the media. Couser develops the implications of 
this further:  
Thus one fundamental connection between life writing and somatic anomaly is that to 
have certain conditions is to have one’s life written for one. Cultural representation 
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mirrors daily life. Thus people with disabilities are also vulnerable to involuntary and 
prejudicial representation in diverse media. (2009, p. 17) 
Disability studies has been very much postmodern in its concerns since the 1990s. As Marks 
(1999) notes, disability studies challenges “the reductive focus on an ‘essential’ disabled 
person in favour of an exploration of the ways in which people are socially constructed within 
the context of a range of disabling environments” (p. ix). It deconstructs paradigms and 
representation to reveal underlying cultural assumptions about various conditions and the 
people who experience them. Its slogan, “nothing about us without us” (Charlton, 2000, p. 1; 
Germon, 2000, p. 960), is remarkably postmodern in its claiming a voice for a previously 
disenfranchised minority and showing that the peripheries can be as powerful as the centre – 
and, indeed, that the perceived peripheries can, in fact, be the centre. 
Gubrium and Holstein (1998) describe the importance of the personal story as a source of 
experiential data, explaining that “life comes to us in the form of stories, articulated through 
storytelling”, although they caution that narratives do not offer “unmediated access to 
experience” (p. 163). Narratives always represent something about the subject and the 
narrator, as well as their cultural milieu(x) (Ezzy, 1998; Sarbin & Kitsuse, 1994). This can 
create a tension in research between wanting to be specific and to research the experiences 
of an individual person or wanting to generalise from that person’s experiences and revert to 
the lens of illness to understand a life that could be more complex than a pathology that is part 
of it. 
Aimee Benèt (1996, p. 768), an activist for patients’ rights, explains the dangers of 
generalising and of using a medical narrative only to understand a person’s experience: 
We are treated as identical packages or ID numbers having textbook feelings. Concrete 
thinkers reason that if the symptoms or diseases are alike, then it is logical that these 
patients will feel, think, and respond in kind…. They are unaware or indifferent that 
people can see their afflictions dissimilarly, suffer and feel pain in varying ways, and yet 
all be true and accurate in their distinct experiences of the same affliction…. We are not 
always seen as individuals, and we are not taken seriously enough often enough. How 
can we bridge this gap and build credibility and respect? What can we do as patients to 
help those in the medical community hear and attend to our needs?  
Much of contemporary qualitative research into illness calls upon medical practitioners to 
remember the human element of illness and disability (Charon & Montello, 2002; Kleinman, 
1988). Using narrative in qualitative research gives an extra dimension of meaning and 
nuance (Garro & Mattingly, 2000). This is becoming increasingly widely recognised and, 
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because of this, the insider perspective of illness is so important. One way in which the insider 
perspective on illness can be achieved is through illness narratives. 
2.4 What illness narratives are and why people write them  
As with any other type of narrative, illness narratives fall across a broad spectrum of intentions 
and serve many functions for their tellers and their audiences. The following section is 
intended to show what some of these forms of telling are and thereby to provide a context 
against which to read my autoethnographic narrative. 
In the wake of the crisis of representation, trying to do away with the Other, and the persistent 
tensions of the insider/outsider issue, it is very difficult to tell a story that is entirely one’s own. 
Narratives are social constructions and are chosen by the teller for various reasons and for 
various audiences (Weingarten, 2001). Frank (1995) explains the ripple effect: 
The shape of the telling is molded by all the rhetorical expectations that the storyteller 
has been internalizing ever since he first heard some relative describe an illness, or she 
saw her first television commercial for a non-prescription remedy, or he was instructed 
to ‘tell the doctor what hurts’ and had to figure out what counted as the story that the 
doctor wanted to hear….Whenever a new story is told, these rhetorical expectations 
are reinforced in some ways, changed in others, and passed on to affect others’ stories.  
(Frank, 1995, p. 3) 
Illness narratives are a genre of writing that developed as a response to the “othering” that 
many ill people experience. These narratives are narratives written by ill people themselves 
about their own experiences of their conditions, often as a way of reconstituting a damaged 
identity (Bury, 1982; Frank, 1995). As Benèt (1996) describes the situation above, one’s 
identity may sometimes be damaged by medical science and its narratives. Benèt maintains, 
as does Garro (1992), that an illness narrative can create space for the complexity of that life 
and the individual self’s experiences that medical discourse cannot. “A self that has become 
what it never expected to be requires repair and telling autobiographical stories is a privileged 
means of repair” (Frank, 2000, p. 135). Autobiography, however, is only ever really about one 
person. Some illness narratives allow us to confront our vulnerabilities as a community which 
is often ill-equipped to say the unsayable or to say what has not yet been said.  
While an individual’s story can serve to inform and encourage, an examination of illness 
narratives shows that they are complex texts that perform a number of often conflicting 
functions beyond their encouraging role. The majority of illness narratives concern previously 
healthy people becoming ill and then recovering, staying the same, deteriorating or dying 
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(some examples are Bauby, 1997; Ellis, 1995; Frank, 2000; Galvin, 2005; Hornbacher, 1999; 
Kolker, 1996; Sparkes, 1996; Woolf, 2002). Another significant theme in illness narratives is 
that of a person battling with a lifelong illness or chronic disability, which would take one of the 
three paths mentioned above.   
2.4.1 Illness narrative forms 
Emplotment in illness narratives has been analysed by researchers for various reasons. Some 
of the better known authors include Brody (2003), Charon and Montello (2002), Frank (1995, 
2002), Kleinman (1988), and Mattingly and Garro (2000). As with any other type of story, 
illness narratives tend to take certain shapes. Frank (1995) and Brody (2003) have explored 
narrative forms in their respective works. It is not my intention to do a similar study here. 
Instead I wanted to give a sense of how illness narratives function as texts, based on Frank 
and Brody’s work. Their narrative types overlap and I have chosen to use the terms that Frank 
uses for the discussion. 
There is a tendency in autobiographical illness narratives to create what Frank calls “restitution 
stories” (1995, p. 77-96). Frank explains that this tends to happen least in chronic illness and 
recent illness, and that this type of narrative occurs when people look ahead to how they think 
things will be, look back to how things were, or were within institutions. A reason for this might 
be that writers with more distance between them and the illness event see the experience 
differently and can afford to be more philosophical about it. Chronic illness and recent illness 
are still having a strong influence on everyday life. 
Frank describes two other narrative types: the chaos narrative and the quest narrative. Chaos 
narratives are “the opposite” of restitution narratives (1995, p. 97). These stories go against 
everything progressive about modern medical treatment and can cause anxiety, because they 
are without structure, hope and, by implication, meaning. Chaos narratives are “possibly the 
most embodied form of story” (Frank, 1995, p. 101), but in my understanding of narrative, just 
putting this type of narrative into words can create a sense of order that is not there. Chaos is 
the “unmaking of a world” (p. 105). States of chaos are a type of liminal space. Frank 
recommends honouring this space, but he also explains that people can leave this space once 
they have some distance from the crisis that dropped them into it. 
From this, my impression of chaos is that it is painful and needs to be left behind if one wants 
to have peace of mind. It is a state where one’s identity becomes unravelled. If one can leave 
it behind, one would develop a different identity to be able to re-enter society. If one cannot 
leave it behind, it is unfortunate. Chaos is one form of liminal space. I explain my views on 
liminality in the following chapters. For the purposes of this present discussion, there is 
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something about a chaos narrative that might have elements of the postmodern about it. 
Possibly it is not about the unmaking of a world, but the deconstruction of one. Of course, 
unmaking one presupposes that there is one in the first place. In some chronic illnesses the 
writer has never had time to experience a world free of illness. My story is one such story. 
Perhaps if I had developed kidney problems later in life my story might be more chaotic. As 
with any other narrative, a chaos narrative is only part of (a) larger narrative(s) in the writer’s 
life and in the broader community as a whole. 
The quest narrative has three stages: departure, initiation and return (Frank, 1995, p. 119). To 
my eyes this makes it liminal too. A person sets out on a quest by leaving behind his or her 
usual world, undergoes initiation and returns to their world, changed. In my case a quest 
narrative could be that I start out with kidney disease, have a transplant, experience wellness, 
then lose the kidney and return to being ill. As it is, my story involves leaving a world I knew 
and moving into a new one, with no intention of ever going back. It is more an adventure story 
or an emigration story, neither of which seems to have the same ritualistic feel. And yet mine is 
liminal too. I think the crux of the quest story is that one returns home – the quest is of limited 
duration. What happens if you have no home to return to? 
When this happens, anxiety results. Frank describes writers who die of the diseases they write 
about, such as Broyard, fulfilling a different type of function in this type of quest narrative, but it 
remains a quest to convey truth. He mentions his own alarmed reaction to blood tests that 
“require further investigation” (p. 136), a feeling with which I am familiar, even 20 years after 
transplant. I think this reveals that some of us can never really go home. We never really live 
there anymore. We might visit it, but really we are living in another place entirely. 
2.4.2 Remembering or rememberment 
Postmodernity, according to Frank, attempts to deal with chaos through a close examination of 
the particular (1995, p. 137). In addition to this, I find postmodernity a response to and 
recognition of the fragmented nature of life. It is more difficult than ever to sustain narratives in 
an age of such rapid change and in societies that are becoming increasingly complex and 
multicultural. We may not be able to capture such an experience, but we can allow our texts to 
reflect the fragmentary nature of life. A belief that narrative replicates life through verisimilitude 
may have its roots in quantitative research. Narrative does not replicate life. It cannot. It would 
take too long. It can, however, represent aspects of life performatively.  
Thomas-MacLean’s (2004) study of breast cancer patients’ narratives, using Frank’s narrative 
types, caused her to wonder whether the post-mastectomy narrative may be less a matter of 
restitution than reconstruction, since no true return to a preoperative state is possible (p. 
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1655). Reconstruction has an echo in surgical reconstructive practices, so the term may be 
especially apt for her field. I would choose the term “rememberment”, drawing on the concept 
of narrative repairing a damaged life (Bury, 1982; Frank, 2000). This would be what Mattingly 
(1994) calls therapeutic emplotment. Reconstruction has connotations of being able to 
reproduce events, while rememberment has more of a focus on the process of reassembling 
parts. The end product may not be what the original events were. 
One of the first times that a shattered life is put together after chaos is depicted in the Egyptian 
myth of Osiris being put back together by his wife, Isis, after being murdered and 
dismembered by Seth, the god of chaos. Osiris returns to be king, but he is now King of the 
Dead and lives in that world. He can no longer live in the world of the living. When he is pieced 
back together, he is changed irrevocably. You can never go home after being torn apart by 
chaos. Rememberment differs from remembrance because it implies making something new 
from bits of something old; not bringing back something that was lost.  
Despite this and despite the experiences that people writing about illness have had, illness 
narratives seldom address the rememberment aspect of writing. In many respects we live in a 
postmodern age, but popular writing does not (yet) truly reflect this. It often harks back to a 
premodern period and hence we should not be surprised that the protagonists in such stories 
are romantic heroes. In addition to this, illness narratives tend to serve specific functions, often 
one or other type of therapeutic emplotment (Mattingly, 1994). If narrative does indeed help 
one to heal a damaged life, it may be easier to write a story that reflects this aspiration, instead 
of one that performs one’s anxieties and tensions. In conversations with people when I have 
encouraged them to write their stories of chronic illness I almost always encounter resistance. 
When I ask why, my interlocutors explain that living through it was too painful and they are 
afraid of what they will see if they write the story. They do not hold out hope of narrative repair 
and they fear seeing through narrative how they really are now. 
Possibly for these reasons there are not many studies of the sort I am writing: what it is like to 
be ill for most of one’s life and then to become well and discover how this impacts on one’s 
identity. A possible reason for this is that “health” is seen as the norm, even in illness 
narratives which purport to challenge such norms. Another reason could be that such a 
narrative would not conform to the prevalent notion of a “comic plot”, nor would it align itself 
with the just world hypothesis (Lerner & Miller, 1978), where sin is punished and good 
rewarded. Couser (1997, p. 294) describes generic illness narrative as “so invested in 
recovery that the achievement of closure often takes precedence over consideration of what 
dysfunction feels like and how it alters self-perception”. Although the experience of being ill all 
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one’s life and then becoming well has been under-explored, it causes a profound change in 
identity and the new identity / identities that one forms are far from unproblematic.  
The number of illness narratives is growing, possibly partly because these days medical 
science can postpone death for a number of serious illnesses. Recipients of organ transplants 
share some characteristics with members of this society, in that, as a result of medical 
intervention, they have survived an illness that would previously have killed them.  
2.5 How researchers and people who have experienced renal disease write about it 
In this section I discuss some of the renal research and renal narratives that I find problematic 
or noteworthy. I am by no means implying that this is all there is to writing about kidney 
disease. Much of what is written is helpful and insightful, and comes at the cost of difficult, 
often painful experiences on the part of both renal patients and researchers (later in this 
chapter I discuss why Fox and Swazey (1992) left the field). I have found some of this material 
useful in conceptualising my own narrative. A particular piece of research comes to mind here, 
that of Crowley-Matoka (2005) whose recognition of what she calls “persistent liminality” 
helped me to see that such in-between states can indeed be written about. Eventually I was to 
conceptualise such in-betweenness differently from the way she did, by redefining the space 
as a separate (and legitimate) state of being. However, seeing that the people she interviewed 
about life post-transplant shared my sense of not belonging in the world of the well or of the ill 
facilitated the development of my own ideas.  
Reading Martin-Macdonald’s (2003/4) compassionate insights into the uncertainties of living 
on dialysis was also an occasion for self-recognition. I return to these in Chapter 5. Baines and 
Jindal’s (2003) collection of research articles on the lived experience of kidney disease and 
kidney transplantation offered some validation for some of the difficulties I experienced post-
transplant, despite my initial misgivings at the neo-Darwinian slant of their title, Survival of the 
fittest, which I feared was the harbinger of a book about why only the strong should be allowed 
to live. My fears turned out to be unfounded. Instead the book examined why life after 
transplant is fraught with complication and difficulties, some of which are not renal-related, but 
socio-economic. It made a strong case for better after-care and social and psychological 
support for transplantees. 
Most of the research on kidney failure is written by health care professionals for health care 
professionals and about patients (Richards, 2008). Most is necessarily quantitative. Often 
researchers pursue an on-going argument about what type of donation is best, or how 
potential donors could be approached (examples of this include Hippen & Taylor, 2007; 
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Landolt et al., 2003). Substantially fewer attempt to address the psychosocial or ethical issues 
(Richards, 2008). Just as medical discourse, for example, tends to separate the individual 
body from social context (Easthope, 1994), some qualitative research seems to disengage the 
individual’s body from its lived experience. The individual’s transplanted body or dialysing body 
becomes a symbol or metaphor for a larger social issue and, in so doing, ceases being itself.  
Scheper-Hughes (2007), for instance, has problematised the notion of organ donation by 
drawing attention to unethical donation practices (such as organ trafficking) and by using 
emotive terms (“tyranny of the gift” p. 507, “family bondage” p. 507, “sacrificial violence” p. 
509) to express the disquiet that organ donation often evokes. She cites extreme examples to 
illustrate her point that living donation is ethically challenging. While I think her focus on the 
rights of the donors is laudatory, I find her apparent disregard for the humanity of the recipients 
disquieting. The only times they feature is to illustrate selfishness and ingratitude. She seems 
unaware of the trauma and distress people undergo while waiting for a transplant, the pain and 
suffering of having one (Sque et al., 2006) and the moral dilemmas (Baines & Jindal, 2003) 
they have to face. Individual lives are not important in her work, only the big idea of ethical 
issues in organ donation. 
When I read her 2007 article I felt as if I, as an organ transplant recipient, had been rendered 
invisible. I had dysappeared, re-emerging monstrously (Leder, 1990; Shildrick, 2002) as an 
example of a greedy and ungrateful consumer revelling in the benefits of organ 
transplantation. I experienced it as a form of Othering. Whenever I read this sort of document, 
I am painfully aware of two things:  
1)  I cannot avoid reading it as an organ transplant recipient; and  
2)  I have to see that people like me are not the intended readers. We are the ones 
written about. We are the subjects. We are “them”.  
As a result my reading is transgressive and when I annotate the articles I feel as if I am writing 
graffiti. The readers are able-bodied people who have appropriate (or appropriated) academic 
distance from the subject. They are not involved. 
Often this type of analysis will be about organ transplantation in general, with a subsection on 
kidney transplants and will often be gloomy and strangely unpeopled manifestoes on the state 
of the world, using people’s lives to illustrate ideas (Richards, 2008): Kidney for sale by 
owner: Human organs, transplantation, and the market (Cherry, 2005), The courage to fail: 
A social view of organ transplants and dialysis (Fox & Swazey, 1978), Spare parts: Organ 
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replacement in American society (Fox & Swazey, 1992), and Twice dead: Organ transplants 
and the reinvention of death (Lock, 2002). 
Organ transplantation occupies a unique niche in illness and recovery. Organ recipients live 
because other people’s vital organs sustain them. Much debate has raged around the ethics of 
this type of intervention, particularly concerning the ethics of how the donated organ is 
obtained. Organ recipients’ stories are expected to show gratitude with an element of surprise, 
which could be a way of challenging any notion that they were hoping to profit from another’s 
death. The transplanted organ is constructed as a “donation” or “gift”, which gives it the quality 
of being freely given. Scheper-Hughes (2007) problematises this notion. Sque et al. (2006) 
completely reframe this gift as a blood sacrifice. Where does this leave the recipient?  
There is a wealth of literature about organ donation from researchers as varied as Joralemon 
and Fujinaga (1996), Lock (2002), Scheper-Hughes (2007), Sharp (2006), and Sque et al. 
(2006). However, examining this literature in full falls outside the domain of this dissertation. I 
shall further restrict my discussion to literature about kidney failure and kidney transplants 
only. As with other illness narratives and illness research, ESRD, dialysis and transplantation 
have been emplotted in certain ways in biography and in academic writing. 
2.5.1 The use of renal narrative in research 
Literature about renal disease tends to cover transplantation (the preferred therapy: McDonald 
& Russ, 2002; Wolf et al., 1999) and dialysis (the last resort that many people with ESRD end 
up on, even if they have had a transplant). For this reason I have discussed transplantation 
first. Dialysis is a gruelling experience. Dialysis patients are often exhausted and depressed, 
which can make them less forthcoming in interviews than excited patients who have been 
given a second chance at life (Fox & Swazey, 1992; Martin-McDonald, 2003/4). ESRD itself 
receives relatively little attention, as does long-term life after transplant. I discuss these areas 
elsewhere in my dissertation (Chapter 4 & Chapter 6). 
2.5.1.1 Transplantation 
As discussed earlier, most writing about organ transplantation is from the medical (or 
medicalised) perspective. Some writing is by people who have undergone transplants 
themselves.  These narratives tend to have “comic plots” that end with them on the brink of, or 
enjoying, a second chance at life (Etherington, 1991; Klug & Jackson, 2004). These “comic 
plot” narratives tend to read like ‘how to have a happy transplant’ guides that justify suffering 
and “explain” a second chance at life. They are not very different from the medical narratives 
in that they tend to have a generalising, linear approach to organ transplantation, are often 
focused on medical events and outcomes, thereby rendering simple the philosophical and 
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ethical issues, because these are not their focus. A number of key questions remain unasked 
in these narratives and a number of perturbations remain below the surface. This dissertation 
aims to address some of them. 
One of the perturbations I shall not be addressing is the very idea of transplantation itself. 
Either the kidney comes from a cadaver donor (as in my case) or from a living donor who is 
usually related to the recipient. In either event others (the donor, the donor’s family who must 
decide to donate the donor’s organs) undergo pain and suffering so that the recipient may live. 
This can cause recipients much guilt and ambivalence. 
In addition to this, transplantation is difficult to categorise. It is not like anything else. It is a 
therapy (but not a cure) for a fatal disease. It concerns combining the parts of one person with 
another. This is why it has been seen to “threaten the boundaries of self and life” (Couser, 
1997, p. 13; Faber, De Castell & Bryson, 2003; Helman, 2007). Fox and Swazey (1978) 
describe the importance of organ transplantation as lying “as much in [its] social and cultural 
significance as in [its] medical and surgical value” and it is to be associated with “key structural 
attributes of modern medical research and practice and with the values and beliefs on which 
these attributes are based” (p. 376): 
[T]ransplantation ha[s] been extensively practiced and brought to public notice at a 
historical juncture when there are indications the kind of modern society in which [it 
has] been developed is moving into a new evolutionary phase. Some of the 
metamedical phenomena and issues connected with … transplantation are integrally 
related to societal patterns and to alterations they are at present undergoing.   
Organ donation can be considered the ultimate gift (Fox & Swazey, 1992). The nature and 
implications of this gift are often discussed in qualitative research on organ donation, drawing 
on Mauss’s (1969) assertion that certain gifts are given in a way that is “in theory voluntary, 
disinterested and spontaneous, but [is] in fact obligatory and interested” (p. 1). In renal 
transplantation, organ recipients can receive organs from live donors. This creates a number 
of unique situations for both donor and recipient. Potential commodification (Scheper-Hughes, 
2007) of body parts is of great concern to people, because it raises issues around the nature 
and value of human life and death, the boundaries of the self and what Helman (2007) refers 
to as “cultural definitions of anatomy and physiology” (p. 44). 
With the exception of the research of Sque et al. (2006) and Scheper-Hughes (2007), 
transplantation tends to be described in the literature I have cited in this section as “a second 
chance at life”, although this contentious topic is viewed differently in different parts of the 
world (Helman, 2007). The insider experience of undergoing a transplant and adjusting to the 
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new organ is often discussed in contrast to a medical view that transplantation is just another 
form of dialysis. Fox and Swazey (1978), for instance, take this view in their discussion of the 
social significance of these processes and usually discuss them together. For the recipient of a 
kidney transplant or the patient on dialysis, however, the experience of these processes is 
worlds apart.  
Even so, transplantation tends to be seen in terms of the actual operation and its aftermath, 
although the object of transplantation is to give a person a new lease on life. In other words, 
transplantation is still seen primarily from the doctors’ perspective, as a medical procedure that 
they perform. For a person who has overcome a dread disease, a transplant is just the 
beginning of a whole new type of life. This life is seldom explored very far, because on 
average, transplants do not last very long. Even nowadays a third of all transplanted kidneys 
fail, die or reject before the tenth year (McCauley, 2004). I have not found any articles on the 
experience of transplantation after the tenth year and there is very little written about it by 
people who have had transplants. I have found nothing in book form. 
2.5.1.2 Dialysis 
Beyond transplantation, Fox and Swazey’s (1978) sociological interpretation of dialysis is a 
key text in non-medical renal research. The phenomenon of waiting for a kidney is an “activity” 
that takes up much of the time of someone on dialysis. Waiting can become a way of life. This 
needs to be further examined, because researchers tend to treat dialysis as a temporary 
measure, a type of liminal space through which one passes en route to health. For many 
dialysis patients this is not so. It is how they will live until they die. Sometimes they live very 
well, sometimes very badly indeed. Embodied experience is a crucial concept when discussing 
dialysis, but there is relatively little written on it, because most of the writing on dialysis is by 
medical professionals who have never been on it themselves.  
Research done by nursing practitioners tends to be the closest to trying to capture the lived 
experience and identity issues of dialysis patients (examples include Caress, Luker & Owens, 
2001; Martin-McDonald, 2003/4; Scott, 1999; Thomas-Hawkins, 1999; White & Grenyer, 
1999). Dialysis is a topic researched by nursing practitioners and nursing researchers, 
because dialysis nursing is a specialised area of nursing care. Nurses are not only responsible 
for the medical and sometimes technological aspects of dialysis, but also for sustaining 
workable and beneficial relationships with patients who are often long-term and who need 
various types of psychological and relational support. Because of this, nursing research into 
dialysis tends to be the result of long periods of working with such patients and observing their 
needs; it is also compassionate and insightful, with a realistic appreciation of what dialysis is 
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like. Their approach to research tends to be iterative and to their patients tends to be 
dialogical, showing an acceptance of different ways of knowing and understanding. 
In the literature beyond nursing, there are some surprising interpretations of what dialysis 
means: “People with renal failure epitomize Haraway’s (1991) notion of a ‘cyborg,’ in that they 
are both organism and machine” (Faber et al., 2003, p. 144). Haraway’s (1991) cyborg is 
much more than a person languishing on life support and her writing was not meant to be a 
manifestation of technophobia. Her idea of human and machine was more focused on the 
inevitable blurring between people and what we make. We are all cyborgs because the 
distinctions between who we are and how we construct our identities are blurred too. Helman 
(2007) explains this in terms of symbolic skin. When we use technology often (our laptops, our 
mobile phones, our motor cars), it becomes part of our identity and our way of interacting with 
the world. It can even become a type of life-line (as, ironically, one of Faber et al. interviewees 
described dialysis). Haemodialysis is essentially intermittent life support, not a permanent part 
of one, as a pace-maker or an electronic prosthesis is. It can indeed change one’s identity and 
one may very well feel dehumanised and governed by technology, but the alternative to 
dialysis is death. Faber et al.’s article does not consider this, nor does it address the instances 
of people finding dialysis works well for them. 
I find many other points Faber et al. (2003) make are valid, but they do not fully appreciate 
(and how can they?) what renal failure is like. At one level, there is nothing exceptionable in 
the claim by the authors that people on a renal diet want to eat “normal” food because they 
want to be normal. What the authors do not tell us is how they came to this conclusion. Did 
they obtain this information from the people they interviewed or did they “infer” it? If the people 
said they wanted to be normal, do the authors know what this means for the patients? Did the 
patients mean that they felt left out of normal things? That they missed the taste of some 
foods? That they felt jaded, bored and frustrated by a renal diet? Something else? A 
combination of the above? Did the authors infer from other information that the patients 
wanted to be normal?   
These distinctions may mean little to those who look into the world of renal failure from the 
outside, but they may mean a great deal to insiders. A renal diet has to be experienced to be 
believed. It is unpalatable, restrictive and depressing. It can be difficult to adhere to because 
restaurants and fast food outlets don’t cater for renal diets. Faber et al. (2003) don’t discuss 
what the diet involves, interestingly enough, and I picked up no indication that they had any 
insights into it. It is precisely through an understanding of the seeming banalities and 
unimportant details of unpleasant diets that we may understand more about the world of the 
person in renal failure. Outsiders may foreground the fact of having a life-threatening illness as 
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key to understanding renal failure, but along with any terrors concerning mortality and illness is 
the experience of blandness and boredom, an experience which seems to be overlooked in 
outsider accounts. 
2.5.2 “Independent” renal narratives 
I have called the narratives in this section “independent” because they are not part of a 
research project, not because they really exist separately from other narrative forms. They are 
very much like other illness narratives in that they take typical forms and seem to exist for 
typical reasons as discussed in earlier sections of this chapter.  
Most published illness narratives tend to concern illnesses that contain other sorts of cultural 
significance: tuberculosis in the nineteenth century, polio after the second World War and 
AIDS in the current era (Couser, 1997; Sontag, 1978) or organs that are “symbolically 
charged”, particularly the heart (Couser, 1997, p. 12). Some illnesses do not seem to get much 
exposure by comparison. Kidney failure is widespread and is always fatal unless treated and 
yet there are few narratives written about it. 
These narratives usually take the form of an illness damaging an identity and being exorcised 
by a miraculous gift (Richards, 2008). The titles, which I alluded to in a previous article, speak 
for themselves: Transplant: A new life after kidney failure – a dramatic personal account 
(Etherington, 1991), Perfect match: A kidney transplant reveals the ultimate second chance 
(Hermans, 2006). There is a quantity of self-help books on the topic: Your critically ill child: Life 
and death choices parents must face (Johnson, 2007), Coping with an organ transplant: A 
practical guide (Parr & Mize, 2001), Kidney dialysis and transplants (Stein & Wild, 2002), and 
brief anecdotes in some of the Chicken soup for the soul books (Canfield & Hansen, 2003; 
Canfield, Hansen & Reber, 2006). Most of these are written by care providers, friends and 
family.  
Lori Hartwell (to whom I return in Chapter 6) combines both personal narrative with 
motivational and self-help ideas, “to instill ‘health, happiness, and hope’ into the lives of fellow 
patients” (Hartwell, n. d). What makes her work different from some of those above is that it is 
more complex and written from an insider point of view. While focusing strongly on optimism 
and humour, Hartwell is all too keenly aware of the burden of chronic illness. Even so, her 
book fits very much into the motivational speaker mould, coming across sometimes as 
prescriptive and sometimes at the cost of simplifying some of her concerns. Very few of the 
abovementioned works go beyond the crises caused by organ failure and drastic medical 
treatment (Richards, 2008). 
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2.5.2.1 Two renal narratives that seem different, but are much alike 
In a previous article I discuss two renal narratives in detail (Richards, 2010). Through 
discussing the use of title and themes, I show that although they seem so different, one 
narrative being the narrative of a Hollywood fashion guru (Cojocaru, 2007) and the other the 
narrative of a very conservative religious family (Hermans, 2006), they are essentially telling 
the same story. They both adopt a narrative form not discussed by Brody (2003) or Frank 
(1995), the redemptive narrative.  
For different reasons both narrators describe the experience of traumatic loss of a vital organ 
as eventually revealing a hidden gain that allows the patient and his family to experience 
redemption from vaguely conceived sins. In other words, a benefit is seen to come from this 
suffering and the Just World hypothesis (Lerner & Miller, 1978) is allowed to persist 
unchallenged. The price paid is that the tensions and uncertainties in the narratives are never 
truly addressed or resolved so much as silenced. These tensions and uncertainties are what 
would make these texts (in Marcus’s terms, 1998) “messy” and inconclusive. The narrators 
cannot bear to confront them, possibly because they may fear an unspeakable truth that may 
flow from the realisation that sometimes traumatic losses simply happen and one’s life 
changes forever. Both narrators wrestle with the idea of liminality, especially persistent 
liminality (Crowley-Matoka, 2005) or sustained liminality (Little et al., 1998). 
In addition, both narratives make a strong connection between illness and pollution. Douglas 
(1966) argues compellingly that rituals of purity and impurity make sense of experience and 
allow people to atone for real or perceived pollution. In a conference paper (Richards, 2009a) I 
explained that narrative can play the role of such a ritual in contemporary society if it clearly 
delineates an “impure” experience, such as one that threatens what we need to believe (for 
example, that we can control our destiny) and brings an end to liminality. Perhaps after 
performing such a ritual one may be readmitted into society and leave one’s liminal condition 
behind. I saw the two narratives as such narratives. However, since then my views have 
changed on the usefulness of liminality as a way of describing in-betweenness in chronic 
illness. As I discussed in Chapter 1, a more useful term for this in-between state could be 
littorality. 
In the two narratives I discussed the theme of redemption shows the life after the event as an 
improvement. Illness and a changed body image have led to spiritual insight. Loss has been 
justified. This provides narrative closure, because describing life after suffering as better is one 
way of making that suffering meaningful. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it does rob the 
experience of complexity. A danger I see in a story that suggests life is somehow better or 
more profound after a catastrophic event is that it positions the narrator as a type of guru who 
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has unique access to the truth and makes the story a type of moral tale. To some extent, both 
Hermans and Cojocaru do this. For them illness and a changed body image are the price for 
insight, wisdom or spiritual growth that others seem to obtain without such devastation, 
although this is never discussed. Instead loss is rewarded and explained through narrative. 
This has profound metaphorical and moral weight, cultural resonance and provides the 
longed-for (and socially acceptable) narrative closure. 
This is an instance of how shared and acceptable narrative plots may lead to “sins of 
omission” and serve to silence and oppress (Ezzy, 1998). Such plots also affect the identity of 
the narrator, because they provide only a few acceptable roles for the narrator to play (Denzin, 
1995). For a narrative to be “so invested in recovery” that closure may become more important 
than “consideration of what dysfunction feels like and how it alters self-perception” (Couser, 
1997, p. 294) has profound consequences for illness narratives. Redemption through 
meaningful suffering can become more important than what happened when one was ill, or the 
nuances of whom one becomes afterwards. What often slips through the narrative cracks is a 
consideration of a persistently littoral identity. 
A new life requires a new identity, but by the end of both books the transplantees still vacillate 
between being ill and well, and between who they once were and who they hope to become. 
Cojocaru (2007) seems to recognize an underlying perturbation here and, by the end of his 
book, teeters on the brink of accepting that his life can never return to what it was. His life is 
messy and flawed and he sees that he needs to accept this. Poignancy infuses his final pages. 
He does not like this realization and will have to work hard to accept it. He has lost so much 
through his illness that even trying to see this as a gain (wisdom and insight into the true value 
of life) rings a little hollow. 
2.5.2.2 An anthology of renal narratives that serve various functions 
Hutchinson and McCallum’s (2000) collection of 100 patients’ stories shows more of the 
complexity of the experience, although the pieces are very short. Hutchinson is a medical 
doctor in their renal unit and he may have treated some of the writers. If the pieces were 
commissioned, the writers may have been asked to write on specific topics or to specific 
themes. Nonetheless, being able to read many fragments of people’s own interpretations of 
their experience and to see them side by side may allow one to see a more composite picture 
of the multiplicity of experience and the complexity of the situation. 
Their anthology is entitled Heroes. Denzin (2009) describes the pervasiveness of the romantic 
hero even in our (post-)postmodern age. Just as the researcher can set himself or herself up 
as the hero who can tackle and give meaning to the research subject’s life situation, the 
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narrator of his or her own story can reproduce “sad, celebratory and melodramatic conceptions 
of self, agency, gender, desire, and sexuality” (p. 125), casting himself or herself as the hero of 
a narrative that allows meaning to be produced in socially acceptable formats, such as being 
the agent of one’s destiny or looking on the bright side of life and making something good out 
of a tragedy. Older forms of heroism would involve having a fatal flaw and being destroyed by 
it. 
The narrators in the anthology do not, however, come across as conventional heroes, full of 
pluck and derring-do or tragic grandeur. They did not set out to be heroic and for the most part 
do not assume a heroic stance when writing. Their stories show a wide range of experiences 
and the effect of this disease on many different lifestyles. The editors’ choosing “heroes” for 
the title shows that their interpretation is somewhat different from what is generally understood 
as a romantic hero and in email correspondence with me they acknowledge that the idea of a 
“hero” is complex (T. Hutchinson, personal communication, 31 December, 2009). The object of 
the book was to help patients, partly by allowing them to tell their stories and be heard and 
recognised by being called heroes, partly to allow other patients to benefit by reading about 
their experiences (Hutchinson & McCallum, 2000). This can allow people to identify with 
others’ experiences and come to terms with their own. As Moses Baker, one of the 
contributors to the anthology, puts it: “If the information about myself and how I coped with my 
kidney failure helps other people, then maybe I’ll see myself as a hero” (p. 37). 
I found myself identifying with several of the stories in the collection, particularly that of Kristine 
Shapiro (Hutchinson & McCallum, 2000), an academic who is roughly my age and underwent 
her therapies at roughly the same time. She describes a sensation familiar to me of how time 
seemed to come to a stop and how she spent her adolescence in a “zombie-like trance” (p. 
167). The difference is that Kristine’s transplant did not work and mine did. Even today, all 
these years later, with a kidney that has remained uniformly normal for nearly two decades, 
reading a story like that makes me feel sick to my stomach. It gives me a type of psychic 
vertigo, which I discuss further in Chapter 6. For Kristine dialysis is a liminal space between 
transplants: “Despite the daily routine of dialysis, I can see beyond this vale to a future filled 
with purpose and meaning, laughter and joy” (p. 171). Her narrative ends at that point. If she 
does not get a transplant, this “vale” will be her life. She cannot afford to think about that. I 
shall return to this in Chapter 5. 
The weird in-betweenness of post-transplant life is often discussed in the anthology, as 
Laureen Bureau-Gould explains: “It took 10 years for me to realise that first of all I’m still sick” 
(Hutchinson & McCallum, 2000, p. 29). A tension exists between the “happily ever after” 
narrative (p. 107) and this one. I discuss this further in Chapter 6. Briefly, I can fully 
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understand why one would want the story to end happily, after so much suffering and dread. 
Also, one has to fight so hard for so long just to survive. It is mentally exhausting. After fighting 
so hard to keep going for (often) a long time, one develops the habit of fighting, looking on the 
positive side, being cheerful. It is self-defence. When one is so vulnerable, one cannot afford 
to make oneself more vulnerable. 
Nonetheless, many of the narratives still fall into recognisable patterns. Poignantly, a number 
of the stories are intended to fit into the pattern of “I was well, I fell ill, I had a transplant, and 
then I got well again” mould, even when the narrator does not recover. Illness is often 
constructed as a temporary space between two permanent ones. Another variant is “I lost my 
health, but gained so much more”. It is this variant to which Cojocaru (2007) aspires in his 
book-length narrative. Martha Zanna’s story (Hutchinson & McCallum, 2000, pp. 96-98) and 
that of Maurice Kouri (p. 75) show this. They both have a redemptive quality that, from my 
experience, can only ever be part of their story. 
Some of the narrators felt that they had done something to deserve suffering as they had: 
“when I was a kid I felt that God was punishing me ... because I was sick I was bad and was 
being punished” (Hutchinson & McCallum, 2000, p. 25, punctuation as in the original). Illness 
is often associated with pollution (Douglas, 1966; Richards, 2010). In kidney failure this is not 
surprising. Kidneys remove toxins from the blood and so it is easy to think of one’s blood or 
even oneself as dirty. This was a theme that I found in the narratives by Cojocaru (2007) and 
Hermans (2006) too. 
Some of the writers in Hutchinson and McCallum’s anthology see only the bleakness and loss 
and their narratives are tragic (Anonymous, aged 67, p. 32-33; Siméon Likhoray, p. 22; 
Georges Zeitoni, p. 83). Others know they can never go back to what they were before 
(Dimitra Boufonos, p. 18) and some remain ambivalent about their circumstances 
(Anonymous, aged 40, p. 104). A constant question is: Who am I now? Seeing that the 
miraculous surgery has not truly made you well or has even failed is very disturbing. Passing 
and concealment (Goffman, 1963/1990) can become a way of life, if you want to keep your 
job. Antonio Batista (Hutchinson & McCallum, p. 74) has learned that, although he is healthy 
enough and can work, if he tells people he is on dialysis they won’t employ him. 
People like us have no name, other than being “dialysis patients” or “transplantees”. We are 
not strictly speaking in remission and hence we cannot really be part of remission society. We 
are not healed. We need a narrative or narratives of our own that better explain our 
circumstances. 
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2.5.3 Writing the ill renal self through blending genres and roles 
A different type of text is created when researchers and renal patients collaborate. This is not 
unproblematic, however. Ideally such research writing should produce a new type of genre or 
at least a blurred or blended genre of the sort I discuss in Chapter 3. This sort of writing is 
designed to foreground people’s lived experience, while bolstering this experience against a 
theoretical framework and a research methodology. In this way ideally such research can 
reach a wide audience of people experiencing an illness as well as people studying it in 
various ways. Non-renal examples include K and Duncan (2006) and McDougall et al. (2006). 
Sometimes these blended-genre texts are the product of a group of researchers working with 
a group of patients. One of the articles I read was written by a renal patient, along with a team 
of researchers (Schipper et al., 2010). All researchers, Schipper (the renal patient) included, 
were psycho-sociological researchers. I was struck not only by the unusual combination of 
roles, but also by the situating of Schipper as first author. This is the only time I have seen this 
combination.  
The article is all about her experiences. Her co-authors invited her to write the article with 
them. Does this mean she has more of a voice? This is debateable, since the project was not 
initially hers and she was chosen for the position of co-researcher. Schipper is first author, but 
she remains the “patient” or subject of research under others’ gazes, as she has polycystic 
kidney disease. Privately I was saddened to realise that because Schipper is in the relatively 
early stages of ESRD, her experiences and perceptions of her condition are likely to change 
radically as her condition deteriorates. She does not yet know how difficult and frightening it 
will become. Cynically I can’t help wondering if she was chosen not only for her experiences 
and background in psychology, but also because she was relatively well at the time of writing 
the article. From experience I can tell you that a more debilitated writer would not be able to 
meet the demands of research. 
Allen and Hutchinson (2009) examine the role of patients and their experiences in research 
and conclude that this is a murky area, where the power balance is in constant danger of 
reverting to old situations, with the doctor or researcher choosing what will be studied, as well 
as what will be included, excluded, adapted and how. They go as far as saying that the power 
is always in the hands of the researcher or doctor. Allen and Hutchinson’s concern is with 
Participatory Action Research, but it can be extended to any research that uses patients’ 
experiences and narratives. Clearly this is an area that is far from unproblematic and there is a 
need for more research into blurred genres of this sort. 
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In the renal research I have discussed above, a blurring and blending of genres and roles 
does occur to some extent, because patients are allowed some voice in the texts. The 
researchers have generally worked hard to preserve the individual voices of their subjects and 
a certain element of dialogism is present. For instance, in articles where chunks of quotes are 
given, they are not entirely interpreted by the researcher for the reader, so the researcher may 
infer one thing from them, but they still leave space for the patient-participant’s meaning to be 
seen by a reader. Some visibility is better than none. 
Often, it would seem, the writing of academics and the writing of people living with illness may 
have enjoyed different ontologies, but they share the same epistemology. By this I mean that 
writers about illness come to writing about it for different reasons. Often that reason is 
personal, but it is not always one’s own lived experience of enduring a disease. The underlying 
theoretical framework, even in the work of non-academics who are telling their own stories, 
seems to be a way of putting a shattered life back together and regaining some sense of 
normality, or at least finding a reason that is good enough to account for their suffering. For a 
person who has experienced kidney disease, however, this may be only a partial way of 
addressing issues of identity and narrative. 
2.6 What I find problematic in these sorts of writing 
Medical and even sociological authors seldom investigate life after the transplant, when the 
medical crises are over. This is partly because many of them are not concerned with people as 
people, but rather with them as what they represent, or with medical processes and what they 
involve (Billig, 2011; Richards, 2008). Psychosocial writers straddle the concerns of medical 
writers and lay writers, tending to generalise their findings, even when avowedly performing 
qualitative research. 
Moreover, these researchers remain outsiders because they have not experienced kidney 
disease first-hand. When I read their work I become acutely aware of my own appropriation of 
the insider perspective and of the power that gives me because I have access to information 
that they cannot have. When I discuss their research in my dissertation, I do it through the 
insider “lens”. I have had to remain aware of the amount of anger I sometimes feel towards 
some of these writers, as I shall explain below. 
2.6.1 Persistence of the Other 
Despite the attention paid to the Other in qualitative research, a troubling tendency remains 
that narrators try to conceal themselves in their writing through distancing themselves from 
their subjects: “they recognise no hyphen” (Fine, 1998, p. 138). Some renal examples include 
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Faber et al. (2003), Russ et al. (2005), Scheper-Hughes (2007), and Sque et al. (2006). They 
do not recognise being part of the picture they are studying. They construct themselves as 
neutral, as representing a “God’s eye view” or “the view from nowhere” (Hollway & Jefferson, 
2000). But, as Rosaldo puts it, “there are no innocent ethnographers” (1989, p. 41). You are 
always involved. 
Most significantly for illness research, othering constructs a vulnerable and suffering other who 
fits the category “pitiable, victimized and damaged” (Fine, 1998, p. 139). It essentialises and 
polarises categories to aid with generalising about culture (Fine, 1998). It uses philosophical 
discourse to understand its subjects. The result is (crudely): people on dialysis are ill and 
disabled (and not like us). This is my primary issue with Faber et al. (2003), Fox and Swazey 
(1978, 1992), and Russ et al. (2005). People on dialysis are not necessarily (only) victims or 
objects of pity. Nor do they completely lack agency. 
As an insider I felt particular perturbation about Fox and Swazey (1978, 1992), despite their 
years of meticulous research into the experiences of people in ESRD and their seminal 
research about dialysis and transplantation. I am aware that they offer several other reasons 
for leaving the field, including medicine’s frequent refusal to accept limits and a willingness to 
view the human being as a collection of biological parts. This can lead to collusion with 
unethical organ procurement. Fox and Swazey’s concerns were with policies that allowed 
elderly and very ill people to have their deaths postponed, rather than with lived experience or 
with human lives that are affected by policy decisions. A large part of my insider disquiet, 
however, came from learning why they left the field after so many years of research. 
Ultimately, the vulnerability that Fox and Swazey saw rendered them vulnerable too. The last 
chapter of their last book, Spare parts, explains that, amongst other reasons, the individuals 
they met made them feel “sadder and more anxious” and caused them to question why people 
suffered so (Fox & Swazey, 1992, p. 201). At a certain level I am furious that they could leave 
and I cannot.  
I do not see many references in their work to what the patients wanted or needed, and the 
book ends with the record of their own distress as researchers. Their external and subjective 
view was ethnographic, involving participant observation, interviewing and analysis. They also 
use quantitative data to assess outcomes and costs. They claim to have “watched from the 
inside” as these tragedies unfolded (1992, p. 197), but they could not, by virtue of not being on 
dialysis themselves or having undergone transplants, truly be inside. They were not there as 
participants; they were there as observers. They are in some senses insider-outsiders, liminal 
in their own way, perhaps, not really being part of the world they inhabited for so long, but also 
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involved too deeply to be outside any longer. They know what they saw, but they do not know 
what the people whom they witnessed suffering experienced or thought.  
Faber et al. (2003) and Russ et al. (2005), in their studies on dialysis, experienced the same 
phenomenon, although on a smaller scale. Their biases (that dialysis was scary and 
unpleasant) prevented them, in my view, from fully understanding their interviewees’ 
statements. On one occasion an interviewee referred to his dialysis line as an umbilical cord 
(Faber et al., p. 160) and the researchers expressed horror that any adult should have to lead 
a life so dependent on external devices. I used to refer to my dialysis line as an umbilical cord 
too, not to demonstrate my lack of freedom, but rather to show how important it was for me 
and how much I appreciated it. I discuss this further in Chapter 5. My dialysis line made me 
feel safe. I expanded my life line image to include other life lines too, so I could feel like an 
astronaut or scuba diver, with a line to sustain me while I went on adventures and did exciting 
things I certainly couldn’t do without it. Images can be polyvalent. Qualitative research is often 
too linear or too literal about this. 
2.6.2 Liminality/littorality in chronic kidney disease  
Some questions remain in the literature on kidney failure and transplantation: How am I 
perceived? Am I “well”, am I “ill”, or am I part of a “remission society” (Frank, 1995)? Maybe 
transplantees need their own “society”. We are not in remission exactly. What is the difference 
for patients between dialysis and transplant, if, from a medical perspective, they are 
performing the same, or a similar, function (both are therapies, neither are cures)? How are 
transplant recipients seen? Am I seen as a type of Frankenstein’s creature, alive through 
being made up of dead people’s body parts? Am I seen as partly someone else or a whole 
new person?  It would seem that, true to postmodernism, the old binaries of well/ill no longer 
apply for organ transplant recipients.  
Underlying these questions is an issue that writers, both researchers and people who have 
experienced ESRD, are wary of discussing: coming to terms with a liminal life (Crowley-
Matoka, 2005). This is painful for people because it is difficult to define and does not allow one 
to escape back to being well, which has a better social status, fits better with medical 
narratives, and offers more security and legitimation. Trying to escape liminality can lead one 
either to identifying with being “ill” or with failing to be “well”, both of which are depressing, 
disempowering and not entirely accurate.  
Liminality, already difficult to cope with, is not always adequate to explain the experience and 
perception of kidney disease and transplantation. Because the in-betweenness of kidney 
disease can be long-term, other ways of approaching this may be more useful, because they 
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will allow people more scope in which to define their identities, come to terms with the 
complexity of their situations and to accept that an in-between identity is legitimate too. For 
this I prefer the term “littorality” for reasons discussed in Chapter 1. An existence that is liminal 
in part may also have elements of littorality and vice versa. For instance, Russ et al. study 
(2005) centres on older patients having death deferred by dialysis. I see the dialysis 
experience of these patients as littoral in that this is now their life, but it is also liminal in that 
dialysis is a waiting room before an inevitable death.  
2.6.3 The heroic trap and cultural reproduction 
The complexities of both littorality and liminality can be avoided in various ways, such as by 
falling into the heroic trap or by reproducing certain cultural norms. These challenges are 
apparent in the different genres (and even in blurred ones) (Denzin, 2009, p. 125). I think they 
are linked. Reproducing a medical narrative is remarkably easy to do, but it does not tell the 
complete story. Nor does a personal narrative, but it tells a story that a medical narrative 
cannot. One is not merely a vehicle for one’s condition, nor is one a statistic. Even if one 
avoids the medical way of looking at one’s own life, one may still reproduce other cultural 
phenomena. The Romantic hero and his/her story are cultural phenomena, for instance. When 
one tells a story in which one casts oneself as the hero overcoming odds, one is performing a 
cultural act, even a cultural ritual. With illness narratives one is often expected to take this 
stance. 
Of course one is a member of one’s culture and it is not wrong to enact its rituals. But one 
needs to be aware that they can circumscribe one. One of the chief reasons I waited twenty 
years to tell my story is precisely because I felt restricted by the types of story that were made 
available to me. One of these was of the hero overcoming odds. When I was ill this was a 
useful story, because it gave me something to fight for and I needed to fight to survive. I 
couldn’t afford the luxury of too much introspection, because that would lead to feelings of 
loss, fear and depression, and these would make it harder to survive. 
But a Romantic hero is an archetype and conventionally a man. I am neither. Yes, I fought with 
everything I had to survive and I succeeded (for now). I got the right kidney, it would seem. 
Like many heroic stories, my heroic story has an element of almost divine intervention. The 
gods must have smiled on me that day the nurse and social worker found me at university, in a 
pre-cell phone age, when I had no pocket pager and no schedule. They walked into the huge 
library intent on finding me and bumped right into me at the new book stand. It was fated. 
Heroes are special, you know, and deserve special treatment. 
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But in our weary, wary and cynical postmodern age, the nurse and social worker’s finding me 
despite the odds may not be miraculous, but rather a random coincidence. After all, why would 
I be more special than the 45-year-old arc welder or the single mother of three? I do not seem 
to have displayed any remarkable tendencies since then and have led a rather hidden life. I 
have not swum the Hellespont or slain any monsters. I have instead taken a job in academic 
development and live in a small house with a wooden fence, paying my taxes, my mortgage 
and my credit card instalments. 
Being the hero is in some ways akin to being the master of one’s fate. Being a master of your 
fate, however, does not require divine intervention. In fact, it seems to require the absence of 
it. People today like that. We like to feel we are beyond primitive and childish beliefs in such 
things, when instead we should praise our own wonderfulness. Nonetheless, being a master of 
one’s fate does require a belief that one is somehow different from the herd – special. For 
some reason, that specialness is never ascribed to random chance, but rather to one’s own 
choices and actions.  
Going through so much intense illness and its effects on my life, my family, my future, I found it 
extremely difficult to identify with either the heroic or fate-master stories. I did not feel as if I 
was the master of anything. I had become ill as a baby and had grown up in increasing 
debility, over which I tried to exercise control through following the prescriptions of my doctor 
regarding medication and diet. These delayed kidney failure, but could not prevent it. I did not 
really have much control at all and relied on doctors for medical advice. I didn’t have any 
special insights into my condition. I was faced by huge obstacles and had to engage in 
desperate battles to survive. But so were many other people. I fought alone. My mother fought 
too, but we had different battles to fight. She was fighting to save a child; I was fighting to save 
my own life. I did not choose organ failure and nor do the many other people who experience 
it. I was hardly unique. 
A methodology exists that can help one avoid cultural reproduction that can obscure the 
individual’s experience. Autoethnography concerns an individual in an environment. In 
autoethnographic narratives, the repair to the self does not only benefit the individual, but also 
attempts to address the communities to which she belongs.   
2.7 Coming to autoethnography  
2.7.1 Another way of blending genres and roles in illness writing 
Autoethnography is a methodology that allows the researcher to write about his or her own 
experiences. This has profound implications for illness narratives and research into the 
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experience of illness. Carrying out research in this way allows a transparent, reflexive way of 
coming to understand experience, narrative and identity. 
Some of the first instances I encountered of autoethnography were illness autoethnographies. 
Sparkes (1996) writes movingly of the changes in his identity as an active, able, sporting man 
to a man who seems not to fit in any longer after developing serious spinal problems. He 
discusses the relationship between his own private identity and his more public, work-related 
identity, and how these identities are partially constructed by others. He also illustrates the 
complexity of an identity that will forever more be in-between, as a man who is no longer 
considered “manly”. 
Cook (1996) playfully deconstructs medical discourse in order to re-author her life after serious 
illness and being subjected to invasive medical procedures. However, by the end of her 
chapter, she can only “talk back to power” (Pratt, 1992). She cannot truly reconstitute her 
identity and this is what makes her autoethnography so powerful: she enacts the 
powerlessness of the patient. Similarly Weitz (2001) gives a nuanced study of an experience 
so painful that it is almost unspeakable and Rier (2001) gives an account of being in high care, 
but unable to help himself.  
Ettorre (2005) does an autoethnographic study of thyroid disease, whose symptoms can be 
very nebulous. This methodology is useful in capturing that quality and her resulting disquiet 
and silent disablement. Temporary disablement is also the theme of Oakley’s (2007) 
philosophical study of her own experience of a badly broken arm, altered boundaries  and all 
the ramifications of that, social, professional and economic. While she does not describe her 
study as autoethnographic, it fulfils many of the criteria I discuss in Chapter 3. 
A book-length autoethnography, possibly the best-known autoethnography of all time, is Ellis’s 
(1995) Final negotiations: A story of love, loss, and chronic illness. Ellis uses autoethnography 
to trace a story of two lives irrevocably altered by a fatal disease. The length of her 
autoethnography allows her to explore many of the complexities and messiness of this 
situation in a way that a shorter study would not. 
Pratt (1992) describes autoethnographic texts as “heterogeneous” in that they can address 
two distinct groups of readers, the dominant group as well as the marginalised, and can be 
received “very differently by each” (p. 7). Possibly the type of narrative I am writing could go 
part of the way to closing the communication gap between the professionals, the patients and 
their friends and relatives in the renal impairment arena. It will show what it is like living the life, 
feeling the feelings, rather than taking notes about it. It will also show what it is like living in 
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limbo, with an invisible “disability”. I have chosen to use my own story because I do not want 
my voice mediated. I hope to avoid the “problems of appropriation that so often distort and 
undermine collaborations between nondisabled academics and ‘their’ disabled informants” (K 
& Duncan, 2006, p. 291).   
2.7.2 Autoethnography and postmodernism 
For someone to be able to explore what their identity may be and to be able to explore what 
their narrative is requires a certain type of emancipation that I find missing from many of the 
renal texts I have discussed in this chapter. This emancipation involves the putting aside of a 
particular way of reading and writing and accepting instead truly blurred genres, the power of 
the insider voice, the importance of process and recursiveness. Such a writer would need to 
accept that a narrative does not naively replicate a pre-existing experience, but instead 
interprets it and reinvents it, that the act of writing and indeed of reading is an experience in 
itself. In a world where people are surviving longer because of advances in medical 
technology, the misuse of terms such as liminality and littorality can prevent them from 
narrating their own lives and remaining narrated by others. This writer may have to accept that 
his or her existence is littoral, that he or she inhabits the third space (Garber, 1997). This writer 
would need to become a type of postmodern narrator. 
Some autoethnographers express concerns about postmodern (or poststructural) approaches 
to autoethnography. Some of these concerns result from postmodern criticism aimed at 
autoethnographic research. Ellis (2009, p. 231) describes postmodern criticisms as centring on 
autoethnography’s being “too realist” and therefore “naïve”. These critics ask for a more 
performative approach that leaves the self destabilised and problematised and texts messy, 
non-linear and contingent. An overtly postmodern approach to autoethnography is seldom 
attempted and even less seldom achieved. Often writers pay lip-service to postmodernism, 
while reproducing linear narratives. 
According to Barthes, “the logical continuation of structuralism can only be to rejoin literature, 
no longer as an ‘object’ of analysis, but as the activity of writing” (Barthes, in Jefferson, 1986, 
p. 112). Postmodernism continues this to one or other extent. However, this aspect of 
postmodern writing seems often to be forgotten. The process or production of writing is as 
essential to its meaning as its content and, indeed, the two are indivisible, because meaning is 
produced in how one says something. We can no longer naively assert that writing is merely 
the recording of data or the reflection of an external “truth”. Instead, a text is not only an 
artefact, but it also has an autonomous existence from the experience it is allegedly recording, 
so much so that a text can be seen as being a new type of experience altogether. This has 
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profound implications for qualitative research, but a particularly powerful impact on qualitative 
research into the experience of illness. 
Autoethnography poses some interesting questions about representation, especially in terms 
of subject/object dualism and mind/body dualism. In autoethnographic writing one can be both 
the subject and the object of a narrative. One can choose one’s identity to an extent. What 
does it mean to be both subject and object?  If one accepts one is both subject and object, is 
one not still subscribing to a Cartesian mind-body dualism? Can this situation be escaped from 
through writing about embodiment, or does this reveal that as autoethnographers, and indeed 
as representers and representees, our responsibility is to continue to question our position(s) 
and to avoid settling into complacency? If one can achieve this, as is hoped for in this 
dissertation, one’s subject/object positioning and mind/body relationship will remain dynamic, 
fluid and individual.  
In addition to this, writing the ill self when well allows one to incorporate otherness to express 
a more complex self. This self, a mixture of past and present, can express liminality and 
littorality residing in one’s identity and can also express dualism. As I shall demonstrate in 
Chapter 3, there are many ways of doing autoethnography. The narrative that emerges needs 
to convey accurately something of the experience. If the experience is non-linear, messy and 
contingent, fraught with ambiguity and in-betweenness, the narrative will likely be the same. 
2.7.3 Consequences of falling between stories 
Postmodernism has caused us to fall “between stories” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998b, p. 425). We 
have lost conventional and traditional narratives and we have not replaced them, because in a 
postmodern world we cannot. This reflects my problems in telling my own story and shows 
why I eventually, 20 years after the events that spawned it, started to tell it as 
autoethnography. 
I was never able to tell my story of what happened during ESRD, dialysis, transplantation and 
afterwards. Different types of story existed, such as the “organ transplant solves life’s 
problems” or “chronic illness took from me, but also gave back” or one or other type of 
redemption, restitution or tragic narrative. However, none of these glib-seeming types really 
were my story exactly. When I first had my transplant, people I knew wanted to know what had 
happened and so I told them in terms of the narrative with which I was most familiar – the 
medical narrative of my doctors that they recited over me for so many years – about creatinine 
levels, blood pressure, prognosis. But this story seemed to lack something significant: me. I 
soon learned that certain audiences expected certain stories, the sorts I have mentioned 
(Weingarten, 2001).    
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But still I felt dissatisfied with my options, constrained by what I could and could not say, but 
unsure of how to tell anything else as I had seen nothing else. I was between stories myself, in 
a type of littoral zone, or maybe even a liminal one, because I withdrew from telling stories in 
order to prepare to return to telling them. 
I also withdrew from the transplant community, determined to live my life free of the constant 
reminder of my condition. I learned how to pass as “normal”. This was a gradual decision, but 
made easier by my looking “normal”, which not all transplantees do. I forgot about being a 
transplant recipient and the long years of medical treatment, despite taking my medications 
every day and attending clinics at Groote Schuur, the main state-owned hospital for Cape 
Town. That was “medical stuff” in my mind, not my story, but a type of emotional tax I paid in 
small amounts every day and in one large submission once a year, for being normal. I 
compartmentalized my medical condition. 
But nothing in life is compartmental. One day the compartment I had attempted to erect burst 
open. That was the day I discovered I had not qualified for health insurance, as I explained in 
the Foreword to this dissertation (see also Richards, 2007). My paradigms exploded and so 
did I. It was nearly 20 years after my transplant and I found that I was still between stories. But 
this time something was different: after all those storyless years of silence, I found I could not 
stop speaking. I was like Rosaldo (1989, p. 49), learning about grief and a head-hunter’s rage 
against a backdrop of Ilongot culture: “One day the fog lifted and the words began to flow: It 
seemed less as if I were doing the writing than that the words were writing themselves through 
me”. 
 
My dissertation takes up the challenge of bringing an insider’s view to kidney failure, dialysis, 
transplantation and life afterwards. The aim in doing this is to show in more detail how a 
person who has been through this complex situation experiences it and how this affects her 
identity, as well as to show how this might be expressed in writing. A preliminary narrative I 
wrote a few years ago had already shown how much there is to explore in terms of a post-
transplant experience of identity (Richards, 2006). A pattern of seeking an appropriate and 
satisfying identity has emerged in recording only a few of my own post-transplant stories. A 
strong sense of being in limbo or, at any rate, in a liminal state, runs through the preliminary 
document, combined with a sense of frustration and recognition of not being categorisable. 
This is to be expected in a narrative about the experience of an orphan disease in an orphan 
genre. I aim to bring some of the themes from my initial narrative on post-transplant life into 
these sections about living with a chronic illness from infancy, kidney failure and dialysis. 
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This type of narrative approach would be more accessible to lay people and would allow them 
access to other important resources as they attempt to make sense of their situations. It would 
fall somewhere between narratives such as Zip, zip, my brain harts (McDougall et al., 2006), 
which is aimed primarily at a lay audience consisting largely of care providers, and Siyabulela 
K’s story, which is aimed at an academic one (K & Duncan, 2006). Both of these narratives 
perform a type of advocacy that is essential in developing a more holistic environment for 
people with disabilities. Neither, however, concerns kidney failure, transplant or recovery from 
disability. Zip, zip, my brain harts (McDougall et al., 2006) is a story about children with 
disabilities and how this impacts on the family, while Siyabulela K’s story (K & Duncan, 2006) 
is a collaboration between a man who has schizophrenia and an academic who is writing 
about it. 
I began my quest in a utopian mood, not to say a Romantic one. I was soon to discover my 
mood changing to one of irony as I found myself replicating the very heroic structures that I 
scorned in others’ stories. I needed to study this phenomenon. As I pursued an investigation of 
how narrative worked, and specifically how illness narratives functioned, I discovered 
autoethnography. 
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CHAPTER 3: AUTOETHNOGRAPHY AS METHODOLOGY / 
METAMORPHOSIS / MÉTISSAGE - WRITING IN THE THIRD SPACE 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the things I want to achieve in my research is a narrative suitable for a life-long 
condition, where littorality, disjunctures in identity and mixed genres are acceptable. In short, I 
want a narrative that reflects my experience as a long-term, kidney transplant recipient. I also 
want to understand why my narrative looks as it does and to be able to accept the ironies, 
contradictions, tensions and paradoxes. I want to be able to capture the complexity of such a 
long-term experience. I have not seen this represented anywhere in any of the literature I have 
read. I found this disquieting because it made me feel as if I were invisible and unheard. More 
chillingly, it made me feel like an endangered species. I have always been aware of the length 
of time people keep their transplanted organs (and their lives). We renal folk love numbers – 
our creatinine levels, the length of time we’ve had our kidneys (the new ones). I have not been 
able to avoid noticing that most people do not seem to keep their kidneys very long.  
There are relatively few of us who have kept our kidneys for more than a decade, even fewer 
for more than two. In fact, when I looked up articles on long-term kidney transplantation, I 
found few in all my research and in them “long-term” is generally defined as five to nine years 
(McCauley, 2004; Stegall, et al., 2011). It seems not enough of us are around after that or too 
few kidneys have survived to warrant further research. I stopped looking for more information 
at that point, I realise now, with the same dreadful cheerfulness (“Oh well, never mind, on to 
better things!”) I assume in the patient support group when one of my friends no longer comes 
to meetings. I no longer ask where they are. I learned long ago on dialysis that their absence 
usually means they are dead and that the staff won’t always tell you what happened. Research 
seems to indicate by its absences, hiatuses and silences that there is nothing after nine years. 
A person who has survived a life-threatening illness for so long, who has a second chance at 
life, can feel she is living on borrowed time. A person whose life is filled with texts can feel 
disquieted if her story is nowhere among them. “Life comes to us in the form of stories, 
articulated through storytelling” (Gubrium & Holstein, 1998), after all. If you have no story, you 
may even feel that you have no (legitimate) life. Superstitiously I decided that if I could write 
my story and understand it in intellectual terms, in an academic context, even tell it to others, 
have it become part of the body of knowledge, I would not feel so endangered. My longer story 
and I would gain a type of credibility because we would be endorsed by research. Previously, 
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as a new transplant recipient, I had been hindered in telling my story because my story did not 
fit with others I had heard and therefore seemed as if it had no place or right to belong 
(Garden, 2010). Being able to tell a story that reflected my experience and not one approved 
of by others whose circumstances differed from mine was something I hungered for. 
For one thing, I noticed during my reading that liminality is a problem for people experiencing 
illness, either chronic or acute (Cojocaru, 2007; Crowley-Matoka, 2005; Little et al., 1998). I do 
not find liminality disturbing; I find the incorrect use of the term disturbing. In a chronic, life-long 
condition, an identity in flux and inhabiting a littoral zone is simply how things are. I have 
become used to it over the past two decades. Now it is simply who I am. I do not battle with 
the subjunctive mode (Good & Good, 1994). I maintain that sometimes and at some points in 
chronic illness, one should embrace one’s in-betweenness, rather than trying to do away with 
it, and instead inhabit that littoral zone, because that is how one’s life is. 
And so I chose autoethnography as a methodology for very specific reasons: it would allow me 
to write an academic and personal narrative together; it would allow me to work with liminality 
and littorality; it would allow me to consider for the first time the ironies, contradictions, 
tensions and paradoxes of my story. This is partly because autoethnography is not only a 
methodology, but also a means to changing one’s identity by occupying an alternative space 
from the binary positions that are usually available to one in a world where one is other than 
the norm. 
3.2 Autoethnography as I use it in my research 
Methodology is a claim about the significance of the theoretical underpinning of the study, not 
necessarily a recipe that allows a study to be replicated or that separates researcher from 
object of research, which is not possible in postmodern research (Clandinin & Connolly, 2000; 
Clough & Nutbrown, 2007; Jones, 2005; Nelson, 2001). Autoethnography is a type of conduit 
for a consideration of a certain type of experience. In some ways the work of autoethnography 
is similar to that of bricolage.  
Far from generalising findings, the bricoleur is more concerned with specific findings and what 
these reveal about a specific study. Turning autoethnographic method or bricolage into dogma 
would be tantamount to what Chamberlain (2000) refers to as methodolatry and would run 
counter to its theoretical underpinning. Sensitivity to the context of analysis and the specific 
ontological and epistemological conditions that produced it can only derive from dialogical 
research (Kincheloe, 2001). Any truly reflexive research is dialogical even if paradoxically it 
contains only one voice. 
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Autoethnography is the focus of this chapter, in the sense of how and why narrative would be 
used as a strategy, tool or process, rather than a way of collecting data when researching and 
writing illness narratives. Autoethnography takes different forms and I shall discuss how 
various researchers see different types of autoethnography in order to position my own views. 
In addition to being able to take different narrative forms, autoethnography can take forms 
such as performance autoethnography, poetry, sculpture and more (Denzin, 2009; Martineau, 
2001). I cannot discuss all variants of autoethnography in this chapter. I shall restrict myself to 
written texts. I discuss the rationale behind autoethnography, its advantages and limitations, 
and its relationship to writing about illness, as well as my own approach to autoethnography in 
my doctoral research. For the purposes of this chapter I shall restrict myself as much as 
possible to a discussion of autoethnography in research about illness. The field of 
autoethnography is large and varied. It has proven particularly useful in health research and 
education studies. 
Inherently postmodern, autoethnography is a tricky subject and a subtly textured term. It is 
protean in its practical applications. Couser describes it as “a slippery, ambiguous, but useful –
indeed indispensible – term” (2009, p. 93). I see autoethnography as a blend of hermeneutics 
and bricolage: “If hermeneutics came to connote the ambiguity and slipperiness of textual 
meaning, then bricolage can also imply the fictive and imaginative elements of the 
presentation of all formal research” (Kincheloe, 2001, p. 680). Part of autoethnography’s 
slipperiness lies in its deceptively everyday aspect: telling stories about human experience. 
Another part of its difficulty lies in its postmodernity. Possibly more than any other qualitative 
methodology, it is by its nature a conduit between different aspects and methodologies of 
research. This makes it intrinsically postmodern. If researchers do not appreciate what this 
means, they will not understand how it can and does function.  
The core of this chapter concerns the conceptual changes brought to narrative in the 
postmodern era and includes the work of Richardson and St. Pierre (2005), Ellis (1995, 2004, 
2009) and Frank (1995, 2000, 2002, 2007), amongst others. Most importantly, 
autoethnography changes a basic perception about research. The traditional distinction 
between writing (as a means of recording) and fieldwork (as a means of researching) is the 
underpinning of much research (Clough, 1998). In the spirit of Van Maanen (1988), 
Richardson and St. Pierre (2005) problematise this distinction, showing that writing, far from 
being part of data tabulating, is very much part of the discovery process of research itself and 
that writing affects the meaning of one’s ideas, a far from transparent act. 
The personal story as a source of experiential data has caused a great deal of perturbation in 
qualitative research. This perturbation stems partly from the recognition that personal 
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narratives do not offer “unmediated access to experience”, nor can experience be conveyed 
“in some pristine or authentic form” (Gubrium & Holstein, 1998, p. 163). That is not the 
purpose of an autoethnographic narrative. Rather, it can be seen as a form of social inquiry 
with human actors in a human context, rather than being about human action (Larson, 1997). I 
write from the premises that an understanding of that narrative is a cultural act and is shared, 
that no story is independent of its culture or of a larger narrative. 
Autoethnography is a quest, whether for self-esteem, identity, recognition or anything else.  
This quest is, however, a specific sort of quest that involves not only going forward, but also 
going back and looking again – re-searching – and for this reason, an autoethnographic 
narrative may not take the typical form of a quest narrative as described by Frank (1995) and 
others. Autoethnography is highly concerned with self-perception. This aligns it with current 
trends in disability studies (preventing othering, empowerment, visibility, having a voice).The 
reflexivity of the researcher can be difficult to explain or convey (Hertz, 2006; Mayan, 2009). Is 
this useful to research? I find it is essential, but how you convey it can affect the seriousness 
with which your work is viewed.  
Because the quest is an exploration through writing, researchers have been suspicious about 
postmodern hermeneutics, wondering whether anything lies beyond textual prank-playing and 
pyrotechnics (Marcus, 1998). They have seen that writing can conceal rather than reveal. 
Texts can “enchant”, concealing information and seducing the reader. They can seem to offer 
more than they actually have to offer, like access to truth and understanding. They are like 
faerie gold or a changeling child, who is not quite what he appears to be. One may forget that 
long ago changelings were not evil tricksters. Once faerie children and human children could 
change places for the betterment of both their races (Anderson, 1998). Likewise, people may 
forget the purpose of written texts. They are not meant to stand for external reality or to be the 
truth. They are a means of moving towards it. 
3.3 Postmodernism, autoethnography and identities in flux 
The goal of qualitative research is not generalisability or quantifiability. Instead, it is to offer a 
more complex, deeper, textured view of human subjectivity, to capture some part of human 
experience and to reflect on it, to try to understand its philosophical underpinning (Denzin, 
2009; Goodall, 2008; Hollway & Jefferson, 2000; Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005). The 
postmodern period has forced researchers to reconstitute the research subject (Hollway & 
Jefferson, 2000) and even themselves and their relationship to that subject (Fontana & Frey, 
2005; Hollway & Jefferson, 2000; Van Maanen, 1988). Hollway and Jefferson describe the 
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type of nuance that is required as “everyday subtlety” that is often lost from research (2000, p. 
2) and whose loss can result in essentialising categories. 
A goal of postmodern qualitative inquiry is to try to avoid essentialising categories. Certain 
postmodern, so-called postcolonial researchers and writers, such as Glissant (2002), 
Mudimbe-Boyi (2002), Pratt (1992) and Spivak (1988), would very strongly support 
questioning authority and trying to reveal and destabilise power structures, overcome dogma 
and question the status quo. Ultimately seeing the common humanity between researcher and 
researched is like understanding that as important as the country club is to “us”, most people 
do not belong to it because they are kept out, with all that entails about access to power and 
resources. Recognising that allows researchers to see that people are not resources or 
subjects, but fellow minds, with experiences and insights to contribute. These days blurred 
borderlines and borderlands are almost unavoidable in the light of the massive social and 
economic changes in the world and the realisation that research can play an important part in 
giving a voice to disenfranchised people and redressing wrongs (Denzin, 2009). Some 
researchers inhabit both the world of the researcher and the researched. I am one of these. I 
am studying my own experience and I am doing it not only to empower myself, but also to 
empower others who have lived in the strange post-transplant world. We need other stories 
and we need to tell them. 
Postmodern narrative inquiry is especially concerned with the “third space” in and between 
polarities or binaries: researcher and researched, subject and object, past and present. 
Beyond “knowing how” and “knowing that”, there is a third kind of knowledge, “knowing what it 
is like” (Goodall, 2008, p. 14). Narrative creates “an alternative pathway to meaning” that is 
both “imaginative and analytical” (Goodall, 2008, p. 14). For Goodall, narrative is the 
epistemic. The quest for knowledge becomes the act of knowing. Many autoethnographers 
would agree (Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Poulos, 2006; Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005). Some 
would not (Chang, 2008). 
A movement from scientific objectivity to radical subjectivity is the natural progression in this 
type of research. There are varying degrees of subjectivity in postmodern research (Ellis & 
Bochner, 2000; O’Byrne, 2007). Postmodern autobiography problematises the “notion of the 
coherent, individual self”, while postmodern ethnography problematises “the realist 
conventions and objective observer position” of traditional ethnography (Reed-Danahay, 1997, 
p. 2). Autoethnography combines aspects of both of these. 
Autoethnography has the potential to be creative and flexible because, like bricolage, it can 
blend different qualities of research in different ways. It can help create a non-linear aspect to 
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a linear academic argument. The non-linear aspect may be a more accurate representation of 
how life works. Wyatt’s (2008) autoethnography about loss illustrates this performatively, 
through being itself a recursive, fractured and fragmented text. The very act of making a story 
(and, indeed, living one) concerns structure and antistructure in Turner’s (1969) sense. 
Structuring a story is necessary for the story to make sense. The story’s centre and 
boundaries, the way the different parts fit together can sometimes even be seen as mimetic of 
the structure and antistructure that it represents. A fragmented story depicts a fragmented 
reality. Illness can, after all, be seen as “a series of disconnected shocks” (Broyard, 1993, p. 
19). Broyard did not like this, but I do. If the experience is a series of disconnected shocks, 
then it should be shown that way. In the chapters that follow, this is part of what I aim to 
capture. 
The everyday subtlety of life is difficult to capture. Autoethnography has allowed researchers 
to research elusive experiences or unspeakable experiences: teenage motherhood (Muncey, 
2005), loss of a home to a fire (Lollar, 2010), loss of a partner to a slow death (Ellis, 1995), the 
experience of persistent “minor” illness for an older woman (Ettorre, 2005), the change in 
masculine identity after a sports injury (Sparkes, 1996). What all these stories tell us is that 
people battle to understand profound changes to their identities and that their new identities 
can seem liminal for a very long time.  
Autoethnography can help writers to do this by blending the personal with the public, and the 
emotional with the intellectual. It is one thing to know that you suffered. It is quite another for 
that suffering to have meaning. The academic component of autoethnography can take a 
researcher beyond believing that his or her story has meaning to seeing what that meaning 
may be ontologically and epistemologically. It can help situate the story in a bigger picture and 
give it a sense of proportion. It can help a researcher to see how and why their story may have 
developed and what its influences might have been. Seeing that can help one to develop one’s 
story further (Bruner, 1987; Bury, 1982; Ezzy, 1998; Frank, 2000; Sarbin & Kitsuse, 1994) and 
to allow one’s theories to evolve. Sometimes seeing that your story is fractured can in itself be 
helpful. Understanding a story goes beyond intellectual appreciation of it, however. 
Autoethnographers explain this in different ways (Chang, 2008; Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Pratt, 
1992; Reed-Danahay, 1997). 
Writers have long recognised the restorative properties of narrative in illness and how 
narrative can heal a damaged identity (Brody, 2003; Bury, 1982; Frank, 1995, 2002; Kleinman, 
1988). I contend that narrative can and, arguably, should do more than this. Immediately after 
acute illness and medical crisis, a narrative can serve a ritual function of creating and defining 
a liminal space, allowing the narrator to exit an old identity that no longer applies to them and 
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to learn to inhabit a new one that they might not have expected. However, I contend that a 
different set of problems and narrative needs await a person who must live and has lived with 
a long-term chronic condition or with (in my case) a form of therapy that is not a cure, but that 
allows me to function like a healthy person. The narrative forms that work so well in other 
circumstances (Brody, 2003; Frank, 1995) no longer apply. Twenty years post-transplant I am 
not trying to form a new identity in response to crisis, repair a damaged one or obtain closure. I 
have, over the years, gained an identity of my own that no longer fits categories – or narrative 
types – imposed by others. I have my own story (or stories) now and I also have my own 
meanings and routes to healing (Hovey & Paul, 2007). 
3.4 Métissage: Telling stories in the third space 
The first version of this chapter began as a description of what autoethnography is and ended 
as a patchwork quilt of ideas drawn from different disciplines. Perhaps a soup or salad might 
be more accurate, because it is not intended as something to cover something else, but rather 
as a specific flavour compounded of many other flavours, a bricolage. I was at first alarmed by 
my strange concoction and explaining it to myself as a postmodern, fractured text in many 
voices did little to settle my unease. So I redrafted it in various ways, intending to find an 
underlying structure to my ideas on autoethnography. The problem with that sort of intention is 
that one tends to find what one is looking for. The structure that now exists may be entirely 
artificial and not a true representation of the evolution of my ideas on autoethnography as 
methodology. However, in the course of my struggles I encountered a useful term. 
A term that captures the process of permanent becoming and changeability in place of fixed 
being is métissage (sometimes spelt “metissage”) (Glissant, 2002). It is a term that Glissant 
used initially to give an identity to Creole people. Previously they tended to be represented as 
deriving from various cultures, but not having an identity of their own, a “defective” 
representation of the “parent” cultures. Métissage allows an alternative identity to emerge – a 
positive Creole identity, which comes from and yet does not slavishly follow its parent cultures. 
In the same way, you share qualities of your mother and your father, but are not a replica of 
either. Instead you are your own person. Such people occupy an alternative space of 
possibility, the result of blurring binaries, a type of third space (Garber, 1997). Creolisation is 
not the mixture of two things, but the creation of something “new, unheard-of and unexpected” 
(Glissant, 2002, p. 291). Lionnet (1989, p. 14) shows some of the implications of this, when 
she describes “the site of undecidablity or indeterminacy” as eluding categorisation by its 
dynamic nature and its ability to deconstruct and resist “symbolization within a coherent or 
homogenous conceptual system”.  
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I see my academic and narrative position as that of a Creole: I am researcher and researchee. 
Associated with this recognition of my Creole status is the question: what is the academic 
value of my work? What saves it from being “pointless self-analysis” (Goodall, 2008, p. 39)? 
Personal reflection must be supplemented by epistemological reflection (Goodall, 2008). Only 
together can these types of reflection really allow a new identity to emerge. How much of an 
argument should there be and what form should it take? What about the process of 
autoethnography?  What does it reveal?  Should this be discussed or revealed in the course of 
one’s argument? Concealing the process seems to send one back to the very academic forms 
one is trying to escape by blurring genres. 
Métissage is not just a state of being, but also a practice. This is one way in which one might 
practice bricolage and autoethnography, because practices of métissage can allow a critical 
approach that avoids essentialism and anti-essentialism, by acting as “textual and 
performative strategies in the unsettling of any reductive politics of identity” (Zuss, 1995, p. 
170). The focus on essentialising can be replaced with a focus on relationship(s) and 
multiplicity (Zuss, 1995). One instance is the multiplicity of the narrated self. Portraying the self 
as contingent and multiple can disrupt narrative form and destabilise positions of power in a 
text, creating a tension between self-as-subject and self-as-object, in the context of changing 
experience and knowledge (Zuss, 1995). This dialogical approach to selfhood and identity in a 
text can be an advantage in understanding what an experience, particularly a long-term one, is 
like and how it is complex. Using a narrative methodology of this sort allows a researcher to 
mix, blur or erase the difference between the emic (insider position) and etic (outsiders’ 
stance) and can produce a deeper understanding of what one is studying (O’Byrne, 2007). 
This is similar to Kincheloe’s (2001) conception of bricolage, especially his explanation of how 
the slippery nature of hermeneutics combines with fictive and imaginative presentation. 
In addition to this, autoethnographic writing creates a third space between academic and 
personal biographical writing. This can be seen as type of liminal space, but it can also be 
seen as métissage. Does métissage help address liminality? Is it especially suited to 
liminality? Is it a liminal state or a state that appears liminal but is actually different? Is it a state 
of inbetweenness/becoming? It is all of these. However, I would say that métissage creates a 
space for liminal identities rather than resolving them. A third space is useful in telling personal 
stories of illness, because it makes space for the liminal and for one’s change in identity, from 
researchee to researcher and back again, from a person who may have belonged to the 
kingdom of the well and has now emigrated, from a person who has changed through doing 
the research into something she never dreamed of being. 
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A blending of writing cultures can allow one to be more expressive of one’s situation and to 
capture one’s experience in a more three-dimensional way. For my part, I consider the textual 
nature of autoethnography and the act of writing as a type of métissage and a type of third 
space. The body of the text itself symbolically takes the place of experience, possibly even of 
the body of the person writing about their illness. Reinscribing a story is not a small thing. It is 
a powerful ritual of (re)creation. It builds a bridge between writer and reader, past and future, 
experience and understanding, an old identity and a new one (Pratt, 1992; Trinh, 1991; Zuss, 
1995). 
In Glissant’s words (2002, p. 195): “What might writing mean today? …it may be, above all, a 
matter of looking for the frail but trustworthy link between the wild diversity of the world and the 
balance and knowledge we desire to have.” For me the key words are “desire to have”. This 
recognizes that what we want may remain always, already out of reach, but through writing 
about it, we might write towards it. If we write ethically, we would acknowledge that this is what 
we are doing, thereby allowing the story to remain in flux and dynamic, and to recognize that it 
is part of an on-going, larger story. All research is iterative in various ways, but postmodern 
research, and especially autoethnography, makes this aspect of knowing explicit by the way in 
which the written text is structured, drawing attention to its self-referential qualities, 
recursiveness and fractures or disjunctions. Hence writing itself becomes a method of inquiry 
(Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005) and research becomes re-search and re-vision. 
For these reasons the writing aspect of autoethnography cannot be overlooked. 
Autoethnography is not a matter of transcribing data or even really of representing it, but of 
interpreting it and synthesizing it. In this it performs a key function of qualitative research 
(Chamberlain, 2000). What does it mean to write? It means, amongst other things, to take note 
of, to describe, to record, to inscribe, to fix, to control, to mediate, to authorise. This is an 
inescapable part of writing, but that does not mean a researcher should be unaware of it. 
Awareness of this can to an extent create a type of deconstruction, reflexivity and resistance to 
discourses that control, legitimate, legislate and mediate ideas. “Autobiographical métissage is 
a conscious textual act that resists the fixed categories and ideological closure of racial, ethnic 
and gender identities and their performance within a culture” (Zuss, 1995, p. 168). 
3.5 Categorising autoethnography 
On a simple level, autoethnography is telling a story that involves the writer as a character, for 
example, as a central character who narrates, or as a peripheral observer who is nonetheless 
involved in what unfolds. It is the way that researchers represent their everyday life (Denzin, 
2009). Chang (2008) describes autoethnography as “a research method that utilizes the 
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researcher’s autobiographical data to analyse and interpret their cultural assumptions” (p. 9). 
Unusual sources can be used for autoethnography such as, for instance, dreams (Poulos, 
2009). Autoethnography can take many forms along a continuum that ranges from 
autobiography to ethnography. However, Chang (2008) warns that telling one’s story will not 
result in better cultural understanding. This can, in her approach, only be obtained through “in-
depth cultural analysis and interpretation” (p. 13), which she sees as autoethnography’s role. 
My contention is that this type of understanding can be gained through other means too. 
The protean, slippery nature of autoethnography (Couser, 2009) can be seen in the different 
views of what autoethnography is meant to do. It is an interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, even 
transdisciplinary, methodology and different disciplines have different requirements of it. 
Denzin (2009) and Martineau (2001) describe autoethnography as a type of performance. 
Denzin finds it useful for symbolic interaction, Martineau for art as protest. Sparkes describes 
autoethnographies as “highly personalized accounts that draw upon the experience of the 
author/researcher for the purposes of extending sociological understanding” (2000, p. 21). 
Theoretical, analytical and ethnographic foci produce a surprising variation of 
autoethnographic accounts (see Chang, 2008; Pratt, 1992; Reed-Danahay, 1997 as 
instances) to more autobiographical work from Ellis and Bochner (2000) and Denzin (2009). 
Ellis (1998) makes a strong case for the sociological and ethnographic value of using other 
researchers’ written work to create a context for one’s own and it is to this view that I adhere.  
This is “systemic sociological introspection” (Hudak, 2007, p. 59). The personal narrative is 
combined in various ways with theoretical texts from the social sciences. My contention is that 
the interplay between these different types of narrative will allow a specific type of meaning to 
be made.  
However, autoethnographies are inclined to have a particular métissage-like quality: Jones 
(2005) explains that autoethnographic texts tend to resist categorisation and closure because 
of their liminal nature. She describes autoethnography as being “between story and context, 
writer and reader, crisis and denouement” (Jones, 2005, p. 764) and points to “the power of 
the in-between”, of occupying a space between theory and practice, analysis and action 
(Jones, 2005, p. 784). This type of writing deliberately reveals tensions, raises questions and 
recognises the hyphens to which Fine (1998) alludes. 
The autoethnographer is a “boundary-crosser”, whose role can be characterised as having a 
“dual identity” (Reed-Danahay, 1997, p. 3). On a most basic level the autoethnographer is both 
the subject and the object – both the insider and outsider. Reed-Danahay, however, warns 
that this type of dual identity is too simplistic for an understanding of processes of 
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representation and power. She also discusses the phenomenon of the teller being one who is 
not completely “at home” (Reed-Danahay, 1997, p. 4). This allows the teller to re-inscribe and 
redefine everyday conceptions of self and social. At the core of any autoethnographic study, 
therefore, are issues of identity and selfhood.   
In-between lives, such as those of people who are in one or other type of remission, are 
particularly well suited to this type of writing, because they play themselves out in two often 
contradictory worlds – the world of the well and the world of the ill. Furthermore, the tension 
between being subject and object can serve to highlight aspects of a social situation and to 
capture aspects of embodied experience.  This can also subvert power structures that are 
often not questioned in other types of discourse.   
Richardson and St Pierre (2005) break autoethnography into three components: auto (self, 
autobiography), ethno (context, ethnography) and graphy (writing). They explain that 
autoethnographic texts can be individual combinations of these three parts, emphasizing one 
or more. I would say that researchers embarking on autoethnographic studies would have to 
ask these questions: How do these different aspects of autoethnography relate to each other? 
Where do I fit in as researcher and as researchee? I have a certain type of authority as 
researcher and play a specific role, but I am split in two (or more) pieces, doubled as a 
subject. Have I subjected myself as any other subject of research? Have I become a 
postmodern subject, dual and elusive? Or does my “unique” situation make me something else 
entirely, as both subject and subject (that is, as subject-as-agent and subject-as-object)?  
Some researchers emphasise the usefulness of autoethnography in understanding culture(s) 
and in linking the self and the social (Chang, 2008; Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Hudak, 2007; Pratt, 
1992; Reed-Danahay, 1997). Pratt’s (1992) version of autoethnography, for instance, 
describes the phenomenon as a clash of cultures, a type of cultural dialogism. She draws a 
contrast between what she describes as authentic narratives of self-expression and 
inauthentic narratives of assimilation. Autoethnographic writing is a way that colonised people 
can talk back to their colonisers and assert their identities. Pratt warns against a simplistic, 
polarised view of autoethnographic writings that ignores their transcultural and dialogical 
character. Her approach to this is not unproblematic (Zuss, 1995), as I discuss later.  
Autoethnographic types vary as they do because researchers use autoethnography for 
different reasons. For instance, there is a fair amount of autoethnography in studies of 
educational biography. There are also a number of autoethnographies written on the 
experience of illness (Ellis & Bochner, 2000). My article makes a case for having some 
memoirs, for instance, classed as autoethnography (Richards, 2008).  
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If I were going to study chronic illness, it may help to study how the illness presents itself 
medically. It would help more knowing how it feels to live it. An example from my own life: 
when I was in end-stage kidney failure, my doctor told me that “one can live quite comfortably 
on a third of a kidney”. That was the received medical point of view. Believe me when I tell you 
there was nothing comfortable about living on a third of a kidney. My experience was that it 
was slow torture, a hell of endless thirst that no amount of fluid could quench and being tied to 
a wasting body whose dwindling energy could not drag me from the bed to the shower without 
going into deficit, experiencing endless exhaustion, and enduring metallic-tasting food. I 
experienced a deep, ingrained sense of failure because I could not live the normal life I was 
prescribed. No, nothing comfortable there, I’m afraid. In fact, it is because of remarks like the 
one my doctor made that I find it important to write this dissertation. I want people to know how 
it really was. So I need to remember how it was for me, before I remember how my doctor 
taught me it ought to have been. 
Another less subjective, but, ironically, more personal reason for the difference between the 
two is that a story of an experience of illness is before anything personal, even though it 
occurs within a community or communities (family, friends, medical care providers). A story of 
education is indeed personal too, but it is simultaneously communal. You cannot have an 
educational biography without reflection on specific types of interaction with communities. The 
ways in which you interact with your communities as patient/healthcare provider or as 
student/teacher differs. However close you are to your students or teachers, your relationship 
with them is different from your relationship with your doctors or patients. Students do not 
depend on you for their physical existence. You do not depend on your teacher for literal help 
to survive that you cannot get anywhere else, such as access to medicine or life-saving 
technology. 
I have identified three main types of autoethnographic illness narrative: “testimony”, 
“emancipatory discourse” and “destabilised text” (Richards, 2008, pp. 4-7). Briefly, the three 
types do tend to overlap, but can be described in terms of their chief functions. Testimony’s 
chief function is to make sense of damaged lives and to give the author a chance of being 
understood. Emancipatory discourse tends to have a political or social reform angle. The 
destabilised text aims not to simplify and control, but rather to free itself from such normalising 
confines and to remain open-ended, thereby engaging the readers in the debates and 
struggles of the author and encouraging them to make up their own minds, or to continue to 
engage with the issues beyond the confines of the narrative. 
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3.6 Autoethnographic challenges   
3.6.1 Methodological challenges 
One of the challenges of autoethnography is that it can be approached in several different 
ways. For instance, Wall (2006) attempts to trace her own journey of learning to know, while 
Ettorre (2005) uses her story as a launching pad for an analysis. Both these approaches left 
me feeling that something was lacking from their work and yet they both gave me insights. 
Wall alerted me to the highly abstract nature of much discussion about autoethnography and 
caused me to wonder why this was so. I return to this later in this section. The structure of 
Ettorre’s article made me consider how people use academic and personal writing together. 
Ettorre chose to separate them. Doing this, however, took her away from what I consider fully 
autoethnographic writing, because she compartmentalised the genres and did not blur them. 
The result was a traditional research article that used narrative as data. 
Examining these articles revealed some important considerations to me. A significant 
compound challenge with autoethnography is that a) the person carrying out the research may 
still value traditional forms of research or be influenced by them, and b) the environment in 
which she conducts research (a university faculty, a field of study, a peer-reviewed journal) 
might value and be informed by traditional hierarchies. This is a challenge with any type of 
postmodern qualitative research (Denzin, 2009; Marcus, 1998), but its implications for 
autoethnography are profound, as they would undermine the ontological and epistemological 
foundations of the exercise. The privileging of analysis over experience submerges the 
embodied life once again.  
Doing this, one might (re)create a hegemony or dogma that merely asserts itself without 
insight or self-analysis. In addition, any intellectual endeavour is invested in protecting a 
dominant ideology to some or other extent and of normalising this dominant perspective 
(Derrida, 1988; Foucault, 1975/1991). One has to speak the language of power to survive 
(Spivak, 1988). Autoethnography attempts to address othering in various ways, including 
allowing the researcher to be transparent about his/her relationship with what s/he is studying 
and/or being the subject of research as well as the researcher. Nonetheless, autoethnography 
can replicate the very power structures it seeks to challenge by replicating traditional academic 
discourse. It is easy to privilege academic discourse over “other” discourses – in the end I 
must produce an academic document that has intellectual worth in a specific context to be 
awarded my degree. Nevertheless any academic research in the postmodern era should 
include a humble acknowledgement that one does not have the last word. Of course, the 
trouble with humility is that as soon as you think you have it, you lose it. The tension between 
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experience and analysis needs to be sustained. Neither the academic discourse nor the 
experiential voice should dominate, if this new métissage is to be sustained in a text. 
When representing the Other (whether it is oneself or someone else), there is a tension 
between the value of raw experience and analysis. Raw experience can, out of political 
desperation3, become privileged over analysis (Fine, 1998). Fine is not talking about 
autoethnography specifically, but what she says can be applied to autoethnographic writing, 
which can become an excuse for avoiding rigorous intellectual dialogue. The “conception of 
what cannot be said” can become a way of permitting lazy thinking – it is the same as saying 
that something is difficult to conceptualise, therefore I will not try.  
In addition to this, a search for identity and autonomy can become so desperate and emotional 
that it can cause one to be persuaded that Creolisation has resulted in something unique, not 
just a mix of things already known. The supporters of the idea that Creolisation results in 
something unique are almost invariably people whose identity is, in one way or the other, 
Creole. Despite this, a person or an idea or even a text may remain a child of two cultures, 
resembling both, but never truly taking on his/her/its own identity, an uneasy mix of oil and 
water. 
Reinscription and the replication of methods or of technologies is pervasive and difficult to 
avoid (Denzin, 2009, p. 187). Buzard, for instance, points out that Pratt’s approach to 
autoethnography does not deconstruct its own problematic metaphors of “Voice”, “Letting the 
Silenced Speak” or “Talking Back to Power” (1999, p. 9) and, as a result, unwittingly 
entrenches the dominant ideology’s construction of the Other as other, lesser, weaker, and so 
on. It is difficult to deconstruct one’s own ideas. After all one has constructed them so 
painstakingly in the first place. The human mind likes to categorise ideas. We like to know 
where things belong. We like ritual, where everything has meaning and everything has its 
place.  
One of the greatest challenges I faced in writing this chapter was whether to write it recursively 
or in a linear way. Eventually I came to see that I would have to write it recursively if I were to 
be true to the ethical and intellectual considerations of my research. However, this meant that I 
would rearrange the traditional order of a dissertation, because I would have to include some 
of the discussion and conclusions in the methodology section. This could require my readers 
to jump back and forth in the dissertation to see the full picture. On an aesthetic and more 
personal level, I was reluctant to write this particular section recursively, because I believed it 
robbed my dissertation of the element of surprise. I had intended to lay out the methodology 
                                                    
3
 This can be seen sometimes in disability studies or in research whose aim is to empower minority groups. 
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and then reveal how it worked in practice and discuss the implications, even though a 
dissertation is not traditionally supposed to surprise. My research surprised me and so I 
decided that some of this surprise should be captured methodologically. The blurring of 
personal and academic narrative genres allows – even insists – that this happens, because 
personal narratives allow truths to emerge in a different way from academic (linear) narratives. 
Academic writing is by tradition linear, because of our Cartesian belief in rationalism. 
Rationalism and rhetoric (in the sense of rational argumentation), as Vico argued, are not 
always in accordance with one another, although both aim at the truth (Struever, 1983). While 
Descartes saw the human mind as objective, Vico maintained that we construct our view of the 
world through our own contexts, meanings and symbols (Van Oorschot & Allolio-Näcke, 2006). 
This is a central problematic in writing up research, even in traditional research. In traditional 
research, although one’s research journey is (or should be) recursive, one writes about it and 
its methodology in a linear way. In so doing one achieves an impression of mastery – one has 
been through the experience and streamlined it. In the type of research I am conducting, the 
problematics of methodology are as central to the dissertation because they are also the 
findings; they are the testing of the theory. The struggles I had with various aspects of 
postmodern qualitative research are as crucial to the theoretical underpinning of this project as 
were my struggles in recording and arranging my narrative. For this reason I decided to 
incorporate some of my discussion of the method in this chapter. More follows in subsequent 
chapters and in the conclusion. 
Life is not static or easily divided into binaries; instead it is messy and contingent. Ideally 
autoethnography is a way of attempting to capture some of that messiness, multiplicity, 
relativism and changeability of identity. Buzard asks a crucial question concerning colonised 
people writing back, “but do they have to be trapped in the place from which they begin to 
speak?” (1999, pp. 9-10). Surely part of the point in speaking in the first place is to break out of 
the colonised space and to create a new identity of one’s own? O’Byrne’s (2007) assertion that 
stories are eternal and speak where memory cannot is worrying if these stories trap people in 
places that are disempowering. Possibly we should instead consider that stories are dynamic, 
changeable and constantly in flux. If we tell them long enough we either repeat them and 
entrench our own disempowerment, or we discover that they are growing and changing, and 
so are we. 
Connected to this is the issue of ontology and epistemology. If you write without sufficient 
reflection or you write without sufficient reading, you run the risk of not understanding your O’s 
and E’s (Chamberlain, 2000). That is a risk in any type of qualitative research, but especially in 
autoethnography. The aesthetic features of the writing can stifle the philosophical dimensions. 
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Two autoethnographies I have read fall into this trap. They both concern a quantity of poetry 
mixed in with more theoretical work. The mixture is uneasy and does not result in métissage. 
In one autoethnography (Clarke, 1992), the researcher is a mother with an asthmatic child. 
She uses Audrey Lorde’s poetry to express what her own words cannot. While reading her 
article I found myself distracted by the poetry, partly because I am certain Lorde was not 
writing about asthma and partly because the excerpts distracted me from Clarke’s own 
insights. She could have left the poetry out and her article would have been more forceful, 
because it would have been in her voice and more about her and her daughter.  
Similarly, in an article about eating disorders, Tillman-Healy (1992) uses poetry to convey 
immediacy of experience and emotion. This time the poetry is by the author, but it nonetheless 
serves to distract, rather than to enlighten, appearing in the text seemingly randomly. In both 
cases, the poetry excerpts are longer than is necessary to illustrate any of the points raised 
and so they scatter the focus and break up the texts, but not, as far as I can see, to achieve 
any postmodern effect or comment on identity and change. My impression was that both 
writers included poetry to illustrate what they felt, but they would have been better served by 
writing out in prose what they felt, even though they might have found it painful and 
frightening. That way, they might have been able to use narrative to express what they meant 
or even to change their stories. Instead, the poetry becomes a way of distancing the reader 
and the writer from painful and powerful emotions, because it breaks the narrative flow and is 
cryptic and metaphorical (and hence difficult to read). If one simply writes in a personal style 
and also in an academic style, one runs the risk of creating a patchwork text, instead of 
something new. The new text might not necessarily come from the dialectic between personal 
and academic.  
Methodology itself can be reified or replicated, leading to methodolatry (Chamberlain, 2000). 
This is what Glissant (2002) calls fixation, transcription or inscription. The balance between 
fixing a methodology to ensure quality and rigour, and denying it appropriate adaptability is a 
fine one. Couser (2009), despite his concern that amateur ethnographic biographers lack 
rigour and theoretical underpinning, acknowledges that much academic work can be overly 
theorised and abstract. Autoethnography is, by its nature, an adaptable methodology. Because 
of this, it ought to produce highly specific and concrete narratives. Couser (2009) wants to try 
to pin autoethnography down and categorise it, but it becomes slippery, because of its subject 
matter, existing in the blurred boundaries and intersections of individual identities. 
Autoethnography is slippery precisely because of what it does: adapts, individualises, blurs 
boundaries and subverts categories. 
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For this reason, one of the largest gaps in autoethnographic research is examples or 
descriptions how one might carry it out. Writing about autoethnography can seem highly 
abstract or theoretical (Wall, 2006). Such writing (examples include Chang, 2008; Ettorre, 
2005; Oakley, 2009) is often autoethnographic, but may give the impression of only being 
about autoethnography, because autoethnographies are often unique and do not follow a 
pattern and the form and the content have a dialectical relationship with one another, which is 
often overlooked. If one reads an autoethnography in a conventional academic way, as a 
linear recording of objective, external facts, one risks missing part of what the writer intends. 
The writing is not a recording of an external truth, but rather the construction of an experience 
and a passage into awareness about that experience, however transient.  
As I discussed earlier, an important aspect of autoethnography is that it consists of “auto”, 
“ethno” and “graphy” (Reed-Danahay, 1997). Ellis and Bochner (2000) point out that in 
practice one or other of these options is privileged. This does widen the scope for what can be 
produced, but also opens the door for sloppy and superficial use of methodology. While I do 
not want to make the method too rigid and perpetrate methodolatry (Chamberlain, 2000), in 
my opinion the “graphy” part is often overlooked. 
As autoethnographers go, Chang (2008) comes close to methodolatry. Her fascination with 
formalising the method and creating something solid is almost quantitative and she seems not 
to have addressed the deeper epistemological and existential issues in her study. Exchanging 
one system for another can all too easily lead not to displacement, but to re-placement. The 
new system becomes as totalitarian as the old. I suspect one of the challenges of writing 
autoethnographically is that too structured a methodology would create a dogma that might 
limit one. “Narrative smoothing” (Spence, 1986) might occur that would deprive the 
autoethnographic narratives of their contingency. Interpretation cannot be formalised (Denzin, 
2009). It must pertain each time to that which it interprets. It has to be specific, not universal or 
general. Denzin is not referring specifically to autoethnography, but to postmodern research 
methods that attempt to address the issue of how to avoid othering. No one can afford to be 
complacent. I find Denzin’s point about interpretation especially pertinent to autoethnography, 
which is all about the specific and the individual. 
A variant of this is essentialising researchers’ identities, which can be extremely tempting and 
detrimental to this type of research. Polarising and essentialising identities deprives one’s 
ideas of nuance and prevents one from seeing internal conflicts and tensions within a group 
and even the “overlapping, conflicting, decentred circles of identities” themselves (Fine, 1998, 
p. 148). We all enjoy multiple identities and these identities overlap; in my case, as researcher 
and researchee, in others, such as Fox and Swazey’s (1992) version of “insider” researcher, 
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as outsider-insider. There are many other combinations. Just as it is essentialist to assume 
that “only women can/should ‘do’ gender” (Fine, 1998, p. 152), it is essentialist, as I came to 
see, to assume that only a person who has experienced a disease can research it or 
understand the experience. In fact, it is just as essentialist as assuming that only a medical or 
academic “expert” can research a disease experience. It is essentialist to recognise another’s 
subjugation and not be able to see beyond that, so that the person’s entire identity becomes 
their romanticised subjugation (Buzard, 1999; Fine, 1998). It is very much worse, in my 
experience, to recognise one’s own subjugation and not be able to go beyond that identity. 
The story one attempts to tell in that case cannot be one’s own. Instead one begins to act a 
role, to play the part of the victim. 
There is another side to the coin. Part of the function of autoethnography is to subvert power 
relationships. Couser describes ethnographic research experimenting with ways of achieving 
this and of acknowledging the Other without othering (2009, p. 89). This can be done by 
revealing such relationships or showing tensions or by giving the Other a voice. However, I 
can foresee that one’s own position as the “giver of voice” can become hegemonic. It is a 
powerful position to occupy. You decide who talks, how much and when (Allen & Hutchinson, 
2009). This type of position can prevent dialogism. Self-scrutiny and clarity about one’s own 
biases are important in any research, but essential in autoethnography. An autoethnographer 
might veer between being the disenfranchised voice of the victim and being the overlord of the 
text. The story can simultaneously become one of victimology and oppression. One’s own 
power should be subverted or at least challenged, if one wants to present an accurate account 
of events. 
Moreover, one method of inquiry does not negate others. I have used autoethnography; 
Crowley-Matoka’s (2005) study of the post-transplant experiences of Mexican kidney 
transplant recipients has used interpretive and political-economic approaches to ethnography. 
This does not invalidate her findings or mine. This was a mental leap that I have had to make. 
One’s essentialist conditioning runs deep. When I began my study, I began it in reaction to 
voices that I believed oppressed me and did not understand my experience (Richards, 2006). 
Soon I discovered that I did not myself fully understand my experience and that I had 
essentialised my identity as a transplanted person. I came to see, in the course of my 
research, that I was not inquiring into me versus “them”, but rather into how I situated myself 
and my own experiences. I began to feel trapped in the space from which I had begun to 
speak, a possibility Buzard (1999) warned about. 
Just as researchers can be trapped in essentialising behaviour when they undertake research, 
they can also be trapped in essentialising behaviour when they read. Research, when it 
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considers itself and its methods, sometimes tends to forget that producing the research is only 
part of the process. In certain senses the research process includes how and where it is 
received, not only the action of “doing research”. Ethical behaviour is at stake here, both 
traditionally and in postmodern terms. How do we trust what we read, or do we read in a 
different way? New criteria suggest a different engagement with the text (Denzin, 2009; 
Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005). I have not explored the issue of criteria of reliability because 
that is a research topic on its own. Is authenticity a problem as a concept? How do we know 
when something is authentic? Can we count on ourselves to read ethically? I am not able to 
pursue this in my dissertation, but it needs further examination. 
Autoethnography needs to be long in order to do its job. As Miller puts it (in Brody, 2003, p. 
37), “[a]ll stories are potentially interminable”. You cannot summarise a story without its 
becoming a different type of story, one that has been chopped up and reassembled without 
some of its parts, one that has been interpreted. The length of a story is not dissimilar to the 
length of a piece of string. There are usually strict word limits on articles, dissertations and 
other types of academic writing. This may not be in the best interests of autoethnographic 
storytelling.  
Connected to this is the idea that stories work holistically. Academic writing works linearly. 
Necessarily these types of writing are read in different ways. An autoethnographic reader 
needs to be aware of this, as much as an interviewer needs to be aware of the interviewee’s 
words, nuances and complexities. An autoethnographic reader might need to be more 
involved in (re)constructing the text than an academic reader usually would be. An 
autoethnographic reader needs to read recursively too. This does not always suit modern life. 
My poster about the experience of dialysis ended with this sentence: “This poster is now part 
of my story too...” (Richards, 2009b).  
Each time I wrote a journal entry (Richards, 2007), wrote an article (Richards, 2008), read a 
paper (Richards, 2009a), created a poster (Richards, 2009b), or edited a draft of my 
dissertation, I found my story had escaped from me again and changed shape. At first I 
resisted this and tried to tie the creature down, but then I found it was more fun to let it do what 
it wanted to do. Each time a text is read, it will be different, whether it is being re-read or read 
by a new reader, even as it is being written, rewritten or told by someone new. This and the 
blurring of definitions can be seen as a crisis of meaning (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005) or perhaps 
it is a new constellation of meanings. 
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3.6.2 Challenges of blurred categories 
The issue of blurred categories has been the subject of much academic debate. One of the 
blurred categories is that of blurring genres of writing (Denzin, 2009). Genres become “mixed” 
as a response to the changeability of the world and our response to it (Glissant, 2002). 
Blurring them allows us to reinvent them, as bricoleurs, better to suit our purposes. Criticisms 
of blurring genres include Marcus’s (1998) concern that this leads to experimental writing that 
does not go further than being an experiment and can be self-indulgent. Blurred genres can 
also perturb readers because they defy categorisation (Brettell, 1997; Geertz, 1973). Does this 
help or hinder our understanding of what they are doing? Does it force us to take a closer look 
at what they are doing, instead of accepting certain givens? I am inclined to think so. The 
traditional forms of academic writing can too easily be seen as natural and be read uncritically, 
so that the power structures that these forms reinforce (such as positivism, post-positivism, or 
empirical research) are re-entrenched. They are for this reason highly unsuitable for 
postmodern qualitative research. The form of your writing structures the form of your 
knowledge. 
By blending cultures, epistemologies or ontologies, autoethnography allows the writer to tell a 
unique story that represents ideas about a particular part of society and allows meaning to be 
derived from this, by involving the writer as a character, whether it is as a central character 
who narrates or as a peripheral observer who is nonetheless involved in what unfolds (Dwyer 
& Buckle, 2009). Autoethnography, in other words, can take many forms along a continuum 
that ranges from autobiography to ethnography. However, autoethnographies are inclined to 
have a particular quality: Jones (2005) explains that autoethnographic texts tend to resist 
categorisation and closure because of their liminal nature.  She describes autoethnography as 
being “between story and context, writer and reader, crisis and denouement” (Jones, 2005, p. 
764) and as a type of writing it points to “the power of the in-between”, of “occupying a space 
between theory and practice, analysis and action” (Jones, 2005, p. 784). This type of writing 
deliberately reveals tensions and raises questions. This can be disconcerting if one is inclined 
to want closure, and a researcher might forget that closure is not the goal of this type of 
research. 
For my purposes, understanding that the autoethnographer is a “boundary-crosser”, whose 
role can be characterised as having a “dual identity” (Reed-Danahay, 1997, p. 3), allows me to 
use my private identity as a patient to challenge and question some notions of power, 
legitimation and legislation. On a most basic level, the autoethnographer is both the subject 
and the object – both the insider and outsider. As autoethnographer, I can introduce another 
voice than those of medical doctors and sociologists into the research on the subject of organ 
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transplantation. I can speak back to power from a unique perspective (Pratt, 1992). Reed-
Danahay (1997), however, warns that constructing dual identity in a binary way is too 
simplistic for an understanding of processes of representation and power. For Reed-Danahay, 
the teller is one who is not completely “at home” in either world, rather than one who belongs 
to a colonised world (1997, p. 4). This allows the teller to transcend everyday conceptions of 
self and social and, to some extent, to rewrite them. At the core of any autoethnographic study 
are issues of identity and selfhood (Reed-Danahay, 1997). This is what I came to see in my 
own autoethnographic journey.   
In-between lives, such as those of people who are in one or other type of remission or who 
have had organ transplants, are particularly well suited to this type of writing, because they 
play themselves out in two often contradictory worlds – the world of the well and the world of 
the ill. The person in remission does not fully belong in either. Furthermore, the tension 
between being subject and object can serve to highlight aspects of a social situation and to 
capture aspects of embodied experience. This can subvert power structures that are often not 
questioned in other types of discourse. In addition to this – and for the purposes of my work, 
this is essential – wherever you are, a trace of where you have been remains, like a Derridean 
palimpsest (Derrida, 1998). The trace does not go away and cannot be ignored. Its presence 
allows “the conception of what cannot be said” (Glissant, 2002, p. 293). This is necessary in 
forming new identities, leaving old ones, or dealing with unspeakable things. This is why it 
works especially well with illness narratives. 
Another type of blurring occurs in the research I read and in my own work. I found this blurring 
particularly problematic: the blurring between liminality as ritual (Turner, 1969; Van Gennep, 
1960) and liminality as state (Crowley-Matoka, 2005; Little et al., 1998). Perhaps it has allowed 
me to interrogate more thoroughly what liminality, ritual and condition might mean for illness 
narratives. It did, however, cause a tension so severe in my work that it almost brought it to a 
halt. Other troublesome tensions I experienced while writing were the tension between 
knowing and unknowing, and the desire to find closure while resisting it. Making versus 
analysing is a tension in any type of writing, academic or otherwise, but it can derail one 
methodologically in autoethnography. These tensions tended to paralyse me instead of 
allowing the dynamic interplay of ideas. This could have been partly tensions in my personality 
between a desire for order and a love of chaos. I was at any rate compelled to re-examine 
these tensions constantly, so I gained deeper understanding of the epistemological and 
ontological issues of my research. 
Liminality is a part of the postmodern experience and a part of illness, especially chronic 
illness. It is a state created by people to help understand changes in identity (Turner, 1969; 
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Van Gennep, 1960). In recent studies of chronic conditions, liminality has come to be seen as 
a state of being that people struggle to understand (Little et al., 1998). This bewilderment can 
be seen in biographical work too (Richards, 2010). In ritual liminality (Turner, 1969; Van 
Gennep, 1960) a person withdraws from society in order to put aside their old identity and take 
on a new one. A ritual action is needed to bring the person back to “the land of the living” and 
recognition of their new identity must be made by both the liminal person and the society to 
which they return. This implies that the new identity needs to be understood (and made fixed) 
through ritual. 
Recent studies of chronic illness (Crowley-Matoka, 2005; Little et al., 1998) have used 
Turner’s (1969) and Van Gennep’s (1960) idea of liminality, but have forgotten that it was 
meant to be a ritual state, one that is purposefully created, not a state that occurs as a result of 
physical changes, where one has no control over its duration. Seen this way, liminality can be 
an obstruction to getting on with one’s life or something to overcome, a condition associated 
with illness and being Other. When illness is chronic, that condition can become life-long and 
people struggle to come to grips with a situation they feel should not exist. It becomes a type 
of limbo instead of a powerful way of coping with changes in identity and moving between 
structure and anti-structure. But what if that is what life is? What if we are always ceasing to be 
something while becoming something else, even if we are not coping with the effects of 
chronic illness? It is all too easy to revert to traditional categories of understanding and to 
attempt to resolve this third state into being health or illness, and then feeling disquieted when 
it fits neither, because it is something else. 
As I developed my ideas and my narrative, I was forced to re-examine periodically the blurry 
issue of liminality. This caused me to begin to argue that what we see as liminality in chronic 
illness is not in fact liminality, but that the changeable nature of the experience of chronic 
illness itself. This changeability and in-betweenness is intrinsic to chronic illness and the 
identity of a person experiencing chronic illness. This needs closer examination in 
autoethnographic writing, which often seems to be trying to resolve that blurriness.  
Sandelowski (1991) describes stories as liminal and part of the hermeneutic cycle of 
reinterpretation. I find it better to call them dynamic and littoral. Part of this dynamic nature 
comes from the irresolvable tension between the blurred aspects of their identity. Just as I 
blend two cultures in being both ill and well, displaced and (in some senses) replaced, 
researcher and researchee, writing about illness holds immense scope to blur and blend 
genres and, perhaps, to form a new identity.  
Autoethnography poses some interesting questions about representation, especially in terms 
of subject/object dualism and mind/body dualism. In autoethnographic writing one can be both 
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the subject and the object of a narrative. One can choose one’s identity to an extent. What 
does it mean to be both subject and object? If one accepts one is both subject and object, is 
one not still subscribing to Cartesian dualism? Writing about embodiment and emotions may 
not allow embodiment or feelings to express themselves, but simply become another way of 
representing them and objectifying them. Can this situation be escaped from through writing 
about embodiment, or does this reveal that as autoethnographers, and indeed as representers 
and representees, our responsibility is to continue to question our position(s) and to avoid 
settling into complacency? If one can achieve this, as I hope to in this dissertation, one’s 
subject/object positioning and mind/body relationship will remain dynamic, fluid and individual.  
3.7 My approach 
3.7.1 What I am doing 
My approach differs from Chang’s (2008) cultural-analytic approach in the sense that I am not 
conducting a cultural study of a population group as an anthropologist or sociologist would. My 
study is in and of narrative. My intellectual culture is one of narrative. My academic 
background is in literature and ancient history, both of which I could only access through 
written texts. Frank draws a distinction between thinking about stories and thinking with stories 
(Frank, 1995). My hermeneutic approach causes me to suspect that one always does both. 
The telling of a story is a type of littoral zone which one must needs traverse many times. It is 
a zone that shifts and changes constantly. 
Narratives are themselves cultural constructs. However, they are more than that. Narratives 
are data only to an extent and they can be analysed only to an extent. My narratives speak to 
each other and to narratives beyond themselves. They are formed and informed by other 
narratives. They are always themselves and other. I am not concerned so much with diverse 
cultural backgrounds as I am with unpacking my own. For the purposes of this study I need to 
be able to understand my own perceptions against the cultural backdrop whence I emerge. 
Ontology has its uses: it pays to know people’s contexts. Chang (2008), for instance, is a 
sociologist. I am a narratologist. My emphasis is on the graphy side. How and why we write as 
we do is as important as what we say. In fact, it is what we say. We seem to understand how 
the self and the culture affect how and what one writes, but the graphy part affects the auto 
and ethno parts too. If you do not have the linguistic means or the patience to work at it, and if 
you do not realise there is a process with writing that is as important as what you are trying to 
say, you will not be able to say what you mean (Elbow, 1973; Hjortshoj, 2001).   
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My academic training in English literature taught me to do close, detailed analyses of texts, so 
my writing tends to be peppered with direct quotes from documents I have read. This will likely 
cause my work to have a different flavour to that of people trained in the social sciences, who 
generally go more for a theoretical and conceptual reading of texts, extrapolating the main 
ideas (Goodall, 2008). My way of reading and writing shows different things than other 
approaches that are more grounded in the social sciences. In my understanding of texts, the 
details are what make the whole. The choice of word is significant. It makes the meaning. The 
danger of extrapolating is that you must perforce paraphrase and interpret what others are 
saying, despite your coming from a different context and position of power. On the other hand, 
if you quote what they say out of the context of the whole narration, it will not mean exactly 
what it did before either. This applies to segments of narrative and to narratives of length. If 
you change the words, you lose the identity of the person talking and, in doing that, you 
colonise them and take over their textual being. 
This more “graphy”-centric autoethnography will allow me to provide a thick and textured 
description of a state of being and also to interrogate assumptions about that state of being 
(Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Ettorre, 2005; Muncey, 2005).  Autoethnographic narratives do more 
than relate the history of a life (autobiography). They allow an ethnographic understanding of 
that life within a certain context and acknowledge the researcher as influenced by and 
influencing her environment as her identity changes. Just as ethnographers previously sought 
to understand other cultures than their own and returned, knowing more about themselves 
(Geertz,1973; Malinowski, 1922/1984), so can one seek to understand oneself and discover 
more about others. There are different ways of doing this (Chang, 2008; Ellis & Bochner, 2000; 
Ettorre, 2005; Richards, 2008; Wall, 2006). I have chosen a narrative approach that is 
hermeneutic, because it is reflexive and discursive and allows me to dialogue with other texts. 
The phenomenological, experiential nature of the text allows me a deeper understanding of my 
own perceptions and identity. 
Along with the usual academic audience for a dissertation, autoethnographic research may in 
future allow my study to reach health care professionals (doctors, nurses, counsellors) and lay 
people (patients, families of patients, carers, and friends). A narrative approach with a strong 
theoretical and ethical grounding might allow the professional care providers access to the 
lived experience of organ failure, transplantation and life afterwards and a person’s self-
perception through this, rather than just to the data and symptoms (Richards, 2008). In 
addition it might allow people from the broader chronic illness community to see some of their 
experiences reflected, particularly as there are few renal narratives and virtually nothing about 
long-term experiences of kidney transplantation (Nicholas et al., 2011; Richards, 2008). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
83 
 
I am speaking back to power, but not only medical authorities, the power I initially wanted for 
myself that can silence other voices and other narratives as effectively as medical discourse. I 
have had to speak back constantly to my own inner empiricist demons that urge me to treat 
narrative as a way of recording things, to forget the aims of qualitative research, to buy into the 
idea of the omniscient, powerful researcher, and all that these temptations imply. In my own 
document I have had to resist the urge to conform to an often dominant ideology of research. 
Ironically this troublesome ideology closely mirrors that of quantitative research, from which it 
is allegedly trying to escape (Chamberlain, 2000; Denzin, 2009). One of the first ways in which 
I was constantly reminded of my urge to conform was when I realised in early versions of 
writing my story that I tended to keep to the medical tale. Subsequently I came to see that I 
wanted to be the Romantic hero on a utopian quest. Later I realized I was not yet out of the 
woods, because I found myself evaluating my own work with criteria I had imported from other 
types of research (Do I have enough facts? Have I substantiated this? Is the narrative 
coherent and unified?). Old habits die hard.  
One of the first questions I asked myself when writing this chapter was: Why is telling my story 
a way of writing back to medical and other authorities who had made decisions about my life 
for so long? To whom am I writing back? Ironically the impetus for pursuing this study was 
indeed a way of writing back to authorities I felt had denied me my humanity and dignity as a 
transplantee (Richards, 2006). However, once I began my study, I realised that I was not 
writing back so much as writing backwards. I was not writing to an imagined panel of faceless 
institutional lackeys, but rather to myself now, to an earlier version of myself and about an 
earlier version of myself. I was also in a sense writing forward about myself now towards what 
I might become and in so doing I was beginning to make my story anew.  
As my story progressed, I found I was no longer speaking from the place in which I began to 
speak, because I was no longer there. I had moved. Because of the recursive, iterative nature 
of story-making, I would not necessarily call this movement a progression, certainly not in the 
linear sense. But it was a change. This change might not be easy to see in the version(s) of 
the story in the chapters that follow. After all traditionally a story has a beginning, a middle and 
end. It is constructed in such a way that it has direction and development. Instead the change 
is seen in the fertile, liminal spaces between the versions of the story and in the juxtaposition 
between the versions and the documents of which the story consists, including drafts of the 
dissertation, two articles, a conference paper, a poster and a research journal (Richards, 2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010). Personal writing can be seen as a progression from 
uncertainty of one sort to certainty, and then to uncertainty of a different sort. The further I got 
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from the big event of my transplant and the longer I had to deal with post-transplant 
uncertainty and lack of closure, the more these became part of my everyday life and identity. 
3.7.2 Why I am doing it 
I am writing this dissertation because I expect by so doing that something will change. What 
that something is I am not sure. Paradoxically I am also writing this dissertation so that 
something can stay the same, so that I can fix it permanently in writing and it can be 
remembered. Again I am not sure what that something is. It could well be the same thing that I 
expect to change. 
I am focusing on writing to the extent that I have, because I am arguing for a broader definition 
of autoethnography than Chang’s (2008) or even Ellis and Bochner’s (2000). I believe more 
attention needs to be paid to the act of writing in autoethnography. This has been touched on, 
but not elucidated (Jones, 2005; Reed-Danahay, 1997; Wall, 2006). My dissertation is an 
attempt to take this somewhat further. Autoethnography is an interdisciplinary method and 
should not be restricted methodologically to one or other discipline. If one uses it within a 
discipline, it can be adapted to the discipline’s requirements, but can also be displaced 
(Shildrick, 2002), set free from its predetermined framework, so that its meanings are less 
limited. This can allow it to be interpreted differently through a type of defamiliarisation.  
There may be no autobiography per se, because the self is always political and always 
constructed. Chang (2008) finds it ironic that self-narrative involves others. Why? Narrative is a 
social act. Each self is part of a greater whole and achieves his/her identity in part through 
interacting with others. It’s a question of focus. Because autoethnography is analytical and 
interpretive (Chang, 2008) as well as aesthetic and creative, researchers can find it difficult to 
pay due attention to everything.  
When I reflected on the ways in which some autoethnographers had used artefacts such as 
photographs, for instance, I had some concerns. I was perturbed by Muncey’s (2005) use of 
photography in her article about teenage pregnancy and identity. She has selected 
photographs to use as symbols and discussion points of her journey as an autoethnographer 
and as a person who experienced teenage pregnancy. She discusses some of the theories 
around photographs, but she does not discuss what taking a picture involves. The 
photographer chooses what to put in it, frames the subject in a certain way, arranges the parts, 
chooses the light, pushes some items to the background and leaves others in the foreground. 
In Muncey’s case, other people took the photographs of her, so they have constructed her. 
She accepts what they have seen. She does not discuss this. I feel ambivalent about how she 
has used these pictures, but cannot deny that it is useful, as she uses the images to construct 
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a stronger self-image that ties in with society’s expectations. Her narrative is a story of the 
recovery of self-esteem, but this tenuous self-esteem seems very much dependent on her 
public identity. Her relationship with her daughter (and indeed the rest of her family) seems not 
to be part of her journey. Does this article flounder because Muncey tries to cover too much?  I 
had to wonder if my own endeavour might not experience the same type of problem, as I too 
was looking at life-long experience, instead of a short-term event. 
Although Cook (1996) does not name her methodology autoethnography, she is creating an 
autoethnography through medical artefacts (forms and x-rays) to express her medicalised 
identity in a composite way. The composite nature of her article is strengthened by the focus 
being on a part of her life instead of her whole life. Like Muncey, she is concerned with the 
power relations of representation. She uses her article to demonstrate her experience of being 
anatomised and compartmentalised by her medical practitioners, and illustrates this by using 
their artefacts to do so. In doing this she deconstructs their images of her and replaces them 
with her own. This is autoethnographic in Pratt’s (1992) sense, because she speaks back to 
power. She also shows how the medical discourse insidiously alters her own self-perception. It 
is possible that I warm more to Cook’s article because it is about the experience of illness, with 
which I am familiar, instead of teenage motherhood, with which I am not. Also, Cook uses 
theorists with whom I am familiar, Foucault and Barthes, while Muncey uses theorists with 
whom I am not familiar, Kuhn and King. 
These two articles showed me that artefacts give concreteness to an autoethnographic work 
and prevent it from being too abstract. So I decided to base my own work on my own artefacts 
of various types. Autoethnographic narratives do more than relate the history of a life 
(autobiography). They allow an ethnographic understanding of that life within a certain context 
and acknowledge the researcher as influenced by and influencing her environment. Artefacts 
can achieve this by showing complex instances of key points in one’s life. But I had no 
photographs and few medical records in my own possession. As a patient in a state hospital I 
was seldom granted access to my own files and was never allowed to keep anything. It 
seemed my medical data belonged to others, not me. The only artefacts were ones I had 
created over the years and they were all in narrative form.  
Writing is an artefact. I do not have the ethnographic artefacts that Muncey (2005) has. My 
texts are simultaneously more literal and more abstract. Not photographs, epaulettes and 
official documents, mine are journal entries, memories and dreams. All of my texts are liminal 
texts, the products of liminal or littoral states recalled. And so my study takes the form of a 
narrative, or rather of a number of smaller narratives juxtaposed to each other and compiled 
into somewhat larger ones of different shapes. These narratives form a dialectic with the 
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academic parts of the text. The object of this is to destabilise my text as a whole and to act as 
a reminder that no story, academic or personal, is ever complete and that any “truth” is 
contingent. Through writing my story I attempt to capture it, to fix it, to remember it. 
Paradoxically I also try to set it free to live and grow. I try to create my story and to give some 
type of form to my experience, so that it can truly be an experience and be mine.  
To some extent the chapters will build on one another and develop themes that are common 
to all. Sometimes, however, chapters or parts of chapters will break down, contradict or 
deconstruct (Derrida, 1998; Selden, 1985) other chapters or parts of chapters. Living with a 
life-long chronic condition is a complex experience of many layers, or, to use another 
metaphor, it is seen through a fractured lens. It is postmodern in that the way it is written will 
become its epistemology. Not only will there be possible contradictions and erasures, but there 
will also be other disjunctions. These might take the form of silences, absences, mute 
presences, gaps (sometimes of several years), or stories that may seem different or unrelated 
to others. An album of snapshots creates a bigger picture when seen as a whole. Likewise a 
collection of smaller narratives is greater than any of its constituent parts. The whole is, 
however, still not complete. No photograph contains every truth about its subject; instead it is a 
framed, symbolic representation of a moment in time (Muncey, 2005). Likewise narrative 
smoothing (Spence, 1986) can achieve the same in a narrative that framing does in a 
photograph. 
Finally, writing is a technology in the sense that Leder (1990) describes, in that it allows one to 
extend oneself, one’s vision and one’s experience. It creates a symbolic skin similar to that of 
one’s house, one’s clothing or one’s national identity (Helman, 2007). This “skin” is permeable 
and can be incorporated by a reader, creating in some small way, perhaps a temporary 
consanguinity between reader and writer. My hope is that my research will be a type of ethical 
and compassionate conversation with the reader that may lead to further research or in some 
way change the reader and the reader’s views of my subject as I and my views have been 
changed. 
3.8 Research ethics 
A discussion of the ethics of autoethnography is unavoidable by virtue of its blurred nature. 
Followers of a more traditional way of research would question the ethics of a research 
method of which the researcher is part. Postmodern researchers would maintain that 
researchers are always part of their research and that it is unethical to insist otherwise. Instead 
of thinking of ethics that uses narrative versus ethics that does not, it might be more useful to 
think of ethics in which narrative is implicit or explicit (Brody, 2003). 
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Narrative knowing is different from other ways of knowing, because narrative rationality differs 
from propositional rationality (Goodall, 2008). Narrative lets you know “what it is like”, instead 
of “knowing how” or “knowing that” (Worth, in Goodall, 2008). Narrative knowing allows a type 
of coherence to emerge that has far-reaching implications: 
Among those for whom the story is alive there is a revival of ethical authority otherwise 
almost effaced in our society. For it establishes on a new basis the coherency of social 
and personal time. It makes it possible to recover a living past, to believe again in the 
future, to perform acts that have significance for the person who acts. By so doing it 
restores a human form of experience. (Crites, 1971, p. 311) 
This in turn allows both reader and writer to take a more ethical stance towards life. As the 
story unfolds, it surprises the writer as it tells itself. Narrative research contravenes any idea of 
authorial omniscience. Even though the story is your story, it is not truly yours until you have 
told it. You cannot know a story until you have told it; hence every story is a quest story in 
some way. To conceal that quest is to defeat the purposes of narrative methodology. 
Narrative style does no more simply depict a scene than a photograph “simply” depicts a 
scene. While writing about one’s own experiences can be seen to raise ethical problems, it 
can also be seen to help “develop ethical selves engaged in social action and social reform” 
(Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005, p. 959). Richardson and St. Pierre (2005, p. 959) argue that 
writing is “a method of knowing”, where the author’s position as knower and teller will always 
be examined in one way or the other. In a previous article I described qualitative writing as a 
negotiated text, not "a neutral tool, but a complex interplay of cultural factors” (Richards, 2008, 
p. 1720)  
Any form of representation, even representation of oneself, must be linked to what Csordas 
calls “being in this world” (1997, p. 277) and the ethical implications of this. Precisely how one 
might be in this world can be discussed in terms of various types of dualism. The difficulty of 
any dualism is that one of the pairings is always viewed as superior (day/night, male/female, 
black/white, subject/object). If one fights for the underdog of the pairing, one simply reverses 
the dualism and the split remains. Seeing the pairing as “equal, but different” is often a form of 
intellectual dishonesty; equal things are the same, not different. Collapsing the dualism seems 
to work only in the short term. Dualisms are not fixed but dynamic, the result of power 
structures that are changeable. If they are viewed as dynamic and maybe even 
complementary, they can be useful in advancing one’s understanding.  
The type of dynamic dualism that one experiences when writing about oneself as one 
oscillates between subject and object allows for self-reflexivity and an interrogation of one’s 
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ethical stance. “The politics and poetics of representation” (Reed-Danahay, 1997, p. 3) go part 
of the way towards describing the processes and experiences. Regarding illness narratives, 
selves are created through writing and an ill self is in a state of perpetual alterity with the 
“normal” world (Frank, 2000, p. 136). The recognition of this is an important ethical act in a 
world where so much can be quantified. Speaking as a member of a marginalised group is an 
emancipatory and ethical act whose implications extend beyond oneself. 
3.9 Where this led me 
My philosophical considerations were weighty, not to say burdensome. It was with gloomy and 
apprehensive thoughts that I began to revise my chapters, because, contrary to more 
conventional ways of writing up one’s research, I had already written them after some initial 
forays into the uses of autoethnography. I reasoned that now that I had written the chapters, 
analysing them with an eye to my recently acquired philosophical qualms might allow me to 
deconstruct them or, I desperately hoped, to synthesise the main ideas in them (but not, I 
assured myself, in a way that would dismay Glissant or be utopian or Romantic). I wrote a big 
“NB” in my notes, next to “I am exploring something here, not setting out to prove something”. 
This lends a different flavour to my study, because I am not setting out with the end already in 
mind. 
Despite what I had understood in Glissant’s work, I was fairly certain I would need to examine 
ontological and epistemological issues in my next phase. And so I did, reassuring myself that I 
didn’t need to answer all the questions. I reasoned my postmodern, hermeneutic, iterative 
process is itself a type of methodological rigour: revisiting, interpreting, questioning, 
backtracking, to try to see what the story is (at this point). Does it consider reflexively the 
relationship between researcher and subject? Constantly. Can my theory emerge from the 
practice and experience of writing my research? I hope so. Can the experience of writing 
become part of the experience of living and part of the methodology (or method) of research? 
Can practice precede theory? Denzin and Lincoln (2005) and Kleinman (1988) seem to think 
so. 
Equipped with a cache of reading and a glimmering of understanding about phenomenology 
and existentialism, I decided to return to writing my dissertation chapters. Of course I had 
started with writing them before starting this chapter, because my story was what I knew (I 
thought). I had started with the chapter about dialysis. The events around that period in my life 
told me it was a tipping point for me where matters could have gone one way or the other. I 
had already encountered some surprises in writing it. I now knew that I would have to return to 
my dialysis chapter again and retell to myself what I had learned and unlearned while writing 
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the stories, but for now I could feel a sort of temporary break from the liminality of unknowing. 
Perhaps I was doing autoethnography at last! This reminded me very much of Ellis’s (2004) 
reminder that autoethnography is not linear. Being in the experience and being able to move 
out of it emotionally are essential for autoethnographic understanding. This discovery felt like 
the frail but trustworthy link that Glissant (2002) refers to between the wild diversity of the 
world and the balance and knowledge I desired. 
I was initially excited by Zuss’s (1995) treatment of métissage as strategy – not only a way of 
representing something, but a way of interacting with it. As a postmodern document, the 
autoethnographic text functions in a metatextual way as well as textual way: its form mirrors its 
content. It performs its own uncertainty. It makes explicit its author’s philosophical antecedents 
and journey to understanding. It is not only a cunning plan to challenge power structures. 
Métissage is a strategy for dealing with becoming, with metamorphosis, with “new forms of 
subjectivity” (Zuss, 1995, p. 176). In illness narratives it can also be a strategy for dealing with 
unbecoming – with ceasing to be and with things that are unspeakable. It might even help 
counteract dysappearance by creating other possibilities than the “norm”. 
However, my elation about my miraculous closure was of course short-lived. Stories only serve 
their function in the living and the telling. Only then can they truly “educate the self and others, 
including the young and those such as researchers who are new to their communities” 
(Clandinin & Connolly, 2000, p. xxvi). What does it mean to tell the story of yourself? Can you 
remain unchanged if you do that? Do you fix your identity in telling it or do you unfix it? And 
once you’ve told the story and are changed by it, does it still belong to you if you are not who 
you once were? Do you need a new story now? Is a story a type of transitional object or part of 
a ritual of reintegration to end a liminal state? This is what I meant to find out. And, in the 
manner of all stories, to find the end, I had to start at the beginning (again). 
Part of the reason for my recursive practice at this point was that I had some lingering 
concerns. The first is a personal one, perhaps related to vanity. If I am both researcher and 
researchee, but am still myself, then perhaps I need a new title, having undergone a type of 
academic Creolisation. I fear, however, that such a change may rob me of what authority I 
have, since, although I shall cease being a researchee, I shall no longer be a researcher. I do 
still cling to traditional forms of validation. If I am both, does this change the constitutive 
relationship between researcher and researchee or does it merely reify it? Perhaps I would, 
instead, oscillate between being researcher and researchee, in a constant state of becoming 
and ceasing to be. “But,” says Glissant, “can one endure a perpetual becoming? Do we not 
need the reassurance of anchoring our identity in a territory, a law, a founding myth?” (2002, p. 
292). We shall see. 
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My second concern is that if I am indeed writing an autoethnographic text, I want to be sure 
my “entire” text is, in fact, autoethnographic, even this very chapter. As I contemplate it, I 
wonder fretfully, “Is it autoethnography yet?” I am perturbed that I have no way of knowing. 
My third concern is one seldom referred to by autoethnographers: What if I can’t write well 
enough? Average writing skills are not necessarily an impediment in many areas of academic 
research, but will be one here. The other side of the coin exposes an ethical dilemma: If I can 
write well enough, that presupposes ethical impediments – a disingenuous view of writing and 
texts, a certain craftiness in composing them, an ability to mend invisibly or to cover my 
devious tracks. Then I discovered that metis has another meaning than a person of Creole 
descent (Glissant, 2002). This meaning is older and derives from classical mythology: cunning 
intelligence or craftiness (Beard, 2002). This seemed strangely significant to me as I embarked 
on retelling my story.  
Until I began working on this research my story had been strongly medical and had concerned 
itself with facts and figures. I decided this was a good enough place to start (again). But this 
time, instead of starting with creatinine levels or blood pressure, I decided to start with a 
number that was very much more significant to me: 548820. 
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CHAPTER 4: END STAGE RENAL DISEASE OR THE BIRTH OF 
548820 - “PROTRACTED LIMINALITY” AND THE SUGGESTION OF 
A THIRD SPACE 
4.1 Introduction 
Who is 548820? Why, me, of course. That was the number I was given when I became a 
patient in the adult renal unit of the Johannesburg General Hospital. However, this chapter 
concerns my childhood and adolescence growing up with kidney disease. I was not 548820 
yet, but then again I was not really anyone yet. Looking back on it now, I find it inevitable that I 
should have become a number in a system, even though I never knew my childhood number. 
My mother and my doctor kept it from me. Because so much of my early narrative was 
medical, overtly, explicitly and only medical, I was a number waiting to happen. Numbers of 
different sorts have dominated my life since earliest memory: creatinine, urea, blood pressure, 
red cell count, white cell count, age, height, weight. 
I did not start writing my dissertation with this chapter, but instead with the chapter that follows 
chronologically, the chapter on dialysis. Nonetheless, this chapter remains the most 
preliminary of all, because when I experienced the events I describe I was myself so 
preliminary, only a child, in a world of other people’s stories. Its form reflects my desire to tell 
the story or stories of that time – it is largely personal narrative and little of it is conventionally 
academic. I have attempted to include some theoretical, thematic and methodological 
concerns, but as hard as I try to include them, my eager story pushes them to the peripheries 
of the text. This chapter performs something of the messiness of life itself through the 
associations and varying amounts of time spent on different sections. In this it is postmodern. 
The personal narrative dominates and the academic interpretation itself is reluctant to be 
contained. It emerges from time to time in my personal narrative, although I have tried to keep 
the two narrative types separate. 
This part of my narrative really has never been told before and that saddens me. I was a 
precocious child, reading at three and with an abnormally large vocabulary, a “walking 
dictionary” as a classmate’s mother, who was also our history teacher in high school, called 
me. But I did not have the words to articulate my story and I had no point of reference. Unlike 
many who tell the stories of their illnesses (Bauby, 1997; Broyard, 1993; Cojocaru, 2007; 
Ettorre, 2005; Frank, 1995; Grealy, 1994; Hornbacher, 1999; Klug & Jackson, 2004; Kolker, 
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1996; Linton, 2007; Oakley, 2007; Sparkes, 1996, Tillman-Healey, 1992, Thomas-MacLean, 
2004), I had no memory of ever being or experiencing anything else.  
Not only that, but I grew up with the condition, but without peers. My paediatric renal specialist 
arranged his clinics so that his little patients never had to wait to see him. He believed that 
children should not be in hospital any longer than necessary and he tried to make our lives as 
much like those of our healthy peers as possible. This meant we never met other child patients 
unless we were hospitalised and I never was as a child. I had no other child narratives against 
which to compare the fragile beginnings of my own. So I scoured the literature for children’s 
stories of renal failure. I came up empty-handed (Richards, 2008). I discovered that others 
have had as little success in unearthing children’s renal narratives (Darbyshire et al., 2006; 
Nicholas, Picone & Selkirk, 2011). 
In piecing together my ancient narrative, I resorted to bricolage by using what was available to 
me to carry out the study (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Kincheloe, 2001). How to tell it was a 
problem. There was so much to say and yet so little on which to peg it. Because I was writing 
about experiences that occurred long ago and over a lengthy period, I found I did not have 
specific events or conversations on which to base my narrative, although one or two came 
back to me after some writing. Instead the narrative was a type of blurring together of many 
repeated events (all those clinic visits, the endless food restrictions and, of course, the blood-
taking). I suspect my story gushed out of me so strongly from relief at finally being able to tell 
it. This left me with a feeling of being overwhelmed. This could have been due to the sheer 
quantity of what I found myself writing, or it could have been an accurate recollection of how I 
felt about my situation as a child. I realise now how helpless and how passive I was in the face 
of overwhelming illness and overwhelming medical care in which I had no say. I think I knew it. 
By the time I was in my early twenties my dreams show this clearly. 
The first part of my story in the chronological sense is difficult to situate in a postmodern 
narrative, when it is almost pre-historic. It is very easy to fall back into the traditional view that 
story-telling is an act of memory alone. It is particularly easy when the events you are writing 
about happened long ago and you are cudgelling your brains to remember them. Who you 
were then is not quite who you are now and, at the same time, it is. It is as if your narrative self 
– both the self you are constructing in the narrative and yourself as narrator – are a “third” 
version of you. These entities are not you present or past, but a blurring of the two and, at the 
same time, someone else. 
Moreover, each narrative is the intersection of many other narratives. A snippet of a childhood 
composition about favourite things occurs at a moment when one is also afraid of needles, 
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being hit by one’s sibling, escaping a horrid ballet class and not being allowed the favourite 
foods one so craves with every skinny fibre of one’s 9-year-old body. Are these subtexts in 
one’s official narrative about the sunny side of life? Yes and no. I can see the gaps, fissures 
and omissions in my own narrative, but I doubt any other reader could. 
4.2 Why I decided to use artefacts and how I found them 
Muncey (2005), in her autoethnographic description of her teenage mother status and growth 
into a new identity, chose to use certain artefacts from her past to explain her experience and 
to deconstruct it so that she could make a new identity. It was not always clear whether she 
saw that story-telling was also story-making and not only an act of memory. My impression 
was that she was writing back, trying to create a type of counter-narrative (Nelson, 2001) to 
society’s master narrative concerning teenage mothers and that this narrative was an exercise 
in recovering a lost voice. Her approach to autoethnography was in the tradition of Pratt 
(1992), writing back to power. In doing this and in using the artefacts at her disposal 
(photographs, epaulettes, a childhood book), she deconstructs the master narrative ironically 
through using narratives that others have made of her life. She does not remain in the place 
she started from, disempowered and voiceless, and so evades the fate of becoming 
entrenched in a narrative position of victimhood that Buzard (1999) warns against. 
Reading Muncey’s article inspired me to do something similar. Those early years of kidney 
disease occurred when I was so very young that I had no narrative of my own. Instead I was 
surrounded by and infused with others’ narratives of me and my medical situation. Of course 
the dominant narrative, following the crisis of HUS, was medical. This narrative necessity was 
compounded by my family being medical too. My mother was a nursing sister, my father a 
medical doctor. They tended to see things in medical terms. Some of the doctors who treated 
me were also their friends and colleagues. So mine was a very medical story. I should say 
instead that the story about me was a medical one, because the story was not mine, but other 
people’s. 
I would tell it too, when required. I knew it by heart. There were two versions. The first 
concerned the actual events of my medical crisis. I developed fevers and seizures at 8 
months. I was rushed to hospital. No one knew what was wrong with me until I started 
haemolysing – meshes of platelets formed in my blood vessels and shredded my red blood 
cells. I bled internally, on the brain, in my organs. My body could not take the strain and I burst 
a hole in my heart, my liver shut down and my kidneys ceased working for 12 days. Blood 
transfusions saved me and, because I was so young, I was resilient enough to heal. The hole 
in my heart closed, my liver and kidneys began to work again. But my kidneys had been 
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scarred. This affected my blood pressure, which in turn scarred them more. It was a vicious 
cycle. Although I was treated for high blood pressure, the damage was irreversible. Diet and 
medication could only slow down the inevitable: I was going to go into kidney failure. It was 
only a matter of when. 
The second version of the story was my mother’s. It concerned all the medical details 
described above, but it included her role in saving my life. It was she who had rushed me to 
hospital when others dismissed my illness as a childhood fever; it was she who had diagnosed 
my condition and it was she who had hidden the half-used bottle of blood from my first 
transfusion, in case I should need another. When I haemolysed a second time, she whipped 
the blood out of the back of the ward fridge and presented it to my doctors immediately. If they 
had had to wait for the blood to come from the blood bank, I would have died. 
These narratives developed and replicated themselves as I grew up. Essentially they were 
always the same. The medical narrative explained my condition in terms of my blood pressure 
and creatinine levels, while my mother’s narrative explained my health as a result of her 
vigilance and knowledge of what my readings meant. This showed that she was a good 
mother and a good nurse. Both my mother and my doctor predicted my future based on their 
narratives of my present. Here is where they diverged from each other. My doctor saw kidney 
failure as inevitable and spoke of transplantation. My mother saw my health continuing and 
transplantation as a vague eventuality when I was much older and if I had experienced future 
unfortunate events. 
However, something was missing. By the time I was in kidney failure, in my late teens, I still 
had no narrative of my own and this was beginning to worry me, although I could not articulate 
why. Both the narratives with which I had grown up seemed incomplete to me, but when I tried 
to tell the story myself, I could not find a way of adding to what I had been told. After all, the 
story of a medical condition would have to be medical, wouldn’t it? It took me many years to 
realise that I had been so affected by the medical narrative of my condition that I had not seen 
that I was not a medical condition myself. The stories were not about me at all. The medical 
one was about the progression of a disease and its effects on internal organs. My mother’s 
one was about her struggles as a parent to help her child survive a medical condition. I barely 
featured in them. I came to see that even when I told the stories I was an unconscious baby in 
some and the passive recipient of others’ care and decisions in others. This was at odds with 
my lived experience of the disease and its treatments. In short, what did it mean to me (Garro 
& Mattingly, 2000)? 
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I did not know what to make of it all. I suppose the narrative, had it existed, would have been, 
in some senses, a chaos narrative (Frank, 1995). But I could not tell the story and so it could 
not become a narrative. After transplant I tried for about six months, but could not get beyond 
explaining what my blood results meant and describing my prognosis. Others were eager to 
help by telling their versions of the new phase of the story and soon I began to notice a 
difference between their perceptions and mine. I gave up on telling the story of my descent 
into kidney failure. I decided it belonged in the past. I had a working kidney and a future. I 
chose to focus on that. I seldom referred to my medical condition any longer. I made sure I 
could pass as “normal” and considered it a success when people I encountered saw me as 
such. After five to ten years I grew used to my condition. I didn’t even see a renal specialist for 
a decade. I was like “everybody else”. Then, 16 years after transplant, it all came undone with 
my brush with the insurance company, and when I started my doctoral research, all I could 
write about was the endless renal diets, needles and pills that punctuated (and punctured) my 
childhood. 
So I decided to reclaim my story, to write a story that was truly mine, and Muncey’s (2005) way 
of using artefacts seemed a good place to start. All I needed was a few artefacts of the 
experience and soon my own story would emerge, deconstructing the narratives that had 
defined my life for so long. Photographs, medical paraphernalia, pill bottles – how difficult 
could it be? I found that I had kept nothing of those years. I had not been hospitalised until my 
late teens, when my kidneys were failing. I had no photographs of key moments, because 
there were no key moments. Kidney failure is a slow, subtle and painless descent. I had no 
crises as I slid into it. It was only five years after transplant (when I was 27) that I realised how 
much I had deteriorated after the age of eleven. I can see now how much of a struggle my late 
childhood and adolescence had been, but at the time I did not see it and so did not 
commemorate it. 
If I were to find artefacts from that period (and I was determined to), I would have to be 
creative. Eventually, after much searching I recovered three snapshots. Only they weren’t 
photographs. They were metaphorical snapshots. But they were better than photographs. Two 
were something I had made at the time and one was something an important person in my life 
had made. Not only that, but these “snapshots” were all in writing. 
I would like to say that I chose the three snapshots on which to base my discussion in this 
chapter. However, I didn’t really have much choice. When I went back through things I’d 
written while growing up, I found that although there were a lot of pieces (I have always kept 
my writing), my medical condition was notable by its absence in them. Although I wrote a lot, I 
was not a very confiding child. I never wrote about my illness in the first 20 years of my life, 
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except on the two occasions I record here. That in itself says something. Out of necessity the 
middle snapshot is written by somebody else. I think that says something too. Ironically I have 
had to borrow stories all the way along to understand my own better.  
Whether my resolute silence on the topic of my health was the result of denial, fear, emotional 
fatigue or a response to the unspeakable I do not know, but as an adult I find it perturbing. I 
would like to think it was childish ignorance, but I know better. I was there. There are 
advantages to living in denial – you can avoid pain for a period, you can pretend things are as 
you would want them to be, you can save others unhappiness. This technique has been used 
in medical practice for years (Chen, 2007; Good, Munakata, Kobayashi, Mattingly & Good, 
1994; Marzano, 2009). I learned it from the best – doctors who work with dread diseases and 
their effects every day. My silence is, in some senses, a medical one. You were not supposed 
to cry when they stuck needles in you. You were supposed to be grateful when your condition 
could have been so much worse. Above all, you were supposed to be brave and show 
confidence in what was being done to you. You were, after all, fortunate enough to be treated. 
You cannot believe how devastating it is to find the treatment you adhered to so well and for 
so long is no longer working. 
Narratives perform many different functions: they communicate experience, they (re)construct 
the self, they mediate the personal and the cultural (Mattingly & Garro, 2000). I have seen in 
my own narrative that narratives have a way of containing experiences and risk occluding 
anxiety-provoking ideas (see snapshot one below). So I shall attempt to fill in some of the gaps 
afterwards. Generally in postmodern writing revealing the gaps, fissures and cracks in 
narratives can deconstruct the narratives (Derrida, 1998; Selden, 1985). In this part of my 
narrative(s) there seems to be little else than gaps. Of course, in writing about this part of my 
life, in creating a narrative from so many gaps, I veer close to normalising and smoothing the 
narrative (Nelson, 2001; Spence, 1986). 
The first snapshot is an excerpt from my school composition and comprehension book when I 
was nine. This was a couple of years after I started seeing my paediatric renal specialist, 
Paul.4 By the time of this snapshot I was familiar enough with the routine of clinic, blood tests 
and diet. The second is a fragment of a poem a young fellow patient wrote when we were in 
our early teens, in the middle phase of chronic renal failure. The third snapshot is a description 
of a dream I had in 1990, not long before I went onto dialysis. I was 21. 
                                                    
4
 I have changed the names of people I refer to, so that their anonymity can be preserved. 
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My snapshots are “milestones in a journey” (Muncey, 2005). Although they are part of a 
journey I have taken, they are strangely unfamiliar to me when viewed from a distance. They 
were none of them defining moments when I experienced them, but became defined moments 
when I wrote them down or memorised them. I unwittingly gave them definition when I did this 
aged 9, aged 12 and aged 21. 
4.3 Three verbal snapshots 
4.3.1 Snapshot 1: Composition and comprehension (1979) 
My best food is smoked salmon, jam-tart and pepper mint (sic) creams and roast lamb. 
But I have got a high blood cholestrol (sic) and can only eat special diary (sic) products 
and cut the fat off my meat. 
(Rose Richards, “Composition and Comprehension”, 1979) 
In 1979 I was four months shy of turning 10. I was in standard three at St Katharine’s, an 
Anglican girls’ school in Johannesburg. It had been almost exactly nine years since I had 
contracted HUS. At first, when I reread my piece of childhood writing after an absence of many 
years, I decided that I must have thought I led a perfectly normal life, because it was all I 
knew. This must have been why I didn’t mention my kidney problems or the clinic visits or 
medications. On reflection I suspect that I must have known it was not normal, because I 
explained briefly what a high blood cholesterol meant in terms of diet as if I did not expect my 
teacher to know. I also have a vague memory of my mother advising me here. I asked her how 
to spell “cholesterol” and when I told her why I needed to use the word, she suggested an 
explanation of what that implied. I didn’t mention the things that caused me anxiety, the terrible 
and incessant needles, the pills, the clinic visits, the medical narrative of doom that was 
unfolding inexorably, despite my best efforts. 
My teacher, Mrs Livingston, had asked our class to write about ourselves and we obediently 
wrote out small, wobbly essays about how we looked, who our siblings and parents were, and 
what we liked to do for hobbies. I listed gymnastics as my hobby and described it taciturnly as 
“fun”. We were sure to put in a good word about our school. According to me, St Katharine’s 
was “lovely”.  
The parts of the essay on which I spent the most time were my brother (his appearance and 
proclivity for hitting me “allmost (sic) all the time”) and food. Rather sadly all the foods I listed 
were forbidden foods in terms of renal diets of the 1970s. Salmon, lamb and chocolate-coated 
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peppermint fondants contain too much cholesterol. Salmon and lamb are also full of salt and 
protein. By then my diet was fairly restricted. 
I did not hit my brother back. It never occurred to me to do so. He was two years and eight 
months younger than me. Officially I was the big sister and care-taker. I had been taught not to 
hit. Privately I knew I was not strong enough to fight back. I was not growing as fast as I ought 
to have been. He stood shoulder to shoulder with me and was more than my weight. This had 
been so since he was 4 years old and I was 6 years old and 8 months. We looked like fraternal 
twins, a pretty little pigeon pair in matching shorts and T-shirts. Dressing alike seemed to 
pacify him. Maybe he resented the extra attention I got for having to go to the doctor every 
three months for blood tests, taking antihypertensives and anti-gout medication each day and 
having to keep to an increasingly restricted diet. Mom worried about me constantly and saw 
me as frail. If I had the suggestion of a temperature she tucked me into bed. My brother by 
contrast was seen as tough and strong – a big boy. 
Because I was small and slender, I was always being seen as years younger than I actually 
was. I hated it. It was one of the reasons I had left ballet a few months previously. I had started 
ballet because my gym teacher had suggested it would give me grace and poise. It was the 
beginner group. My class mates were 6. I was 9. My ballet teacher had tried to pass me off as 
7 to the examiners. I was so outraged I thought I’d explode. This was the worst of many 
humiliations I had had to endure in her class, from being jeered at by school mates whose 
younger sisters were in my class to being told that I looked strange when I tried to conform to 
the discipline’s inflexible rules.  
For the exam, each member of the class had to do the “Dolly dance” individually for the 
examiners. It was very formal. We had to walk into the room in a certain balletic way, curtsey 
to the examiners and be introduced to them by our teacher. We were not allowed to speak. 
But when she told them I was 7, I whispered indignantly, “I’m not!” The teacher smiled stiffly 
and repeated, “Seven years old” in a quelling way. I shouted, “I’m nine!” Later, after the exam 
was over, she asked if I’d be back the following year and I shouted, “No!” 
As with ballet, when I read journal now about the food issue, it clearly was a big issue. The diet 
became increasingly and regularly more restrictive. Food is an inescapable part of life. For 
more years than I care to calculate, every day, three times a day I forced myself to eat meals I 
found unpalatable, could not taste because of the toxins that saturated my system and for 
which I had decreasing appetite. Even today, nearly 20 years after transplant, food is still a 
weighty emotional issue for me. This aspect of kidney disease is often not understood by 
researchers, because they have not lived it. Food is beautiful. It has colours, flavours, textures 
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– and this diet takes all that away. Combine this with the lack of appetite and the way in which 
your sense of taste changes as you become more and more toxic and you have a recipe for 
wanting to eat other things. It’s also difficult to organise a diet such as this in a normal 
environment with friends and family needing proper food. That’s why the patients in Faber et 
al.’s study wanted to be normal – not because they felt it made them look sick. That’s the 
outsider interpretation of Faber et al. (2003). I used to fantasise about steaks, while eating 
matchbox-sized pieces of meat and leached vegetables.   
One of the few promises I made myself about life after transplant was that I would never eat 
anything I didn’t want to eat or deny myself anything I did want to eat. I would always eat as 
much as I liked of anything. I would never diet again. I would accept my weight at whatever it 
settled at. These promises I have kept. I weigh 25 kilograms more than I did after transplant. I 
am however still within the normal weight range for my height. 
Weight became an issue during my teens, but not in the way it usually is for adolescent girls. 
My growth slowed down even further and I started to waste away. In my late teens I could 
pass as a schoolchild between 12 and 14. I could still shop in the children’s department. In my 
mid-teens this used to irritate and embarrass me. In my late teens I found it amusing and 
enjoyed passing myself off as a child prodigy. I seemed to freeze in time during my teens. I did 
not grow much. I did not develop much after puberty. My hair and nails barely grew. Even 
emotionally and intellectually I seemed to not be able to move forward. These days I find it 
difficult to work out how old I am in photographs taken during my teens and so they would not 
have done as artefacts. I can usually only guess at my age by my context or clothing. I looked 
the same for years. I grew after transplant. 
*** 
I found my school essay by chance in a cupboard, while looking for something else. I had 
decided to include it in this chapter for over two weeks before I saw what was missing from my 
essay: the illness itself. True, high blood cholesterol was the reason I was on a restricted diet, 
but the reason I had an elevated cholesterol was because I was in chronic kidney failure. At 9 I 
knew that my kidneys were damaged. I knew some of the work that kidneys do (pass urine). I 
knew they were vital organs. I knew that means you cannot live without them. 
Adults think that children do not understand what death means. This is not true. I never had 
the comforting illusion of immortality that some people have well into adulthood. As a small 
child, before I could talk properly and when I was still young enough to be wearing nappies, I 
used to get croup. This was not long after I had recovered from HUS.  
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Everyone of us has those dark secrets that only we know about. This was mine. Each night, as 
I lay in my crib with the high white sides, or later in my little bed, in the dark, I would listen. Not 
for the reassuring murmur of grown-up voices from beyond the door. Not for the rustling of 
birds or branches, but for breathing. My own. I knew that if I was not breathing, I would die. I 
had heard the grown-ups say so. They did not like me to cry. I was not supposed to and I 
could not talk well enough to explain to them why I was so upset. So I learned not to cry. 
Instead, I learned to listen to my breathing. In and out. In and out. In and out. Over and over. 
As long as I was breathing, I would be all right. 
There was only one problem. When I didn’t have croup, I couldn’t hear my breathing. So I 
used to breathe harder, through my mouth, so that I could always be sure I would survive. I 
worried about falling asleep too. I would not be able to monitor my breathing. Not to worry. My 
mother found me some tiny illustrated books of child’s prayers and my grandmother would 
often read them to me. Sometimes we’d read through the book together and look at the 
pictures. Soon I could read myself. But by then I had already become familiar with “Matthew, 
Mark, Luke and John”. To my mother and others it was just a charming rhyme. To my 
grandmother it was a comfort. To me it was a death threat: 
Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, 
Bless the bed that I lie on. 
Four corners to my bed, 
Four angels round my head: 
One to watch and one to pray, 
And two to bear my soul away. 
 (Tudor, 1964) 
Life was never something I could take for granted. But I veered between struggling to stay 
alive and simply accepting that clinic visits, blood tests, restricted diet and medication were a 
normal part of my life. For a long time I felt normal. Chronic disease can be like that. Inside me 
my kidneys were atrophying, but this did not hurt. Slowly, very slowly, my body was filling up 
with creatinine and urea. My kidneys could not filter these toxins efficiently as their glomeruli 
(filtering parts) became scarred and thickened. And my kidneys began to shrink into 
themselves as their inner workings gradually ceased to function. 
I was losing a set of vital organs and their gradual demise was being charted by my doctor 
every three months. Each time I went to him I came away with more dietary restrictions, 
different blood pressure medication and new instructions regarding the decreasing amount of 
exercise I should do. I simply gritted my teeth and went along with it all. I did not feel loss so 
much as limitation, restriction and deprivation. I felt my world getting smaller as I got bigger.  
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Restriction was counter-balanced by my own physical deterioration. My appetite diminished 
and my growth slowed. I was always tired. It did not matter after a while that my food was 
boring. I could not really taste it. I did not want to run around a lot or go out late with friends. 
Social events took too much energy from me. So I did not develop a desire to go to parties and 
drink alcohol or experiment with drugs. I stayed home with my books. I suppose in some ways 
kidney failure made me who I am today.  
*** 
Here is what I remember about my diet in those early years. It was to become very much 
stricter in the next decade. In 2007 I started writing a journal about what I remembered of 
those times and to make it easier to begin telling my own story, I began with the medical parts 
that dominated my life for so long. Food featured prominently in my journal: 
The renal diet was a bit of a shock. It started out as fairly low protein, very low salt and very 
low cholesterol. Mom consoled herself that this was a healthy way of eating, but it 
essentially meant that our household cooking had to change. I remember my mother being 
flustered and anxious, trying to work out what could stay and what had to go. Essentially 
dairy products and meats were out, and so were foods that had preservatives. We had 
never eaten much junk food, so this didn’t matter. However, salt could also be found in 
cooking spices, baked goods, biscuits, most recipes and, well, table salt. No salt on your 
food at the table. No salt in the meal as it was cooking. No salt on your popcorn in the 
movies. 
Mom decided the easiest way of doing things would be to have everyone eat a low salt and 
low cholesterol diet. It was, after all, healthier. She didn’t think she could restrict everyone’s 
protein too though. My father liked his meat and my brother was growing. So was I. She 
worried about my brain development, but went out at once and replaced our food with low 
fat and salt free food and threw out the newly unhealthy foods. She also threw out her 
recipes that were no longer healthy. She liked to cook and tried to make a challenge out of 
cooking without salt and cholesterol. It was a bit more of a challenge than she bargained 
for and she found her repertoire shrinking. She also found it was not practical to present 
guests with low fat, low salt dishes. We could get used to flavouring our foods with herbs 
and not salt or fat, but guests needed the real thing. So apparently did my father. 
They used to fight about that. He would cut the fat off his chops with surgical precision 
before my renal diet started. Now he was fantasising about chickens roasted in butter 
(which we no longer kept in the house). And baking didn’t taste the same with low-fat 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
102 
 
margarine. Nonetheless my mother continued to discard the unhealthy foods from the 
kitchen cupboards and the fridge. 
I was recruited to help her. It was for my own good, she told me. I had to know how to look 
after myself. I remember her crouching down in front of the deep cupboard that held a type 
of carousel which you could spin around to reach things at the back. She had a black 
dustbin bag, filled with packets of this and sachets of that and she was industriously 
tossing into it more malefactors, after checking their ingredients and nodding, “yes, salt” or 
“protein, of course, and that means cholesterol too”. There was not much left at the end. 
So she bought new stuff. Margarine for butter. Low fat milk when it became more readily 
available. Egg powder for eggs. Orley Whip5 for cream. She tried to make my food as 
interesting as possible, but Orley Whip doesn’t taste anything like cream and I came to 
hate the mocking whoosh as it puffed out of its can onto my tinned peaches. I soon 
decided I’d rather go without cream at all than endure Orley Whip’s oily froth anymore. 
There was also junket and blancmange. They were horrible. The egg powder was pretty 
vile too. It came in plastic bags, inside little cardboard boxes, with its own yellow plastic 
scoop. I cannot for the life of me remember what it was called, only that its name was a 
grisly pun. I soon deleted that from my diet. Mom saw it as ungratefulness. I had to make 
an effort, she would shout at me, after all, she couldn’t do it on her own. I had to take 
responsibility. I was seven. I tried. I really did. I notice searching the internet now that there 
are other things you can use to substitute for eggs – oils, bananas, even baking soda. We 
didn’t do that though. I remember her scoffing at that as desperate and unappetising. I 
think my mother wanted to keep things as much the same as before the diet as possible. 
But food gets into everything and every aspect of your life. You have to eat three times a 
day every day. There is no putting it off. 
There were other things I couldn’t have. I remember being invited to a birthday party 
around that time – maybe a year later – and Mom was discussing the party with Paul. I was 
lying on the examination table, watching the patterns of blue hospital initials against white 
starched sheets. They looked like flowers. I had looked at the neon lights in the ceiling and 
the rungs of the curtain which was never drawn around the examination table. It had a 
different pattern to the sheets. Stripes, I think. The top sheet was worn and its edges had 
started to fray. It also had a bit of red ink on it from the laundry stamp. It was very clean. I 
could hear big people walking about in the corridor and nurses talking to each other. It was 
a funny thing about the paediatric renal clinic. You never saw other kids. 
                                                    
5
 Orley Whip is a non-dairy cream alternative. 
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“It’s quite all right for her to go,” he told her. “She must just be careful not to overdo it. The 
weather’s hot and she mustn’t get dehydrated.” 
“Did you hear that?” said Mom to me. “You must drink lots of fluids. Every half hour.” 
“Every hour would be enough,” said Paul. 
“Can I play games?” I asked. 
“Yes, just don’t let yourself get tired. Rest in between.” 
“So you don’t put strain on your body,” said Mom. “Don’t let those kids run you into the 
ground!” 
They never did. I used to run them. I was going to say so, but decided against it. I knew 
what was coming next, but it was worse than I imagined. And it wasn’t bloods. 
“Be careful what you eat,” said Paul. “No egg sandwiches…” 
“I don’t like eggs,” I said, relieved, but he continued. 
“No chips, no ice cream, no nuts, no cookies, no Niknaks.6 You can eat sweets as long as 
they’re not chocolate, no …” 
I assessed each treat as it passed me by. I loved chips. I quite liked ice cream. I enjoyed 
nuts. I couldn’t care less about cookies. They were in the egg sandwich category as far as I 
was concerned. They took too much chewing I loved Niknaks too. I liked chocolate, but 
could do without it. However, sweets in general didn’t interest me much. Where was this 
going to end? What sort of a party would it be? I would have to sit in the shade watching 
other children play and then stand at the edges of the crowd watching them eat. I wished 
Mom had not told him about the party. I felt more stressed as each item rolled off his 
tongue. By the time he got to Niknaks, I was still clutching chips, and something snapped. 
“Can I have any birthday cake?” I blurted out. 
Paul stopped his list and looked at me with melancholy eyes. 
“I don’t know what the icing will be,” I mumbled. “It might be butter or it might be royal. 
Maybe it will be an ice cream cake. Michele had one last year, with a Barbie doll in it, but I 
don’t know. It wasn’t all ice cream. There was a sponge cake inside, but the ice cream was 
                                                    
6
 Niknaks are a type of puffy corn chip. 
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thick and pink and white, in ruffles, like a skirt. So it’s not solid ice cream – it might not even 
be real ice cream. It might be like Orley Whip, but thicker and I could maybe have a small 
piece…” 
“Of course you can have birthday cake,” he said rather sadly, I thought. 
I wondered if he were disappointed in me for not “playing the game”, as Mom would call it, 
and making the best of my new restrictions.  He didn’t seem angry. 
“Just have one piece though,” he said. 
(Richards, undated journal entry, 2007) 
I think I secretly believed that if I kept to my diet I would get better and be rewarded with 
treats whenever I wanted them, like other people had. I would at last be allowed to be 
carefree, the way my friends were. I didn’t feel unwell – at least not that I was aware of. But 
my disease was a wasting disease and it was insidiously wearing me away. My slow 
growth was an outer sign. So was my slenderness. My pallor. I used to get sick quite easily 
and I notice, looking back over my school reports how often I was off school. It was easily 
twenty-something days in the year. To be honest I wasn’t always at Death’s door. If I didn’t 
feel perky or enthusiastic about the day’s classes I could easily talk my mother into keeping 
me home. Sometimes she even suggested it. 
…The treats I used to get when I was sick were often cheating treats. Chips, salty packets 
of soup, chocolates, cheddar cheese. Chocolate digestive biscuits. As my diet got stricter 
and my mother more frantic, Paul suggested we cheat sometimes. In fact he strongly 
advised it. 
“Are you sure it’s all right?” my mother said dubiously. 
“Yes, it’s healthy and keeps one going,” said Paul. “Go out for a treat once a month and let 
her eat whatever she likes.” 
So we did. When I was in high school, Mom used to pick me up from school on my early 
days (usually a Tuesday) and we’d go to one of several coffee shops in Rosebank or 
Sandton and have something special. At the Oslo, we’d have venison soup and 
homemade bread and butter. At Steffanie’s we’d have meringues and cream (real cream). 
At the funky sports place in Sandton, we’d have non-alcoholic tomato cocktails with salt 
and pepper and a bowl of raspberry gelato. At the Sandton Sun hotel, it would be rock 
shandies and shrimp cocktails. It was like Christmas, but without the anxiety. 
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But I can eat them now. Mom’s story would be one of triumph – look what I can eat 
because I did what I was supposed to do. Mine is one of scarring. I still feel like looking 
over my shoulder if I buy chips. I still am eaten by guilt and a combination of thrill and 
anxiety. I eat a lot of things I “shouldn’t” now. I wonder how my arteries are. Sometimes I 
go for cholesterol testing. It’s slightly above what is considered desirable, but it never 
changes. For me that means it never gets higher. Considering what I eat, I would be very 
surprised if it got lower. 
(Richards, undated journal entry, 2007) 
Something I had not mentioned at all in my composition and comprehension book was 
something that for most people is a clear and unmistakeable trapping of illness and to be 
resisted at all costs: pills. I have taken them every morning of my life since I was seven years 
old. I still do. The pills change over the decades, but the routine does not. At the time of writing 
the piece about the food I liked, I had been taking pills for almost three years. I wrote about 
pill-taking in my journal: 
Pill-taking is a field of study on its own. How patients with chronic medical conditions take 
(or don’t take) their medicine is especially interesting to doctors and pharmacists.  
Compliance in pill-taking is a big area of debate. 
I know, when I was growing up, that my doctor was very concerned about lack of 
compliance amongst his adolescent patients. He used to lecture me about it, while he took 
my blood and did my obs. He used to tell me that when people became adolescents they 
became rebellious and would even do things that were not good for them. He told me 
about teenagers in his care who had lost their kidneys because they had stopped taking 
their pills and sticking to their diets. I stuck to my diet and never missed my pills. I took 
small amounts of different beta-blockers (antihypertensives whose dose changed over the 
years) and Zyloprim for my gout. I only lost my kidneys in my early twenties. 
I could never understand why other patients were so emotional about the pills. They didn’t 
taste of anything unless you held them in your mouth for too long. Then they tasted bitter, 
but a few sips of water and a quick swill would take it away. They took seconds to swallow. 
Apparently taking them made some people feel bad about themselves and to see 
themselves as defective. I found this strange. I did not feel defective particularly and I 
reasoned that we were taking pills because we were ill, not ill because we were taking pills. 
I suggested my doctor explain this to his other patients, but he looked sceptical about it. 
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After I moved to the adult unit at nineteen (my doctor hung onto his patients as long as 
possible and told me he’d look after me until I was 25 if my kidney function held out, but it 
didn’t), I noticed that adults were even more fussy about their pills. They never liked them. 
Never liked taking them and complained about them constantly. Especially about the side 
effects. I thought they were babyish. I kept on taking mine. I had had some side effects in 
my last couple of years at school, but my doctor had changed my pills to new ones that 
didn’t have side effects. Of course the doctors on the adult clinic didn’t listen to us as 
carefully as my doctor did. This might have been part of the reason there was a problem... 
So how did it begin? Almost as soon as I had seen Paul for the first time, at seven, I was 
put onto antihypertensives. My blood pressure must already have been elevated. I felt 
pretty much as I had always felt. While taking the pills, I felt as I had always felt too. My 
mother found a baumanometer to read my BP at home. It was in a silver metal case, the 
length of a loaf of bread and had a silky grey blue cuff that wrapped around your arm. The 
cuff was very long, like a scarf and the part of it nearest the two rubber tubes contained an 
inflatable rubber pad. 
…The BP pills were not designed for children either, but luckily Paul had years of 
experience in calculating the right doses. All I needed to take was a quarter of one tablet a 
day. This meant of course that the pills had to be cut into quarters. Breaking them in half 
was easy enough, because they were scored down the middle. You had to be careful 
though to break them evenly. With such small does, two thirds instead of a half would drop 
my blood pressure to a dangerous low. The trick was to take a heavy-bladed knife, with a 
sharp point and to rest the sharp point in the middle of the score mark, push it in and chop. 
That was the easy part. Once the tablet was halved, the difficult part came. It now had to 
be halved again and this time with no score marks. It was impossible to break it into 
quarters, even with Mom’s strong fingers and tough nails. My fingers were too little and my 
nails too soft and flaky. They just broke or peeled if I tried. So we had to practice with the 
knife again. It took quite a lot of trial and error before we got the knack. 
A couple of years after I started with Tenormin, I had to start taking Zyloprim. It was for 
gout. Uric acid crystals were accumulating in my joints because my kidneys weren’t filtering 
uric acid out of my system efficiently. My joints were sore, especially my ankles. They felt 
hot too sometimes and even swelled up a bit. My mother said I should tell Paul, so I did. At 
first he said they were growth pains, but I wasn’t growing very fast. I told him so. He felt my 
ankles.   
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… To my dismay, Paul said he was going to draw blood. More blood. He’d just taken some. 
I hated having blood taken. Maybe he was cross about how I’d spoken to him. I wanted to 
cry. 
Yes, something else I didn’t mention in my school essay was blood-taking. I could manage 
the clinics, the examinations and the pills, but the blood-taking defeated me time after time. 
Even today the thought of needles makes my insides quiver. I do find it interesting that I 
refer to my cholesterol levels as “a high blood cholestrol”. It is medically accurate (other 
than the spelling), but usually one talks informally of a “high cholesterol”. The blood leaked 
into my thoughts anyway – and with that, how it was taken out of me. 
… The result of that particular test was that I did indeed have elevated uric acid levels in 
my blood. This meant that I had to be very careful about the protein I consumed, so there 
was less of that than before. I loved meat. I couldn’t believe it. I wished I hadn’t mentioned 
it. 
It also meant that I had to take Zyloprim. These tablets were white and small and didn’t 
have to be broken. I took varying amounts of them because we never seemed to be able to 
get the doses quite right, although they were apparently easier to adapt for children. I also 
remember Paul examining my skin minutely after I started taking them. He’d start by 
looking closely at the backs of my hands and then my arms. He’d look at the skin on my 
stomach while palpating my abdomen and skim over my legs, paying close attention to my 
ankles and feet. 
I see, researching Zyloprim, that the most frequent adverse reaction to Zyloprim is “skin 
rash”. Furthermore, “skin reactions can be severe and sometimes fatal”. My source does 
not say how… Terminal rashes must have been what he was looking for. All he ever turned 
up were spider nevi, little red spots like pin pricks on the backs of my hands. These can be 
the sign of an underlying systemic disorder, especially if there are more than five, but there 
seems to be some debate about how reliable an indicator they really are of, for instance, 
liver disease, since healthy children often get them too. Nonetheless, Paul wasn’t taking 
any chances. We counted my spider nevi and tested my blood, adjusted my doses, felt my 
ankles. Mom put me on multivitamins too. 
And so we continued until my mother became seriously ill when I was nine. She developed 
septic arthritis and spent several months in hospital. My brother and I went to stay with her 
parents. They took me to clinic every three months, collected my prescription every month 
and Granny and I handled my medicine at home. Mom had always made sure that I knew 
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what I took and how much, although she’d done most of the cutting. She’d also monitored 
my taking the pills every morning.   
Now Granny did that, but she was old and frail. Her sight had almost gone completely and 
she walked with a white cane. She had a lot on her mind, with Mom being so ill and I didn’t 
want to worry her, so I made sure I remembered my pills each morning. This meant that 
when she asked me about them at breakfast I could tell her I had already taken them. This 
made her look pleased, so I developed an elephant’s memory about them and never 
missed a dose. If she forgot once in a while to ask me at breakfast if I’d taken them, I would 
remind her to do so or mention that I had, in fact, already taken them. I also found myself 
cutting the pills. It was rather boring, but we decided that I’d sit down at the kitchen table 
immediately after coming home from clinic, without even changing out of my school 
uniform, and start cutting up the Tenormin.   
Granny would fetch the cheese board and the knife. I had to tell her which knife would work 
best (not serrated, pointed tip), although their knives were not the same as ours. And off I’d 
go. It could take an hour. Granny would talk to me while I cut and she’d get started on the 
supper preparations. She was a teacher and I was her eldest grandchild. She would ask 
me about school and test me on my homework. Or we’d talk about what I’d been reading or 
the adventures my toys were having. Most of my toys were animals that behaved like 
people, wore clothes and talked English. She would make them little notebooks so they 
could record their thoughts (inscribed, “To Pink Panther, with love from Granny”) and would 
remember all the things they got up to between our conversations.   
(Richards, undated journal entry, 2007) 
I was a great one for not mentioning things. Interestingly I seem to recall that I wrote the essay 
of this first snapshot while waiting in hospital. Not for my turn at having bloods taken, but for 
visiting time to see my mother. She had been admitted for septic arthritis and nearly died. I 
wrote it kneeling on the floor next to my grandmother in the waiting room at Sandton Clinic. I 
have a very strong memory of doing this, but I could have sworn that my mother had been ill 
the previous year. 
4.3.2 Snapshot 2: Blood and urine (1983) 
Buckets full of urine 
Syringes full of blood. 
If a little extra 
Feed the geraniums in the mud. 
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(Eddie Davidson, c. 1981) 
I am not present in this snapshot, although it conveniently falls roughly midway between the 
other two. Why include it at all? I included it because I wanted to make a point and by so doing 
I am deliberately shaping this part of my narrative. I am also undoing what I set out to do in the 
first snapshot, where I tried to recover my own lost story in the face of the stories of others with 
which I was constantly assailed. My story is once again being told through the stories of 
others. This may be postmodern, after all, as I am transgressing my original “law” (Selden, 
1985) to tell my own story and not work through the stories of others. It is certainly expedient. 
After all I wrote very little about my medical condition growing up.  
The poem is by a fellow patient at the paediatric renal unit of the Johannesburg General 
Hospital. I would have been about 12 at the time it was written. I never met Eddie, although we 
were treated by the same doctor and were patients at the same unit for roughly the same 
amount of time. He was about a year and a half older than me and had his first transplant at 8. 
Our doctor’s consulting room walls were covered by pictures and poems from his little patients. 
Most of the contributions were from Eddie at the time of his second transplant. He wrote on 
pumpkin-yellow paper with thick felt-tipped pens. Sometimes he illustrated his poems with 
pictures of bright flowers in pots and round-eyed, smiley faces peeping over window ledges. 
The poem above was only one of his contributions. 
When my mother saw Eddie’s drawings and poems she urged me to contribute something too 
and I said I would. But when I got home I couldn’t think of anything to say. Eddie seemed to 
have said it all. I was impressed at his daring, writing about blood and especially about urine. 
From my experience people preferred one to stay away from those topics. I used to write 
about death a lot, usually violent, premature death and that seemed to get some (but not all) 
teachers, classmates and parents riled up. I had a feeling they’d riot if I started to splash about 
in urine too. 
Writing about urine was a taboo. You were not supposed to do that outside hospital. These 
things were unmentionable, dirty and shameful. We seemed to behave as if we did not have 
bladders or bowels outside the Johannesburg Gen. I did not succeed in sustaining this illusion, 
however. I still remember my shame when my bladder leaked all over the floor in the locker 
room in 1983. I was playing the fool with two friends and was laughing too much. I used to 
struggle with incontinence in adolescence. I haven’t had a problem with it since transplant and 
since I stopped losing protein through my atrophying kidneys. At the time I thought it was my 
fault. Now, as an adult, I see that it was probably part of the wasting away of my body. No one 
ever explained this to me. But of course I never told anyone, not even my doctor. 
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The shame I felt at discharging what seemed like buckets of urine onto the locker room floor 
caused my body to become apparent or visible, but simultaneously in Leder’s (1990) terms to 
dysappear. Adolescence is a time of great change and great uncertainty even without any 
other challenges. That my physical challenges were never fully articulated and, therefore, 
never fully explored, did not lessen them. Instead it increased my self-doubt and decreased 
my feelings of competence. Possibly I never had the courage to write about buckets full of 
urine myself because I was trying to keep them out of the public eye. 
I felt anxious about the syringes full of blood too. I was more needle-shy than ever, after 
experiencing so many more of them. I preferred not to think of needles when they were not 
being stuck in me. I knew they were the way to test my kidney function and so I endured them 
every three months. I learned to quell my burgeoning fear about them, which started to grow 
about ten days or a week before each clinic visit, by diminishing the experience in my mind: 
“It’s only a little needle – you will hardly feel a thing”. 
Paradoxically that made it worse. I could act brave and not flinch when my doctor put the 
needle into my arm, but I could not fool myself. Outside I looked stoic and calm. Inside I was 
gibbering. My mother urged me to think of happier things to take my mind off the dreadful 
eventuality of the needle piercing my thin and easily-bruised skin and so I pretended that I did, 
to keep her happy. But really the closest I got to achieving that meditative state was to let my 
panicked mind go blank and to disappear for a while. This type of disappearance prevented 
dysappearance.  
Paul always took my blood himself, except on the occasion a student doctor did it. I think 
Paul was on leave then. It was the only time in 12 years. I don’t think the doctor was used 
to working on children. He seemed befuddled by our small arms and little blood vessels. 
He probably felt anxious about having to stick needles in so many reluctant and unhappy 
little children. He decided the best way of handling this would be to keep a wall around 
himself and not to let anything in. This meant he kept his face expressionless and held our 
arms firmly and unrelentingly as he jabbed the needles home. 
He jabbed the needle through little veins, right through both sides, and sucked the blood 
out of our tissues, despite our tearful protests. He found it very hard getting blood out of 
our arms. I told him he was hurting me, but he ignored me and went on doggedly pulling on 
the syringe, whose contents seemed to hiss and bubble. 
“I think you’ve missed the vein,” I gasped at last. 
“I put the needle in it,” was all he said. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
111 
 
He didn’t even look down, but kept staring woodenly at the wall as he pulled on the 
syringe. I felt cheated. I had been psyching myself up for months to being able to watch the 
whole process.   
I had reconciled myself to the fact that I would be having bloods every three months 
possibly for the rest of my life. I had broken the blood taking into stages: 1) Paul selecting 
phials from the polystyrene tray and picking up the syringe, 2) Paul taking the needle out of 
its sterile case and putting it onto the syringe, 3) Paul putting the syringe down and 
checking the baumanometer’s cuff was firmly in place, 4) Paul tapping my distended vein 
and swabbing my arm with hibitaine, 5) Paul picking up the syringe and … I had managed 
the first four stages remarkably easily. I experimented with each one for a clinic or two to 
feel confident about it. I didn’t tell Paul or Mom, deciding I would surprise them with my 
success when I finally managed to watch the whole procedure with an unblinking eye. I got 
a bit stuck on stage five, but Paul kept such a routine, that I could calm myself down 
through its inevitability. I comforted myself that although I could not actually watch him 
push the needle into my vein yet, I soon would.  And I no longer cried about it. I was after 
all 15 and about to be grown up. Enter Student Doctor. 
I have never been able to watch the whole process. I ended up with a bruise the colour of 
midnight that ran from half way up my bicep to half way down my forearm. I looked as if my 
arm had been run over by a car. It took five weeks for it to turn brown. I told Paul. He looked 
grim and said the doctor would not be coming back and that there had been problems with 
other patients too. Paul’s colleagues were not more important than his patients. 
(Richards, undated journal entry, 2007) 
My nose started bleeding around this time. At first the nose bleeds were not too bad and 
occurred only every couple of weeks, but over the years they increased in frequency and 
severity until I was bleeding from my nose several times a day. The last bleed lasted two 
hours. I couldn’t get it to stop until I went to a doctor. I had to have my nasal blood vessels 
cauterised. It might have been partly due to my steadily rising blood pressure. It might even 
have had something to do with that missing clotting factor that was possibly a result of HUS 
and its impact on my liver. I still bleed spectacularly today if I have to take a pinprick test, but 
at least it’s not from my nose. 
It was also around this time that I finally asked Paul whether I could ever get HUS again. I 
never used to care what caused my illness; I was more interested in taking preventative 
measures to ensure a good future. I could not remember anything about when I contracted 
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HUS and everything I knew came from my mother’s short, dramatic accounts of how I nearly 
died as a baby and how terrified she was when I started having seizures.  
It makes aesthetic sense and has a pleasing feeling of symmetry that my nosebleeds might 
have been triggered by some type of cellular memory of my bout with HUS. It took me a while 
to think of the connection, though, and I have to concede they were more likely triggered by 
dry, Highveld winters…although no one else in my family ever had them and presumably we 
have the same sort of nasal passages. And it wasn’t always winter, certainly not during that 
year my nose bled several times a day. Is it my anxiety that prevents me from accepting the 
connection between HUS and my spontaneous bleeding? Or it might be healthy scepticism? 
Another subjunctive (Good & Good, 1994) – another unanswered question, another 
unresolved issue. With my medical condition, seldom can cause be determined (no apparent 
ontology). Is this liminality or littorality? It causes me disquiet, so it feels liminal, but it has 
lasted all my life and I suspect it is simply how things are. It is part of living in a third space, the 
littoral zone that makes me unsettled there. 
At the time I was bleeding I simply viewed it with a mixture of annoyance and amusement. 
Blood itself has never bothered me. Although it did bother me to wake up in the cold, grey 
morning covered in it or to be sitting in the bath, preparing to get out and dry myself off, only to 
have to bath all over again to wash off my own gore. The meaty smell that clung to everything 
was not particularly appetising either when I remembered where it came from. 
4.3.3 Snapshot 3: Unquiet dreams (1990) 
I dreamed there were 2 bright green + yellow vegetables the size of yams in my bedroom. 
But they turned out to be chrysalyses (sic). They hatched into 2 large (+/- 3 foot long) 
silkworms, white and wriggling. I stared at each revolting part of them, especially their 
horrible short fat legs. But parts of their bodies kept erupting into new worms, attached to 
the old ones. In the end the monsters behaved rather like hand puppets.  
(Rose Richards, Dream Diary #1, August 1990) 
Dreams are part of one’s narrative and can be included as part of an autoethnographer’s 
resources as a conduit between worlds (Poulos, 2009). Dreams lie in one’s mind, between 
sleeping and waking, but sometimes they fill one’s body too and it responds as if we were 
really there. Dreams are how the mind interprets problems and situations, when left 
unguarded. Hermes was a trickster god, but also the bringer of dreams. He could move 
between worlds – sleeping and waking, the living and the dead. 
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Kidney failure can cause some rather colourful dreams. This is partly due to the toxins in one’s 
system. It may also be due to fear. It is tempting to interpret this dream not as the result of 
having too much creatinine and urea in my system, but rather in terms of how I felt while 
dreaming it. I felt as I felt while awake: terrified.  
By this stage I was so ill that I was not able to continue my studies. Fortunately I had 
completed my bachelor’s degree at the end of 1989. I had entered into a dark valley in my life 
since leaving high school. Part of the way through my first year at university the year I joined 
the gym club, but failed to attend any classes in it due to extreme tiredness, lack of energy and 
weakness. I soon discovered that I was no longer strong enough to climb stairs. I had to force 
myself to eat every meal. It could take me an hour to eat a piece of toast. I had no appetite 
and my muscles were wasting because of all the protein I was losing through my urine.  
My heart trembled and hiccupped – a problem with my mitral valve, my paediatrician said. I 
was still seeing him; he kept me in his clinic until I needed dialysis so he could spare me the 
horror of the adult renal unit as long as possible. My thyroid had imploded spectacularly and 
haemorrhaged into itself until it was the size of a hen’s egg and had to be surgically removed. 
My throat muscles didn’t work properly. My nose bled every day several times. I still have a 
blood-spattered little fabric pouch from those days in which to keep tissues. I was covered in 
bruises. I was always cold. I was always thirsty. I could drink eight litres of fluid a day and it 
would run right through me. I learned to keep my bladder empty at all times, because of my 
unreliable urinary sphincter. My arms were like sticks. I could count my ribs up into my armpits. 
People at university thought I was anorexic. I seldom thought to tell them that I was in organ 
failure, possibly because my mind was hazy with toxins, but also possibly because I knew they 
wouldn’t understand. They hadn’t on so many previous occasions. 
I used to go to sleep at night afraid that I would not wake up in the morning. Sometimes I 
sleepwalked and ground my teeth so hard that my dentist made me a bite-plate. Sometimes I 
would sit down on campus half-way between class and the library and my legs would become 
cold and hard and alien, like iron, and I could not get up again. So I would sit for hours, staring 
at the pigeons and the students, telling myself stories I was too feeble to write down. They 
were good stories, entertaining, fun and always optimistic and they never involved my life, my 
death or my medical condition. They concerned entirely fictitious people who lived very far 
away from my problems. I was slow eating, dressing, walking. I learned to pace myself. I 
learned to slow down the pace and change my plans so that I never needed to back-track on 
campus. I learned to keep smiling and not to talk about it. No one knew unless I told them. 
Showering and bathing were the most energy-consuming activities I could undertake. They 
were even worse than walking. What I decided to do in terms of grooming decided the course 
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of the rest of my day. I was sleeping up to 14 hours a day by third year. Nonetheless I got my 
first degree in three years, because all first-year students had been told that most (normal, 
able-bodied) people didn’t. Well, I showed them. I don’t think anybody noticed, though, other 
than my mother. 
I did have another activity. I used to spend a lot of time with people who had a range of 
disabilities. This was partly because I enjoyed their company, but also because I identified with 
them and their otherness and daily struggles. It was paradoxically and simultaneously because 
I didn’t identify with them. Being with them made me feel more mainstream and grateful for my 
relative (according to me) good fortune. After all, I could have a transplant and end this awful 
twilight state, while a person in a wheelchair or who was blind could not. 
But by 1990 my optimism was starting to crumble along with my body. Three years down the 
line and I was no closer to dialysis or a transplant than I had been in 1987. It showed in my 
dreams. This dream, the one with the worms, was the worst. In my dream diary of the time I 
described the worms as silkworms. I am not squeamish about creepy-crawlies except for 
caterpillars and maggots. Honestly, these dream worms looked more like maggots (but I 
couldn’t write it at the time because it was too close to death) and they came out of the yams 
as if from something rotten. When I wrote the dream down in 1990, I also wrote a question: 
“Like kidneys?” I was referring to the yams. I found it significant that there were two of them 
and that they were rotten.  
My dreams of that year were filled with dread and helplessness. Paging through my dream 
diary I see an endless succession of dream tigers eating me, dream lions prowling around me, 
dream scorpions swarming over me, a dream version of my brother stabbing my pancreas with 
a giant needle, pythons becoming poisonous and killing my cats (significantly two of them), 
vampiric aliens abducting and draining the blood of everyone who crossed their path, giant 
needles shoved into small, helpless and dying animals, my home turning into “the clinical lab 
where I have my bloods taken”, living people dying unexpectedly and the dead coming horribly 
back to life. All the while in the background lurked a sense of doom and imminent tragedy. 
Often I would wake with my heart pounding and hiccupping; sometimes I could not wake, no 
matter how hard I tried. I started sleepwalking, maybe to escape from my dreams. But I could 
only escape into a waking life that was as dreadful. 
I recorded all of the nightmares. They fascinated me macabrely. I wanted to know what they 
meant. I honestly could see no connection between my medical situation and this endless 
succession of gory attempts on my life. So I wrote them all down, hoping that time would 
reveal their truth to me. I would like to think that I had some premonition that I would study 
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them one day, make sense of them, or that even one day I could bear to look at them more 
closely and acknowledge what I secretly knew – that they were more than the detritus of a 
mind saturated with toxins. They showed my experience more completely than any diary ever 
could. I lived in those places more fully than anywhere else in my ghostly existence towards 
the end of my descent into kidney failure. I do not recall whether I nurtured any such hopes at 
gaining clarity. By then I had become so ill and so weak that I seemed to hang between the 
living and the dead, with one bony foot in each world, my body shrinking away as I lost protein, 
my hair and nails no longer growing. Nothing was clear anymore; nothing was predictable. My 
main questions concerned whether or not I could make it to the bus stop, walk to class or 
manage an evening shower. 
Chronic illness, especially kidney disease, is not usually “a series of disconnected shocks” that 
Broyard describes for acute illness (1993, p. 19). No, everything was connected for me. The 
common themes in my sleeping world of the time are clear and clearly connected to the 
waking world I vaguely inhabited. The subtle violence of my body’s deterioration and the not-
so-subtle violence of my medical care merged into forms I could still understand: big animals 
and needles. 
It is dangerous to try to make a dream mean something. What it “means” in sleeping life may 
differ vastly from what it means in waking life. In those days my waking life was so filled with 
fear and physical torment that all I could think about was my state of health and where I was 
headed – organ failure. Of course, now, all I can do is say what the worm dream signifies to 
me twenty years later. For one thing I think it is significant that the dream took place in my 
bedroom, my private space. Although I don’t say it in my dream diary I remember the yams 
being on my bed, half-way up and side by side, in the position my kidneys would be in my 
body. I remember them looking vaguely kidney-shaped. 
The dream took place at night, in my sleep, but also played itself out in a place associated with 
night-time and sleep. I think this is significant. Night-time and sleep can be seen as liminal 
states. Chrysalises are symbolic of liminality too. Dreams can be seen as a place of liminality, 
of porous borders and the leaking of a story from one domain to the next, or a littoral zone 
where things can blend, a third space. And I as interpreter of my dream am a type of mediator 
between past and present, event and reader. So I, too, as narrator, could be seen as liminal or 
perhaps a type of “third” entity, mediating between the me of the past and the me of the 
present. 
Sometimes, in those days, if I was feeling particularly desperate or despairing, I would 
premeditate a special type of treat: half a litre of full-cream milk. I would think about it on the 
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bus to university for the duration of the forty-five minute trip and once I had staggered up the 
small hill to Senate House from Jorissen Street, I would lurch into the canteen and make 
straight for the tetrapak shelf, choose an unflavoured milk and rip open its waxy container.  
There is nothing as nice as ice-cold milk and I would gulp it down in a couple of minutes. I was 
always thirsty. The thirst of kidney failure cannot be quenched. Then I would sit back and 
wonder how much damage I had done. I would hope that it had been substantial. Maybe this 
time my kidney damage would be severe enough to allow me a space on dialysis and the 
horrible suffering and limbo could end. Sometimes I hoped it would kill me. Death by milk. And 
then, something I could never dream of happened: 
The diet got better – deep frying and lots of Coke – seven or eight litres a day. Suddenly 
the salt, protein and cholesterol didn’t matter anymore, but the potassium still did, because 
it could affect my heart or cause seizures. A normal potassium is 4 or 5 (units). Mine was 
over 40. It seemed small compared with my urea and creatinine. A new and tasty addition 
to my diet was Kayexalate (sodium polystyrene sulfonate, according to drugs.com, so it 
really is made of polystyrene). It was a powder that somehow sucked potassium out of 
one’s body. Even with my altered sense of taste and smell this was truly horrible. Not only 
that, but it was so fine that it was almost impossible to swallow. At first we naively mixed it 
with water, but it wouldn’t dissolve. Then we tried fruit juice with the same results. At last a 
nursing sister told us that you could buy a type of thick sugar syrup from pharmacies and 
that the powder would mix into that and be swallowable. It was just bearable. It became a 
thick grey-white paste that I could just force down my protesting throat. I tried to swallow it 
in huge blobs, because that meant there would be fewer mouthfuls. It was terribly sweet 
and artificial-tasting. I wondered what would happen next, but I was old enough to know 
without being told. Your body knows too, when it is reaching the end of the road. I was 21. 
(Richards, undated journal entry, 2007) 
4.4 What the “album” means to me now 
4.4.1 Snapshots as pieces 
Any photograph album shows only some of the story (Frank, 2010). Snapshots are frozen 
moments extracted from their context and arranged in an order that pleases the person whose 
album it is. So it is with mine. If we believe that a photograph shows us the truth (Cook, 1996), 
we forget it is a representation, part of a larger truth. The picture that emerges is a construct. 
My narrative snapshots are only that – snapshots. To what extent they can reveal something 
about my experiences is debatable. They do, however, now reveal something about my 
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present understanding of those experiences. In years to come that understanding might be 
different. 
These snapshots are aides de memoir that evoke long-buried feelings in me and allow me as 
an adult to see another view of my childhood and adolescence. Generally the photographs 
that make it into the album are the ones that show us on our best behaviour, dressed in smart 
clothes or comical “candid camera” shots. People making albums want to remember cheerful 
or empowering occasions that help to create an identity that is in some way composite. That 
was my direction at first, although I had little choice about the snapshots. 
However, seeking a composite, empowering identity through fragments of the past was not so 
simple in practice – nor was it desirable. As I was to (re)discover in the course of my 
journaling, children with kidney disease face serious challenges that affect their lives and 
identities: periods of acute illness, small size and dietary problems. This can be seen in the 
study of Nicholas et al. (2011). The children’s constant sense of dread, of never feeling safe, 
of knowing that disaster is only a heartbeat away, lurks like a crocodile under the surface of 
Nicholas et al. academic narrative. They discuss the impact of the challenges on forming 
relations with peers, participating in developmentally relevant activities and general quality of 
life. Having no point of reference, I cannot imagine how my life might have been if I had not 
had kidney disease. Unlike the children in Nicholas et al. study, my mind has always shied 
away from imagining how it might have been, even when I was a child. Each time I start 
imagining it, I find myself saying, “But that is not how it was.” As much as I enjoy imagining 
stories, I do not ever allow myself to imagine that one, not even now. For instance, I find it 
difficult forming relationships with people my own age. To what extent is this the result of my 
condition and to what extent the result of my personality? 
The children’s narratives are “paradoxical and dynamic” (Nicholas et al., 2011, p. 9). Those 
words capture the experience of renal disease for me too, but in gathering up this long-buried 
part of my life I find myself falling in some ways into the (as I see it) trap of coherence, of 
making sense of the experience. I am, despite myself, repairing a damaged identity (Bury, 
1982; Frank, 1995; Mattingly & Garro, 2000), an identity, ironically, that has been damaged by 
not acknowledging the impact my medical condition had on my life. I shall never know how 
great that impact has been, but I do know that I am who I am partly because of what I 
experienced in ESRD. Nonetheless, despite this experience being part of my everyday life 
growing up, I have discovered in telling (part of) the story of this period of my life, that I had 
previously rendered it invisible. I silenced it and I silenced myself, because the topic was 
simply too big for me to cope with. 
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4.4.2 What was not in the snapshots 
As a photograph is part of a bigger picture, a narrative is composed of smaller narratives and 
is in turn part of a larger one, and so, by necessity, can never be complete. As with life itself, 
the parts of my narrative cannot be seen in isolation from the other parts. Some themes will 
carry through the other chapters and what might be discovered there could reinforce or 
undermine what has been seen here. There are two things, two very big things, that cannot be 
seen in these snapshots: what it was like learning that my efforts to preserve my kidney 
function were in vain, and what it was like transferring to the appalling adult renal unit where I 
actually became 548820. I notice that I left them out of this part of the story. These events 
were the closest I came during the long, slow decent into organ failure to experiencing 
Broyard’s (1993, p. 19) “series of disconnected shocks”, as he describes the experience of 
acute illness.  
Being told I could not save my kidneys despite years of suffering and deprivation was 
traumatic and disillusioning, but going to the adult renal unit was far worse. It was an 
unspeakable place of uncaring doctors, hostile nurses and spiteful clerks, many of whom 
seemed to derive satisfaction from tormenting dying patients. No one (for instance, the 
doctors) ever stopped the clerks from tormenting us and the patients were too frail and too 
dependent on their “care” providers to fight back. I have since learned that this is called “lateral 
violence” or “internal colonization” (Griffin, 2004; Marquard, 1957; Stanley, Martin, Michel, 
Welton & Nemeth, 2007). When you make the coloniser’s laws your own, very bad things 
happen. Disempowered workers in institutions work out their frustrations on less powerful 
others, for instance, in hospitals. Generally these groups of oppressed minorities cannot fight 
back. As a patient you were not human there, but a number to the clerks, a file to the nurses, 
and a urinary tract to the doctors, and you gradually had all your hope and dignity stripped 
away from you. 
This early part of my story is so much more medicalised in my mind still, I think partly because 
I still believed in the power of medicine. I believed that if I did as I was told the result would be 
positive. But it wasn’t. And in the awful adult renal unit, where I was forced to spend three 
years of my life, I had to face the reality that systems are not necessarily designed to make life 
easier and that one’s so-called care-providers do not always have one’s best interests at 
heart.  
This strange no man’s land in which I found myself was a transitional period for me in terms of 
learning how to tell my story. In the paediatric unit my mother and I had always re-told the 
medical story my specialist had told us, about the importance of blood tests, medication and 
clinic visits, about separating clinic life from the rest of my life. But in the adult renal unit I no 
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longer had this story. I had been forced to see that this was just a tale doctors told themselves 
to make sense of my situation and then relayed to me to make me feel better (Marzano, 2009). 
Sometimes they were right and sometimes they were wrong. They were like the weather 
bureau: they could make forecasts, but they could not guarantee that their predictions would 
come true. They also skirted around the issue of organ failure and death (Good et al., 1994; 
Marzano, 2009).This unspeakable truth haunted me. I tried very hard not to see it and to listen 
to their official narratives. 
I found myself without a story and in chaos (Frank, 1995). I needed to make sense of my life 
as it had become and so I told myself small stories that involved, for the first time, what I had 
done about my medical condition. Usually it involved protecting myself against the 
carelessness, incomprehension or exhaustion of the clinic staff. I related my small victories to 
my mother and complained to her about my not-so-small failures: the time I showed a doctor 
that I understood my medical condition so he did not need to patronise me, the time the doctor 
insisted on prescribing medication I was allergic to, no matter how hard I tried to convince him 
otherwise. 
Life veered between chaos and a terrible order, the one that everyone could see at last – the 
inevitability of my going into complete kidney failure and dying. It was inescapable. Only two 
things could save me: dialysis or a transplant. And even this was not to be taken for granted at 
a state hospital. Resources were scarce and people were turned away from dialysis regularly. 
My new doctors had decided I should receive a related living donor transplant and had 
approached my father about donating. He was a medical colleague so they were confident he 
would agree. They would not listen to me when I told them he would not. Their inability to hear 
my life story of a highly dysfunctional parent-child relationship nearly cost me my life.  
I was not a nephrologist but, unlike them, I knew my family all too well. And I was right. My 
father never had any intention of donating to me. It took the doctors a very long time to see 
this, a very long time where I was not put on waiting lists and was not given alternative 
treatment, such as dialysis. Even after their surprise at his refusal, even after all the evidence 
to the contrary, they kept insisting that their narrative of our family was the correct one and that 
mine was not (Garden, 2010). I came to see that despite their assertions about their scientific 
objectivity (which, in their view, made them omniscient) they were influenced by their own 
experiences and needs. One had a complex and troubled relationship with his father, another 
idolised his father, and so on. They needed to believe the parent-child bond was sacred. I had 
no such illusions. I could not afford them. Their belief in their omniscience prevented them 
from accommodating views that differed from theirs. This frightened me, because I could see 
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that they were not all-knowing and their sometimes flawed decisions affected my life, even my 
very survival. 
4.4.3 The illegitimate narrative 
Narratives are very powerful things. They can dictate one’s fate. The doctors’ 
incomprehension of any expertise beyond their own and of any narrative beyond their medical 
narrative nearly killed me. No matter to whom I tell this part of the story, even now, I am still 
met by incomprehension. It does not suit the legitimated narrative of organ failure where the 
sacred family bond always saves a relative dying of organ failure (Cojocaru, 2007; Hermans, 
2006; various authors in Hutchinson & MacCallum, 2000; Klug & Jackson, 2004); the family 
would never turn its back on its own. Doctors are meant to be the experts who save you 
(Cojocaru, 2007; Hermans, 2006; various authors in Hutchinson & MacCallum, 2000; Klug & 
Jackson, 2004; and many, many others), not the people you have to fight to get treatment.  
My illegitimate narrative (Clandinin & Connolly, 2000; Nelson, 2001) of my doctors’ dangerous 
incomprehension remains invisible, unheard, unspeakable. My hopelessness about it makes it 
even more so, because I hide the story now. I wasn’t going to tell it here. I have learned not to 
tell it and yet it hasn’t gone away. It is the palimpsest (Derrida, 1998) that shines through all 
my other stories, the ghost that won’t be exorcised. It has affected many of my decisions and 
probably all of my relationships since then. It is in some of other form in every chapter that 
follows this one. 
Through all the silences in this text, my narrative is still very long. It had to be to allow me to 
move from one point to another and I retained as much of the length as possible to show my 
path and to avoid reducing my narrative to bits of text that could be used as examples to 
illustrate points in an argument. I could try to contain the narrative (more than I already have – 
you’re only seeing snippets of it here), to make it reshape my experiences and identity, to do 
as Muncey (2005) did. I could show the parts that explained how in control I was of my 
medications from the age of 9 and how I worked out strategies of coping with my needle 
phobia. If I wrote those parts instead of what I have shown here, I would be lying about 
empowerment. As an ill child, I did not have much power or agency. At this point, my narrative 
for this period explains how I experienced renal disease. Metaphorically my dreams (in the 
third snapshot) give the most accurate and primal description of how things were. When I saw 
the nature of my yam dream and returned to my dream diary of the time, I nearly wept. I never 
had wept about it. I had simply endured it. As a child, it can be difficult to make the leap 
between understanding obvious grief and loss (how you felt when your beloved grandmother 
died) and understanding not-so-obvious grief and loss. How do you mourn something you 
never had, especially when you cannot even name it? Avoiding it is easy enough. You simply 
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never talk about your fears or compare your narrative with those of others leading different 
lives. 
I have seen in writing this chapter that although the events occurred long ago, understanding 
them is still a process and remains unfinished and largely unanalysed. I should like this 
chapter to remain unfinished, messy, bulky, rough, because it performs its part so well. Writing 
like this and not tidying it up has helped me to understand the nature of growing up with a 
dread disease. 
In a sense my “snapshots” are subtexts to the official medical discourse. I am writing back to 
the (medical) coloniser (Pratt, 1992). I do not, however think my stories are truly counter-
stories in Nelson’s terms (2001), because they don’t undermine the dominant narratives, but 
co-exist. Perhaps reading them together gives one a more comprehensive story. However, I 
know that the colonisers will not be reading this. It will be read by people who are interested in 
qualitative research. It ought to be read by medical doctors, but most are not interested 
enough in qualitative research. My narrative cannot deconstruct the medical narrative, 
because that narrative is mostly valid and I rely on its narrators for treatment. For them to treat 
me, they have to be left to tell their story, because it helps them to make sense of their world. 
4.4.4 Recovery and rememberment 
My putting parts of the narrative back together is a type of rememberment, I think, more than a 
remembrance. To some extent any story is. As storytellers, we behave like Isis reassembling 
the scattered remains of her dead husband, Osiris, and hoping that in some way he will return 
to life. However, it is more than this. It is impossible for me to think about the stories that these 
fragments show without supplementing them and adding to them. It is also impossible for me 
to add to these stories without evaluating them as narratives that are incomplete. When I do 
this, I am both thinking about stories and thinking with stories (Frank, 1995). My stories 
change as my understanding of them develops and vice versa. 
In the myth, Osiris cannot really return to the world of the living, although he is a god. Instead 
he becomes the King of the Dead and lives (so to speak) in the Underworld. He is a kindly and 
beneficent king and his kingdom offers new hope for the dead. In his kingdom the dead live 
again in a different fashion, according to what they deserve. Most people have daily feasts. 
Now, it seems, there are not only two spaces you can occupy: dead or alive. There is a third 
one: the Underworld is a place where you can be both dead and alive – or even something 
else entirely. Sandelowski (1991) describes stories as liminal spaces. In my (Egyptian) 
conception of storytelling, the Underworld is not limbo. It is another place entirely. It is not 
Pratt’s (1992) borderland. It is not a subtext or a counter-story (Nelson, 2001). Instead, the 
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Underworld is another realm. Stories are another realm too. I have found that they can provide 
a story teller with a new environment in which to explore an experience. They are never the 
experience itself brought back to life. 
Sandelowski (1991) described stories as liminal because she saw them as a way of getting 
from one place to another in terms of identity or understanding. I agree with her idea that 
stories are part of an experience of change and can help one to conceptualise it, but I find 
stories are more than that. They are themselves dynamic and changeable like waves against a 
sea shore, with the tide line always changing. Understanding events that occurred long ago is 
a process. I am coming to suspect it is a process that cannot end, but must stop in an 
interesting place. 
This isn’t the deconstruction I was hoping for, I am sad to say. A narrative that never really 
existed before cannot be deconstructed. It is a story of silence. It does, however, contain some 
pleasing, postmodern ironies: the disappearance of my story possibly prevented me from 
experiencing dysappearance (Leder, 1990). In finally telling the story I am possibly too far 
away from the events to experience dysappearance now and feel only grief and dismay. I 
made some type of sense of my story, but remained perturbed by it and somehow unsatisfied 
by it. What is still missing? Where did I go when my story disappeared and did I ever really 
come back? 
If nothing else, it is clear to me now that because chronic kidney failure takes years, this will 
affect the type of narrative you are able to tell. The length of my narrative and its scale, years 
of my life, is daunting. Chapter 4 feels at this point like the Bloomsday (Joyce, 1986) of renal 
literature. When chronic kidney failure happens during childhood and adolescence, the 
changes that you experience are so gradual and mixed in with so many other changes that 
keeping track of one’s medical condition and experience of illness can be difficult. 
Illness is no more static than health, and even within illness, periods of relative health can exist 
(Thorne et al., 2002). One of the challenges ESRD sufferers face is that their condition is not 
likely to remain stable (Stein & Wild, 2002; Walser, 2004). These days the hope is that we will 
die of other causes and that seems likely with medical advances. However, ESRD is always 
fatal if untreated and sometimes fatal with treatment. It is as fatal as some forms of cancer. 
Our condition remains terminal and the only therapies available, transplantation or dialysis, are 
not cures. Stories, like poems, are only ever a temporary solution to chaos and uncertainty 
(Frost, 1973). Can you really construct a healing narrative out of a condition that is terminal 
and changeable? I have not been able to, at this stage. Other parts of my story could be 
different. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
123 
 
I wanted to keep this part of the story tidy, separating the lights from the darks, the academic 
from the personal and from the medical. In practice it could not work out so tidily and still be 
more or less true to my understanding of the events. And so my story is not black and white, 
but multi-coloured and multi-textured. It is not at all as I intended and I have to console myself: 
while my rememberment cannot give me back the story I should have had as a chronically ill 
child, perhaps it can create a type of story against which other children can tell their own so 
they are not swallowed up in a medical narrative. In discussing it I have to resist my urge to 
order it and to add to it. Now we have to backtrack to the future. I wrote the next chapter 
before I wrote any other chapter. And I did so for very specific reasons. 
The whole of Chapter 4 is the context for much of what follows. It is always there, like a ghost, 
or a Derridean palimpsest, visible through the other texts. I see that now. In telling parts of it 
for the first time here, I can see that I needed to tell it. I needed to be heard, but I also needed 
to conceptualise it, because I never had. Like Rosaldo (1989), when I finally started to write 
about it in my journal something happened. Rosaldo had been studying how Ilongot people 
experienced grief and felt he had a good intellectual understanding of it. However, none of this 
helped him understand his own grief after the accidental death of his wife. At first it silenced 
him and a year later, when he began to write about it, he could not stop. It was like a type of 
frenzy or possession.  
I too had lived through an experience that I found impossible to articulate, partly because it 
was huge and painful, but partly because my narrative was at odds with the formally accepted, 
legitimate narratives I had encountered. When I managed to start writing about it, tidal waves 
of my own narrative buffeted me. My littoral zone changed completely. My shoreline and 
boundaries are not the same. Whether this change is permanent or temporary only time will 
tell. As things are now, I find myself dismayed by what I have seen and not seen. And I find 
myself experiencing the same sort of helplessness that I did as a child. 
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CHAPTER 5: CROSSING OVER - THE DISCURSIVE (THIRD) SPACE 
OF DIALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I do two things. I tell the story of my own experience of peritoneal dialysis (an 
abdominal catheter system that cleans toxins out of one’s body), taking into account that I 
subsequently underwent a successful transplant and that twenty years have passed since I 
needed dialysis. I also use my story to structure the chapter’s argument by comparing and 
contrasting my experiences with those of others to demonstrate the complexity of telling this 
type of story. One of the factors contributing to the complexity of the story of dialysis is the 
length of time (many months if not years) that most people spend on dialysis. As my story 
shows, one type of narrative can easily become another type, even if one’s stay is relatively 
short as mine was. 
I wanted to tell my own story, but also to discover if a “dialysis narrative” exists as a cultural 
trope and to what extent dialysis reflects current social concerns. Is the expert’s version of 
dialysis the dominant form, or is it subverted by the narratives of lay people? And who is 
ultimately the expert on the dialysis experience? 
For the first part of the chapter I discuss how narrative functions and what dialysis is. My story 
continues in narrative form after this. I have divided this part of my story into eight phases to 
show when and how things changed. After this I discuss tensions and analyse emergent 
themes. My own narrative, although more detailed than some, is incomplete, so I will also 
discuss certain themes I did not include in my own narrative and what these hiatuses indicate.  
Remember, I have already started my story about dialysis. It began the moment you started 
reading this chapter. This frame is part of the story. Remember, too, that the story continues 
even in the academic parts of my writing, because the way I reason about it as an academic is 
as much part of how I understand it as writing the personal narrative is. 
5.2 Dialysis and the possibility of a new narrative 
Safety was the reason I wanted to write about dialysis in the first place. Many people would 
not view dialysis as safe, I suppose, on reflection. They tend to see it as a horrible medical 
invasion and experience it as a loss of control and a damaging of identity (Cojocaru, 2007; 
Russ et al., 2005). My experience was different. For the first time in years, I experienced 
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feeling safe and looked after when I came up to the dialysis unit. My trust in medicine and 
doctors had been undermined in the adult renal unit and had filled me with a howling sense of 
rage and injustice. We were treated as numbers and, worse, we were treated as hopeless 
cases. The doctors could not cure our disease, so we ceased to matter to them (or so I 
experienced it). ESRD cannot be reversed, so the adult renal unit was merely a holding pen 
for untreatables. It was a relief for me to get onto dialysis at all after a long wait and a 
redemptive exercise to be able to experience being treated as a human being in the dialysis 
unit. I may have had a number there, but the staff never used it. In the dialysis unit the staff 
looked you in the eye before looking at your chart and they spoke to you or even with you, 
instead of at you. It was as if you had returned to the living. This could have accounted for my 
positive outlook on the matter. 
I noticed, however, that my rosy view of dialysis is not shared by many writers and 
researchers. Dialysis is composed, constructed and deconstructed in different ways through 
narratives written by people who have been on it and by people who have not. It is a slippery 
and complex subject that has caused researchers to realise that observing the lives of others  
living with renal failure can result in oversimplifications and that “a more ecological and 
‘situated’ portrait of life with renal disease” is called for (Faber et al., 2003, p. 144). In addition 
to this, there is an implicit debate in the literature related to quality of life on dialysis concerning 
whether the patient or the care provider should evaluate their own quality of life (Martin-
McDonald, 2003/4). To the onlooker, life on dialysis can seem no life at all, but a person living 
on dialysis could experience it differently. I myself spent eleven months on peritoneal dialysis, 
so I decided to write this chapter to show what it meant to me. 
No narrative is ever complete.  
All writers, each time they write, work through the tensions and compose a text that can 
always be otherwise, always be improved, a text that is inevitably only a step, a kind of 
placeholder, from which still other inquiries with still more field texts may be imagined 
and pursued. (Clandinin & Connolly, 2000, p. 157)  
No story can tell everything, however much its narrator may wish to tell the whole truth. For 
one thing, there simply is no time to reproduce events that may have taken years. For another, 
because narratives are a way of ordering and structuring meaning, the narrator is going to 
emphasise certain things and de-emphasise others in order to retain a narrative thread. While 
my story will, like Foucault’s (1975/1991) interpretation of commentary, make certain things 
visible, it will also render other things invisible, legitimate some power structures and render 
illegitimate others, allow some voices and disallow others.  
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In a certain sense narratives are extended snapshots (Muncey, 2005). Not only do they 
concern a limited number of related events within a limited timeframe in the narrator’s past, but 
when the story is told, it is also narrated within a limited timeframe and at a specific point in the 
narrator’s present life. This all affects the meaning. In my own case, for instance, I was never 
able to tell the story of my illness and transplant in any way that was meaningful to me until 
many years had elapsed. When I tell it now, I am 20 years older than when my illness reached 
a crisis point. I have a completely different perspective on it now. No doubt in 20 years’ time 
my view will be different again. 
In addition to this, illnesses have their own favoured narratives. Kidney failure is no exception. 
The different stages of kidney disease (CKD, the news of ESRD, living with ESRD, dialysis 
and transplantation) each have their own narratives and these vary depending on who is 
ultimately telling them: the patient (Cojocaru, 2008; Etherington, 1991), the doctor (Kirmayer, 
1992; Zaner, 2004) or the social scientist (Crowley-Matoka, 2005; Faber et al., 2003). 
Moreover, a clear distinction can be seen between narratives of people who have had 
successful transplants and those who have not. For many patients dialysis is a passing phase. 
For some it is permanent. The narrative one would write depends greatly on whether dialysis 
is part of the journey or the destination.  
In telling my own fractured narrative in a certain way I create a story that mirrors some of the 
complexity of the experience. I also blur the distinction between researcher and narrator, for I 
am both. I do not wish my narrative to become data in my own writing. There are three spaces 
in which narrative plays a highly visible role. My intention is that these parts should also 
change the way in which you read the other parts of my dissertation. Narrative is read 
differently from linear academic writing. It requires a lot of going back on many levels. 
5.3 The role of dialysis in treating kidney disease 
Kidneys are vital organs. If they do not work, you die. These days, organ transplants are fairly 
successful and kidney transplants are the most successful solid organ transplant (Helman, 
2007). Dialysis is generally seen by the medical community as a way of prolonging life or chronic 
life support, rather than a treatment and certainly not a cure (Fox & Swazey, 1992; Joralemon & 
Fujinaga, 1996; Russ et al., 2005; White & Grenyer, 1999). Some researchers take exception to 
this, even calling it “postponing death” (Fox & Swazey, 1992; Russ et al., 2005). I notice that 
none of them seem to have needed their own lives prolonged. This is possibly a coincidence. 
One rather important idea seems to be missing in all this philosophy: our fear of death – or, to 
put it in more positive terms, our will to live. 
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Dialysis is on the threshold of life and on the threshold of death. So why do people go onto 
dialysis when there is transplantation? One compelling reason is that there are far more 
people in kidney failure than there are people donating kidneys (Fox & Swazey, 1992). 
Another reason is that not everyone can have a transplant. A third is that transplants do not 
always work. 
There are two types of dialysis: haemodialysis (or the “kidney machine”) and peritoneal 
dialysis. Haemodialysis is better known because the vast majority of dialysis patients are on 
haemodialysis. Peritoneal dialysis (the sort I was on) is not as efficient as haemodialysis, but it 
is not as violent, although it comes with attendant risks of systemic infection.  
Dialysis requires a great deal of organisation from the person on it and their family. It becomes 
an unavoidable part of everyday life. This could be why it might also become a symbol for an 
illness. In other words, kidney failure when chronic is a slow decline which can for a long time 
be imperceptible. When acute, it happens so suddenly that one has no chance to adjust. 
Dialysis can come to represent the illness and its losses because it is a concrete artefact. It is 
easy to see and its effects are easy to feel. But dialysis is not the illness. It is the treatment – 
or rather, it is the levee against the rising river. 
Possibly because dialysis is to an extent outside of one, it can be safely seen as a symbol for 
painful things, sometimes unbearably painful things that are inside one. It can come to 
represent losses that predate it, such as the loss of one’s health, one’s physical mobility, one’s 
freedom, one’s relationships, one’s kidneys. It is the result of these things, not the cause of 
them, but in one’s mind it can become the reason things went wrong, when there is no reason.  
Dialysis is a perplexing thing. It prevents or postpones death, but it is not a cure. It has been 
described as “not-quite-life” (Russ et al., 2005, p. 297). People suffer on dialysis and this can 
be disturbing to see (Faber et al., 2003; Fox & Swazey, 1992). Often observers of this 
suffering resort to an “appeal to Nature” argument – it is “unnatural” to prolong life through 
“artificial means” and this causes people to suffer more than if they had died (Fox & Swazey, 
1992; Russ et al., 2005). 
I suspect that there is confusion about the status of dialysis. For instance, Helman refers to 
dialysis as “life enhancement” as opposed to other therapies that are described as “life saving” 
(2007, p. 12). Dialysis is essentially “chronic life-support” (Russ et al., 2005, p. 297), although 
patients do not need to be on it continuously, as they would on a ventilator. You can live when 
not connected to the kidney machine, but only for short periods. With peritoneal dialysis you 
are constantly connected, but it is not as startlingly visible. Your own body continues to dialyse 
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for you, but now your peritoneum performs some of your kidneys’ roles. You are likely to be 
well enough to organise your own bag changes as I was or to hold down a job, study or look 
after your children. In other words, you can function in society, be productive and not need to 
be in hospital all the time. 
It is precisely the intermittent nature of dialysis that renders it so perplexing. If one is only 
temporarily connected to dialysis (in the case of haemodialysis, at least), then one is only 
temporarily on life-support or even temporarily a “cyborg” (Faber et al., 2003; Helman, 2007). 
Helman talks of new bodies emerging in the twentieth century – composite bodies that contain 
parts from other people’s bodies via transplantation, cyborg bodies that are part human, part 
machine, and virtual bodies that exist via electronic media (2007). Although this list includes 
dialysis, I maintain it does not truly accommodate bodies that undergo dialysis. I would also 
argue that this still-medicalised view of the body does not truly address the idea of the self, 
which even in today’s scientifically influenced discourse, seems to extend beyond the body. 
However, technology does not annihilate the self, but allows it to alter by stretching one’s 
symbolic skin (Helman, 2007). The self adapts to its circumstances. As traumatic as dialysis 
can be, patients usually realise that it is life saving and adapt themselves and their lives to it 
(Martin-McDonald 2003/4). Our symbolic skins are, it seems, surprisingly flexible. 
Dialysis is such an intimate thing and, paradoxically, it is simultaneously the opposite of 
intimate. Your body, your space, your being, are claimed by medicine and connected to an 
inorganic system that will perform the functions of your kidneys, the delicate filtration organs 
on which your life depends. You develop, or perhaps lose, a symbolic skin. Your boundaries 
are no longer as they were before. 
Something that is meant to happen beneath your skin, unobtrusively and naturally, now 
happens when you are connected to an external system. You have to set aside time for it and 
you have to watch it happen. You have to watch very closely, in case things go wrong, and 
you have to fix them. Sometimes you cannot and then other people have to. People on dialysis 
can experience this as more loss: the loss of remaining freedom and the loss of privacy. 
Your private body becomes a type of public property. Your blood is monitored, your urine, your 
food and fluid. Everything is measured and charted. You know who you are: a dialysis patient, 
with certain readings that place you in a category that defines you more or less successful. By 
the time you need dialysis you will be used to most of the restrictions already. For years before 
(in my case anyway) you will have monitored your blood, urine, food and fluid. It is one thing to 
watch someone experiencing dialysis; it is quite another to live through it. 
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As a life of suffering and restriction, life on dialysis is perhaps more liminal than at any other 
point in CKD. Dialysis is after all life support and the people on it are in a weird state of being 
alive through “unnatural” means, existing somehow between life and death. Their illness and 
dialysis render them invisible. In the case of dialysis, some of the stages of Van Gennep’s 
(1960) rites of passage are literally reproduced. It literally removes them from society. During 
the period of removal, many literal purifications are performed, as dialysis removes the toxins 
from their systems. However, dialysis must be repeated, so the person experiencing it can 
never really complete the ritual, but must always return again to its beginning.   
Dialysis creates a unique discursive space. It is a borderland between three very different 
kingdoms, ESRD, transplantation and death. For some it is limbo (Fox & Swazey, 1978); for 
others a waiting room (Russ et al., 2005). It is on the threshold of life and on the threshold of 
death. Some think it keeps you alive, but stops you from living (Russ et al., 2005). But if you 
needed dialysis and did not get it, you would not live at all. So what are the alternatives to 
dialysing? 
However, these spatial metaphors do not fully capture the changeable, temporal nature of 
dialysis and the dynamic nature of the elements in its discursive space. Dialysis takes time. 
The amount of time it took me was something I never dwelt on. A doctor once told me that no 
time is ever wasted and I started to understand what he meant when I was on dialysis. Life is 
just lived. Whether you do what you choose to do or what you have to do. My story, which 
follows, contains eight phases that go part of the way to exploring that space.   
5.4 My story (1): Death is a cowboy 
In the movies I’d seen, the cowboys always won. Maybe that’s why I identified with the 
“Indians”. When I went back to university after my peritoneal dialysis line was put in, I felt 
very strong. Even though I was by conventional standards pretty anaemic, with a 
haemoglobin of seven, I could walk up stairs – even run up them – a week after the line 
was put in. I wore my favourite outfit on the first day back at university: a white viscose 
cowboy shirt with little cacti on the collar and a cowboy and “Indian” chasing each other 
twice across the yokes, stone-washed jeans and pointy cowboy shoes (I couldn’t find 
cowboy boots in Johannesburg). The “Indian” on my shirt was ahead of the cowboy (why 
I’d chosen it); it wasn’t clear if he was winning a race against the cowboy or fleeing from 
him. I still saw myself more as an “Indian”, but I thought it would be nice to be on the 
winning side for a change and to be a type of self-appointed cowboy. We had our honours 
seminar on the sixth floor of the library and I no longer had to wait for the lift. I beat my 
friends to the seminar room, even with my heavy book bag. One friend said she must be 
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really unfit if I could beat her on dialysis, but she didn’t realise that my muscles were 
building up again, even with the protein loss through my catheter. I was becoming fit, 
because I could exercise at last after years of not being able to climb stairs. I felt better 
than I had since I was 15. I was 21. 
5.5 My story (2): Dialysis as passing 
Part I. 
From 1990 to 1991 I spent 11 months on peritoneal dialysis while waiting for a kidney 
transplant. Years later, when I started to write my own story of CKD and transplantation, I 
started with dialysis although it was hardly the beginning or even the pièce de résistance, 
the transplant. I had written at quite some length about the build up to ESRD, focusing on 
how my childhood and adolescence had been structured by renal diets and medication, but 
when it came to the transplant itself and the life afterwards of being well – a phenomenon I 
had never known – I found myself hesitating. There was something curiously unstructured 
about that life, something almost chaotic or anarchic. So I focused on how dialysis worked, 
instead of skimming over it to get to the “good stuff” of organ transplantation. 
Even 17 years later I remember an amazing amount about how my peritoneal dialysis 
worked. In those days, when I was on it, we did all our sterile-procedure bag changes 
manually, four times a day, every day. I estimate I did about 1,336 bag changes. I 
remember skipping only three. The system was fairly intricate and you could not miss a 
step. The drain-out took the most time, up to two hours, if you’d left the dialysate in too long 
(and it was wise to get it all out). The sterile procedure could take 20 minutes to half an 
hour (providing you made no mistakes). The bag change itself took seconds and the drain-
in time took about half an hour.   
It was not only the repetition of all those bag changes that emblazoned the process on my 
mind. It was the feeling of comfort and security I had when I was finally allowed to go onto 
dialysis, when the doctors finally gave up trying to find a related living donor for me and 
instead started concentrating on keeping me alive. It was also the relative smallness of the 
dialysis clinic compared with the adult renal unit at the Johannesburg General Hospital. In 
the dialysis clinic, the nurses remembered your name and smiled when they greeted you. 
You were not a number anymore – another patient on the long slippery slide to ESRD, from 
which their expertise could not save you. Kidney failure patients must be depressing to 
medical staff. In the dialysis clinic no one told you to stop worrying and “get on with your 
life”. I now realise it was probably because they didn’t expect us to have one anymore. 
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Ironically I now felt more alive than I had in years. I remember that time fondly and this is 
why I started to write about it. 
It was also the only time in my entire, life-long medical history that I felt I personally had 
any vestige of control over my condition. I always carried out my own bag changes. Some 
patients preferred to have their parents or spouses do it for them. Not me. I controlled 
every second of it and I loved it. I had never felt such agency in my life. 
Part II. 
For some people the actual event of going onto dialysis is traumatic. I remember little of it 
except that I was really glad I’d made it and determined I’d learn the sterile procedure in 
record time, just because the nurses expected us not to be able to do it properly. I do 
remember a sister from the haemo ward telling me that the doctors might try to make a 
shunt for haemodialysis in my arm at the same time they put in my abdominal catheter line 
and that I must tell them not to. Apparently this would be a type of back-up in case 
peritoneal dialysis didn’t work. The doctors seemed not to feel confident about peritoneal 
dialysis, but I had chosen it because it meant I didn’t have to have needles stuck in my arm 
several times a week. 
People often complain about the amount of time dialysis takes and how disruptive it is to 
their day-to-day lives. I did have to adjust my schedule to fit my dialysis routine, but it 
seemed a small price to pay for feeling strong. Before dialysis I wasn’t able to do much 
anyway, because I was too frail. Perhaps I would have felt differently had I been a parent 
with children to look after or an employee with a job to keep. Perhaps I would have felt 
annoyed, had I not been so used to waiting. I had been waiting for years: waiting in clinics, 
waiting in medicine queues, waiting to feel better. Only after transplant did I really see how 
ill I had been or for how long. I had never really felt well growing up and had felt really ill 
since the age of 12. Dialysis came as a pleasant relief. 
From November 1990 to May 1991, I exercised on my exercise bike, did muscle 
strengthening sit-ups and hared about campus, as I had never been able to do as an 
undergraduate. I no longer had to plan my schedule as I travelled into university on the 
bus, making sure that I wouldn’t overdo it and would never double back (no unnecessary 
trips when you’re in ESRD). My head was marvellously clear and I found my studies so 
much easier. In 1989 I was cursing my laziness for only being able to do half an hour’s 
work a week on my third-year subjects. By 1990 I had been starting to wonder if I was 
stupid too. I was only taking one first-year subject by that stage and just scraping by. Now, 
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on dialysis, my marks had shot up to firsts. Even my complexion had a faint pinkness to it, 
despite my lamentable haemoglobin levels. I weaned myself off antihypertensives. It was 
the first time since I was 9 that I hadn’t taken any. Twelve years is a long time when you’re 
21. Life on dialysis seemed like the dawn of a new era. 
Part III. 
I was the perfect dialysis patient. I never skipped a bag change (other than the three that 
could not be helped). I was scrupulously hygiene-conscious, to the point of being 
obsessive. I wore cotton vests purchased at the boys’ department at the school-uniform 
outfitters near our house, so that my catheter’s exit site could breathe. I washed my hands 
at every opportunity with the medicated soap my doctor recommended (and still do). I 
always showered (and have never fully embraced bathing again). I never put my feet on 
the bed unless I’d taken off my shoes first. I followed the sterilisation routine to the letter 
and always cleaned out my exit site, no matter how unpleasant it was. I kept religiously to 
my exercise routine (I liked the novelty of climbing stairs) and diet (and charted everything 
for my doctor and physiotherapist to see). I always came to clinic. 
Above all, I never allowed myself the luxury of slouching. I looked at the patients around 
me and thought, “I am not like you. I am different. Dialysis is going to work for me and I am 
really, really glad I am on it.” I made sure I was always dressed properly when I came to 
clinic, even in the beginning after the catheter was put in. I was not going to lie on a 
hospital bed, vulnerable in my pyjamas, being scrutinized by doctors in suits. I was not 
going to lie staring into space. As I saw it, if I had to be in the clinic for a certain amount of 
time, I would use it to read for my degree, write letters and gather information. I would 
always be chipper, even if I didn’t feel chipper, because no one expected it. Dialysis 
patients are meant to be hapless, helpless, and hopeless. I would be the opposite.  No 
peritonitis for me! 
Part IV. 
Sometimes, as I drained my bag for my monthly sample and waited for the doctors, I would 
leave the unit where our clinic was held and stroll over to the haemodialysis ward, carrying 
my dialysis bag in a plastic receptacle, specially made for that purpose. It was a two-litre 
plastic bottle, with a handle for me to carry it with, and its side cut open to accommodate 
the draining bag. This prevented the bag and its connectors from being anywhere near the 
dirty floor. I would go to cheer up the haemo patients and their nurses. We’d drink milky, 
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lukewarm tea from thick mugs and they’d share their toast and marmite7 with me. We’d talk 
about What We Were Going to do After Clinic (sleep, eat forbidden food, watch our 
favourite TV shows or go to the movies, spend time with family).  
Sometimes they’d tell me what they would have been doing had they not gone into ESRD 
and onto dialysis. They would have studied, gone to parties, drunk alcohol with their 
buddies, have had a glamorous job. Some would have got married. But dialysis ruined all 
that. Their fiancés left them; their bosses overlooked them for promotion or even fired 
them; their buddies found other buddies who could drink and stay up late. They had to drop 
out of university, because they couldn’t do field work that involved travelling to collect data 
or work in on-the-job training programmes and were too tired to hit the books. People who 
hadn’t been there just didn’t understand. I nodded sagely, even though I was chalking up 
my second degree. Of course I didn’t have to go on excursions to collect data or do study-
related jobs. I suggested they maybe choose a degree that didn’t involve field work, but 
they said they couldn’t. They could not have been ill for very long, because they expected 
other things from life than waiting and monitoring their conditions. I did not. I wished for 
them sometimes, but did not seriously expect them. 
I did not examine this at the time, but, instead, ate my toast and marmite, which I had not 
been allowed before dialysis, licked my fingers clean and made a mental note to wash 
them with medicated soap back at my unit.   
Part V. 
Sometimes we’d talk about a much bigger and more compelling subject: What We Were 
Going to do After Transplant. But we had to be careful about that for two reasons. Firstly, of 
course, no one knew when the mystic event would occur. Once you’re on dialysis, it’s 
pretty much because you haven’t been able to have a transplant before you became too ill 
to live without life support.   
Secondly, some of us weren’t candidates for transplant. People who couldn’t have a 
transplant faced a lifetime (however long or short that would be) of continual dialysis with 
no chance of relief. Those of us who had a chance of getting a transplant viewed those of 
us who didn’t with a mixture of awe and respect, seasoned lightly with pity and horror. 
These patients were like prisoners serving a life sentence, while we were like prisoners 
who had to serve a certain amount of time, but who might get out early on good behaviour. 
The nurses would warn us who the patients were who didn’t have a chance and, if they 
                                                    
7
 Marmite is a dark brown, salty spread made from yeast extract. 
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were dialysing when we were there, we’d edit our conversation for too much jubilance and 
limit the amount of time we’d spend on the inevitable topic of transplantation. Those of us 
who had a chance would be reminded, looking at our heroic peers, how our lives might be 
if we weren’t careful and would leave the clinic with a fresh commitment to making dialysis 
carry us to transplant. So many things could stop you from having a transplant. However 
much we admired the stoicism of our non-transplantable peers, we didn’t want to end up 
like them.   
I would leave the clinic each month, feeling renewed and thanking my lucky stars that 
things were working so well for me. I’d have committed my test results to memory, to share 
the good news with my mother when she picked me up to take me home and I would tell 
her who had developed peritonitis (not me) and who was no longer at clinic. 
When I was 20, my greatest wish was to live to be 21. I wanted to see spring again. I had 
always been more of an autumn-loving person, but, when I was dying, I developed an 
overwhelming urge to see spring, to the extent that I wanted to paint flowers to capture 
their beauty and fell in love with Georgia O’Keefe. I wanted to see things being born, 
budding, bursting with potential, not running down, decaying or dying. Now that I was 21 
and on dialysis, I realised I could dare to think of other wishes. It was quite a shock getting 
my wishes to see spring again and to get onto dialysis before it was too late. It took me a 
while to think of new wishes. I settled rather meekly for finishing my honours degree and 
maybe even getting a first. I felt sure I’d get a kidney and that my transplant would be 
successful, but I wondered what on earth I’d do with the rest of my life. I decided to cross 
that bridge when I came to it. 
Part VI. 
When or if. If you are waiting for a non-related cadaveric donor, you can never be sure 
when your kidney will come up. Some of those people who disappeared from clinic did not 
receive transplants nor did they recover. No one recovers from ESRD. Once your kidneys 
are gone, they’re gone. And you can’t live without them. Despite my persistent optimism I 
could not help but notice that patients died regularly. Fortunately I never had to see that 
happen, as a friend on haemo did, but, in some ways, not seeing it was worse. I would 
notice their absence and clinic would go on without them. Looking for them would do no 
good. They were nowhere to be found. Their loss saturated the passage ways and their 
unsaid names rang in the wards. After a while I didn’t ask where people were if I hadn’t 
seen them at clinic, because the nurses’ responses were so matter-of-fact (“Oh, he died.”). 
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I agreed to play the game whose rules were unspoken: Don’t look and don’t tell. Pretend 
it’s all right. Focus on the living. 
And yet that cold current flowed beneath us as we ate our toast and marmite and drank our 
tea. It was like that feeling you get in airplanes sometimes: we are very high in the air 
travelling very fast in a tiny tin can. This should not be working! If anything goes wrong we 
haven’t a hope in hell! We are millimetres from total annihilation! Live life to the fullest while 
you can, I thought to myself, washing my hands. 
Part VII. 
I didn’t get peritonitis, but I did get bronchitis. That winter I started to struggle and grew 
weak. I hadn’t even had a cold that year, while all my university friends had come down 
with coughs, spastic colons, shingles, migraines and many other stress-related disorders. I 
was starting to feel invincible. But my hubris caught up with me. It started as a catarrh. It 
quickly travelled to my lungs. I don’t remember how long I was ill, but I came to wonder if I 
would ever be able to breathe unimpeded again. I produced an impressive amount of 
yellow phlegm. It was the only way in which I was productive at that time. I was grateful for 
the mid-year break, so I didn’t miss classes, but I fretted about getting behind in my 
reading. 
My doctor told me it was a bug that was going round, but that I was as sick as I was 
because I was already ill. At first I did not understand he meant I was ill enough to be on 
dialysis. I had come to see dialysis as a stage in recovery, because I felt so much better on 
it. I had to take a lot of antibiotics and my blood pressure had to be monitored constantly. I 
spent a lot of late June and early July in bed. I reasoned this was good, because the 
weather was chilly and our house unheated. My mother was very worried. This irritated me. 
It was only bronchitis, which I got almost every winter since I was 15. However something 
had changed.  
And when a kidney did come up for me, I was too sick to get it. I could not have the 
transplant while full of infection, because my heart might not be able to cope with the 
anaesthetic and the immunosuppressants would ensure I died a quick death. Any infection 
could become lethal with a compromised immune system. Even tooth cavities had to be 
dealt with before transplant. I had waited six months on dialysis and much, much longer 
before that for that kidney. 
I missed the kidney, but I didn’t miss my bag changes. I had learned early on that I felt 
much worse if I didn’t dialyse enough. No amount of tiredness was an excuse to avoid 
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changing my bags. I was always ill – “sick notes” didn’t count where I was. I went to 
classes if I felt lousy or less lousy.  Likewise I changed my bag despite how I was feeling.   
My biggest challenge when ill with bronchitis was keeping my bag changes sterile. Keeping 
things sterile is generally the biggest challenge with peritoneal dialysis. So I soldiered on, 
being careful not to cough or sneeze over my changing table. If I had a coughing paroxysm 
while in the middle of the procedure, I’d have to start all over again. If it came upon me at 
that delicate point while I was disconnecting the connector, I had to work really fast, trying 
to see through streaming eyes, while my body spasmed and I held my breath until 
everything was safely joined up again. 
I stopped coughing and my chest eventually cleared (it took about eight weeks), but I could 
not get onto my feet again. I had not been able to exercise while I was ill (or more ill, 
according to my doctor) and, at first, I reasoned that I had simply lost muscle tone. I had to 
fight to maintain it, because of all the protein I lost through my kidneys and the dialysis 
system. Sometimes the protein would be visible in the catheter bag, like long strands of 
egg white in Chinese soup. Suddenly I was too tired to cycle much, always breathless. 
Stairs were a problem to me again. I said to my mother and my friends that I was unfit and 
that I must get back to my exercise routine, but inside I knew what was wrong. I was 
wondering once again if I would see another spring. 
Your body knows when it’s dying. Although I had overcome the bronchitis, I knew in my 
heart that I would not survive another winter. I had lost some vital spark, coughed it out of 
me perhaps. I wasn’t going to live as long as next winter. I did not tell my mother. I thought 
I should, but I did not want to upset her. Instead I hoped that another kidney would come 
up for me before the next winter and that I’d be well enough to get it. What was another 
year’s wait when you were alive? 
I had been afraid of death for as long as I could remember. When I was small enough to be 
in nappies I had a dread of not being able to breathe. I had a morbid fascination with the 
lengths of people’s lives and anything related to death and decay, be it burial rites or 
biological processes. I was surprised to discover that knowing you are dying is not that 
frightening. It is a fact, like knowing you are hungry or knowing you are tired. Death is just 
something that happens. At a certain point the body knows that and so does your mind.   
I did not want to die, however. I had had a taste of living and I liked it. My mind wanted to 
fight death with everything I had, while my body wanted to give in to it, because it was in 
the natural chain of events and I was spent. It seemed so unfair suddenly. I hadn’t thought 
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much about the future, because I was unsure what to do with one, but now I tried to 
scramble for a plan – a focus – something to live for. There were things I hadn’t done, 
many, many things. I wanted to turn 23, even 30! Imagine what I could do with nine more 
years! I couldn’t even begin to think. I started bargaining with God again, hoping He 
wouldn’t notice I didn’t have a plan. 
I suspected that my body would win over my mind, because nature always does. No one 
lives forever and, in the general scheme of things, the difference between a single human 
life being 22 years or 62 is infinitesimal. I had studied ancient history, where we dealt in 
hundreds, if not thousands, of years as a matter of routine. I knew that to the universe, 
thousands of years are as the blink of an eye. No one life matters that much in the bigger 
picture and when you’re dead, nothing matters at all. You disappear and people stop 
talking about you. 
Before dialysis I used to go to sleep at night wondering whether I’d wake up in the morning. 
The tiredness I felt then was as terrible as death. I had become used to living without it, 
although still grateful for its absence. The tiredness I felt now was not the same, but I knew 
something in my body had changed qualitatively and permanently. It was as if I had taken 
a fork in the road. It was the road less travelled for young adults, but the road we all take 
eventually. I remember feeling really sorry I would not see purple irises or jacaranda 
flowers any longer and wondering why I didn’t have any more lofty ideals than that.   
In my defence I was also sorry that my mother and my friends were going to be left to bear 
the burden of grief. I wondered if I should write them a letter explaining that it wasn’t so 
terrible really, but felt it would be bad luck to do so, an acknowledgement that I was going 
to die. I didn’t write the letter, but I tried to slip some appreciative comments into my 
conversations with them. I hoped they’d notice. Then I hoped they wouldn’t. I kept 
changing my bags. 
Part VIII. 
I had fallen ill in June. By September I was starting to feel a little stronger and was getting 
back to my exercise routine. I hoped my enforced rest had not spoiled the progress I had 
made in developing my cardiovascular system for anaesthetic. I tried as best I could to 
make sure my lungs were clear, with no potential septic foci. Spring came again. In the 
southern hemisphere spring starts in September. I saw the flowering cherry blossoms on 
campus and wished I could breathe them into my lungs and take them with me when I 
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died. I kept on waiting. The jacarandas burst into flower. The coldness of winter that had 
leached into my bones gradually began to dissipate.  
And so I was fairly well when I got the call in early October – well enough to get my kidney 
after all, well enough to see spring again, many springs, well enough to fall in love with 
autumn again, although never quite as deeply as before. 
5.6 Discussion 
5.6.1 Reading my own narrative about dialysis 
When I set out to write my own story, I felt fairly confident about what I would find. My own 
experience of dialysis, from what I remembered, was different from those I had read. Dialysis 
has been constructed in negative ways (Cojocaru, 2008; Faber et al., 2003; Fox & Swazey, 
1992). I wanted to avoid doing this, because my experience overall was that dialysis saved my 
life and allowed me to be well enough to have a transplant (Parts III and VIII). This difference 
between my experience and those of others fascinated me.   
I believed that once I had written my narrative, it too would show that my experience was at 
least different, if not more accurate, than the narratives I had read. However, as my narrative 
progressed, I noticed that it had a rather changeable nature. At times I became alarmed to see 
that my narrative reproduced some of the stories I had read (Parts V, VI and VII). For instance, 
dialysis is meant to be a sad story about the tragic waste of human potential and a grisly 
reminder of imminent death (Fox & Swazey, 1992). Indeed, I could see this trend in my own 
story (Parts V, VI and VII).  
On closer examination, I was relieved to see that more was happening in my narrative than 
mere reproduction. I told the story as I remembered it and as it made sense to me, many years 
after the event. My persistent impression was that my story was qualitatively different from the 
others I had read. I wondered if this difference was a result of methodology. After all, I was 
writing a detailed story of my own experiences, while often the other stories were shorter 
stories in collections of other narratives compiled for research purposes by those who had not 
themselves been on dialysis (Faber et al., 2003; Kirmayer, 1992; Martin-McDonald, 2003/4; 
Russ et al., 2005; Zaner, 2004) or, if told by the person who had been on it, it would be a 
smaller part of a larger narrative and its theme was usually to show how much better 
transplantation was (Cojocaru, 2007; Etherington, 1991). I secretly hoped that my story was 
different because it was mine. 
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I found the realisation that my own personal narrative might already have been narrated 
curiously disconcerting and this was not mere vanity. I would like my experiences to be my 
own – to be authentic and particular to me. Part of the purpose of my research is to inform 
others; part of it is to inform myself. Because the research is about my life and I come from a 
Western, individualist tradition, I have a personal stake in it. My identity is composed, in part, 
of my experiences and my culture. They make me, to an extent, who I am. 
There was more to my perturbation. As a person who has spent a life in various types and 
degrees of medical care, whose very existence for a while was defined by it, I find the idea of 
being assimilated into a general discourse alarming. In the wards and in most of the clinics I 
was simply another patient who presented certain symptoms to be studied and treated. I was 
not a person in the fullest sense and my interactions with many of the staff were not as one 
human being to another, but as a case to a specialist, or a set of symptoms to a care provider 
– or even a file number to a system. My life and circumstances were subordinated to 
institutions and discourses that were much more valued than me (Goffman, 1963/1990). 
One of my personal goals was to demonstrate that despite everything I had been through, 
including the medical system, I was not just another patient. I did not have to fit in with what 
the doctors expected. They were not always right and their melancholy prognostications did 
not always come true. I did not have to be sick and weak just because my kidneys had failed 
and I was on life support. Life support did not mean I could not have an independent life. In 
short, I was reconstructing myself through my writing, healing a damaged identity (Bury, 1982; 
Frank, 1995), an identity damaged by medical perceptions rather than by physical illness. My 
writing was an act of self-assertion and a way of reclaiming my life of that period. I 
remembered it as being full, not empty. I remembered being part of things for once, instead of 
looking on from the outskirts. I could not (literally was not able to), at first, remember being 
scared, as I had been for so long in ESRD. In fact, when I had written my eight-phase 
narrative and was writing my discussion for the first time, I stated quite adamantly that I had 
never been afraid on dialysis, despite having just written in my narrative that I was. 
But in constructing a narrative that “beats” the system, I seemed to be constructing a narrative 
of triumphing over adversity, which is another standard illness narrative. Was I merely 
constructing another triumphalist narrative of free will and persistence defeating 
circumstances? I decided to return to my narrative for another look. 
5.6.2 The narrative revisited 
The first thing I realised is that my story above is a very brief and sketchy outline of eleven 
months of my life. A more comprehensive narrative would take far too long to relate. 
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Furthermore, I wrote it as I remembered it 17 years later. After I wrote it and started writing the 
more academic part of my chapter I was struck by what I had left out. When I returned to my 
narrative, I found myself looking not at what I said, but at what I did not say. 
For one thing, I did not describe what my bag system actually looked like and consisted of. 
Perhaps I did not describe the system in the story because I am myself so familiar with it. I 
have found that when I write about my illness and treatment I tend to write about the things 
that perplex me, so my narrative tends to be a “hard-working” narrative (Jordens et al., 2001, 
p. 1227). This sort of narrative helps a person reorder their life, reflect on and interpret events. 
In Frank’s terms, this sort of narrative can help one to reconstitute one’s identity (Frank, 2007). 
This is certainly partly true of my narrative, but that truth of my “dialysis identity”, who I saw 
myself as on dialysis, ironically, obscures another truth: what my dialysis system actually was. 
It seems these two truths cannot exist together. 
In an early draft of my narrative, I had written about the catheter system, ironically because it 
was a safe, contained, impersonal, medical topic, but even there my description was not very 
detailed and I had to remind myself more than once to put it in.  My eventual explanation of 
how it worked took quite a long time to write. Writing it was hard work. It took much memory 
wracking. It also took a surprising amount of emotional energy.  
Years after coming off dialysis I was surprised to learn that I had done well over a thousand 
sterile bag changes. I had never computed this while on dialysis. I had simply gone on from 
day to day, changing my catheter bags, never thinking about it. When I started writing about 
the procedure I was surprised to find how intricate and laborious it was. I do not remember it 
that way. Looking back on the process was fascinating. I had recently seen a TV programme 
on dialysis clinics in rural areas. I was taken aback when I realised that I had lived the illness 
that afflicted these desperate people. That was why I knew the answers to so many of the 
questions the interviewer asked. I knew, for instance, why they found it difficult to find or keep 
jobs. I knew why they struggled to do the jobs once they had them. It was not only the rigours 
of attending clinic, it was also that they were not physically strong. I could hardly believe that I 
had gone through so much of that. I experienced the same feeling writing about my eleven 
months on dialysis. It was a type of archaeology, where you uncover a lost civilisation and find 
it is your own. How had this information come to be buried? I can only conclude I must have 
buried it myself. 
I also left out the importance of the relationships with other patients, doctors and other care 
providers, especially the nurses. These relationships sustained me and were on the whole 
very healing in themselves, compared with my less than satisfactory experiences in the three 
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previous years I spent in the adult renal unit. From the staff and patients in dialysis I received 
care, support and information which helped me to make my dialysis experience work well for 
me. So why then did I omit these relationships?  
One of the difficulties in telling this story is its complexity. In order to sustain a coherent 
narrative thread, I needed to limit the number of themes I would include. I wanted to talk about 
my experience of dialysis, so I focused on me. But of course no human being exists on their 
own, not even those who are strong and healthy. A modern Western myth is that we can 
achieve independence as adults and forge our own paths. In reality we are all part of a variety 
of communities whose members are interdependent. I focused instead on my experience of 
dialysis, so dialysis (but not its workings) became another thread. Life on dialysis is very 
ordered. It has to be. Each day’s structure is very clear. This gave me a sense of control. This 
life’s routines are also very repetitive, so they are easy to remember. Perhaps my dialysis 
relationships were more complex than I realised, being themselves, in some senses, life lines. 
Maybe acknowledging this would undermine my steely story of self-reliance and control. 
I should perhaps have mentioned (but did not) why I chose to have peritoneal dialysis, which 
augmented my feeling of control. I could say I chose peritoneal dialysis because it more 
closely emulated the function of normal kidneys, allowing dialysis to take place inside my body 
without a machine, but I would be lying. I chose it because I have always been scared of 
needles. So, in a sense, I went onto it not by choice and through control, but by default and 
dread. 
I omitted my personal metaphor for dialysis. I saw my dialysis system as my umbilical cord.  
Even now, the scar that remains where the tube exited my body resembles a tiny navel, which 
I see as the evidence of my second “birth” or passage into my new life. Sometimes I would 
think of my cord as the line that connects astronauts to the mother ship – a variant on the 
theme. I would imagine myself stepping out into space, into an environment that could not 
possibly sustain me, if it were not for that fragile line that kept me alive – my life line. 
My peritoneal dialysis line was inserted into my abdomen, a few inches to the left of my navel.  
In the early 1990s, when I was on dialysis, the line was left attached after the dialysate was 
drained into one’s abdomen, so one always had a long plastic catheter tube coiling out of 
one’s belly, with a dialysis bag attached. Dialysis has been described as having an “external 
kidney” (Helman, 2007, p. 33, and others), but I did not see it that way, possibly because in 
peritoneal dialysis the filtration area is inside the body, only the results are drained out.   
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Perhaps, had I been on haemodialysis, I would have thought differently. However, I notice that 
I am not alone in my description of dialysis.  A Canadian haemodialysis patient described his 
dialysis in exactly the same way (Faber et al., 2003, p. 160). The researchers interpreted this 
only as his experiencing difficulty and restriction. However gruelling and unpleasant it may 
seem to an outsider, it is quite different if the equipment is saving your life. I do not know for 
certain what the Canadian patient meant, but my impression is that he felt the cord was his life 
line, however restrictive. 
The metaphor of umbilical cord is loaded with significance. The unborn baby is attached to its 
mother’s womb by the umbilical cord through which it receives all the nutrients it needs and all 
its waste is removed. Not only does the umbilical cord feed, it also cleans. My dialysis line did 
exactly both of these things for me. The cord is security and life and, in my metaphor, that is 
what it symbolises. It is the connection between mother and child – the most powerful 
relationship of all, and where life begins on so many levels. I was the one performing the bag 
changes, however. I now wonder, seventeen years later, if that made me the mother as well 
as the child. Did I give birth to myself on dialysis? Clearly, I see dialysis, not my transplant, as 
the beginning of my second chance. 
Giving birth, umbilical cords – these are very physical things. So why then did I to a large 
extent occlude my body in my narrative? Dialysis is all about keeping the body alive and 
interactions with the body. Being on dialysis is overwhelmingly an embodied experience. 
Maybe writing about it in a detached way many years later allowed me to control the sense of 
overwhelming physicality. I tend to do that in my life generally. So my body all but 
disappeared. Ironically that was my experience of medical treatment generally – parts of 
oneself or even one’s whole self tended to be rendered invisible. Treatment is given to a 
problem or a disease, not to you, a person, with an embodied life. Doctors would talk over you 
to each other about your condition as you lay in bed, invisible and unrecognised. Sometimes, 
after clinics (but before going to the dialysis unit), after being examined, poked and prodded, I 
would leave the hospital diminished and feeling ghostlike. After being scrutinised all day, I 
could feel myself disappearing. 
However, if my narrative represents my experience of my condition and the medical treatment 
it necessitated, then maybe it functions in a subversive way metaphorically. The “body” of my 
text is my narrative and that body is protean. It can shift its shape to elude scrutiny or to 
redirect the reader’s gaze. It decides where it wants to go and what it wants to be. It is not 
content being data. It wants to analyse as well. 
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There is another thing I never dwelt on: waiting. I had a mantra I used to chant under my 
breath, except when I was performing my dialysis routine, because I needed to concentrate on 
that: “Dialysis is not a way of life. But it’s better than the alternative.” True, dialysis is 
restrictive, but so is ESRD. At least with dialysis I could climb stairs. I had been too weak to 
climb stairs since I was 19. I went onto dialysis at 21. I could exercise again. The dialysis unit’s 
physiotherapist gave me an exercise routine that included various types of sit-ups to 
strengthen my stomach muscles and an exercise bike routine that toned my legs, but also 
strengthened my cardiovascular system for surgery. I was waiting for a transplant after all 
(Parts V and VI). 
I waited for 11 months. During that time I did four a day sterile bag changes every day, except 
for the three changes that I missed. I attended clinic at least once a month. I had innumerable 
blood tests. I cycled hundreds of imaginary miles through imaginary lavender fields in an 
imaginary Provence (sometimes they were Van Gogh-like cornfields). I felt so strong that I 
sometimes raced imaginary trains. I watched too many soap operas – we did not have a video 
machine. I never got peritonitis. It seems unimaginable now. 
I think the most difficult aspect of dialysis is the waiting. It is rather like being in an airport 
waiting lounge, wondering how long your flight has been delayed. No one who is on dialysis is 
really there permanently. It is a stop gap of unspecified duration. Everyone has another 
destination in mind: some believe they will recover and that dialysis will save them (it may do if 
their kidney failure is acute and treated speedily), some hope for a transplant, some stop 
hoping and wait for death. Some even speed death along, deliberately infecting themselves or 
eating the wrong things. 
I cannot deny that dialysis takes time. The amount of time it took me was another thing I never 
discussed. On dialysis I started to understand what the doctor had meant when he told me that 
time is never wasted meant. Life is just lived. Whether you do what you choose to do or what 
you have to do your life passes at the same rate. Your life is within you, not in the things you 
do or do not do. Your rituals become meaningful in themselves, by their very performance. 
They mean because they are. So for me dialysis was process rather than procedure, more 
journey than arrival, a metaphor for life.   
I wanted to live. I had had to fight for my life from an early age and I was not about to give up 
on it. Dialysis was a means to an end. Another medical procedure to be learned. In fact, I liked 
it because I felt relatively well on it and it gave me a measure of control over my health care. I 
did all my dialysis procedures myself. I felt structured and organised, even accomplished, 
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especially as I did not contract peritonitis, which is the bane of all peritoneal dialysis patients 
and their doctors.   
Remaining “clean” became a point of pride with me. It brought out a competitiveness in me 
that I didn’t know I had – and also a type of obsession. I would not use any bag that seemed 
remotely impure. I would return them grimly to the clinic and the nurses would argue with me 
that the fluid inside the outer casing was just condensation. I would admonish them to run the 
bag’s contents into their own abdomens if it was so clean. Of course, none of them were on 
dialysis, but it did seem to give them pause for thought. 
Modern medicine and other technologies have rendered the human body’s boundaries porous 
(Helman, 2007; Swartz & Watermeyer, 2008). On dialysis I came to see how vulnerable I really 
was to attack from outside. You cannot walk without walking on the ground, where many 
others have walked. You have to touch door handles that many others have touched, even if 
only with your elbow. Your hands go repeatedly to your mouth. Your hands are what change 
your bags. 
Although dialysis is often treated in medicine as a type of pit stop between ESRD and an 
organ transplant, some people never get organs and many have to live for years on dialysis.  
One cannot really be said to be waiting if it takes years. That then becomes a way of living – 
an era in one’s life – or, if not living exactly, a type of limbo. Limbo comes from the Latin 
“limbus” meaning the edge. In the Catholic view of the afterlife, limbo is where the souls of 
unbaptised babies go and those of upstanding heathens. It can also mean a prison or a place 
of neglect and oblivion. Liminality comes from the same source, but it means a threshold. I 
wonder if the palimpsests of the related meanings of imprisonment don’t shine through 
nonetheless. 
5.6.3 Liminality or littorality? 
As a treatment dialysis is a trapping of illness, an artefact of it, or a consequence of it, as 
taking medication is. And just as taking medication can be a gloomy reminder to people that 
they have crossed over to the “kingdom of the ill” and are using their other, less glamorous, 
passport (Sontag, 1978, p. 3), so can dialysis. For someone who has had an identity as a well 
person, this constant reminder that they are not who they once were can be devastating 
(Martin-McDonald, 2003/4).  
However, for one who has not truly had an identity as a well person, dialysis might represent 
something else or have a different type of effect on their identity. In my case, I can see, as an 
older person who has now been well or “well” for a number of years, that my existence before 
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dialysis was already littoral. From my mid-teens I was very ill. By the time I went to university I 
was debilitated to the extent that I could barely climb stairs at first and then not at all. I slept 
fourteen hours a day. And yet I had always been just well enough to pass as normal. 
So the more typical liminality of dialysis, the idea of dialysis as a space which one passed 
through from ESRD en route (ideally) to transplantation and health, might not have made such 
a strong contrast for me with my previous life. Or, alternatively, my littoral condition in ESRD 
might have become more liminal on dialysis. In ESRD I was simply separate from my (well) 
peers, in a strange zone, but now I could integrate to an extent. I could never really count 
myself as well before or during dialysis. Nonetheless going onto dialysis certainly marked the 
end of an era in my life. I had never been on it before and it meant that I had indeed crossed 
some sort of boundary. I find it difficult to establish exactly what that boundary was. Possibly it 
changed the littoral state of ESRD into a retrospectively liminal one. 
I think for other people – those few who knew I was on dialysis – it was a clear and 
unavoidable sign of how serious my condition was. I remember my grandfather sighing about 
how hard my lot was when he saw me checking my dialysate delivery each month – 120 bags 
in cartons of six. I felt irritated by this because my lot had been substantially worse before 
dialysis, but he had managed not to see it, burdening me instead with household tasks.  
Until I was on dialysis, the doctors seemed to treat me as if my condition was not all that 
serious and yet my condition was life threatening and irreversible. Before dialysis they would 
tell me to lead a normal life, but would not tell me what constituted normal. I was not able to 
emulate my well peers and my (as I saw it) failure left me poisoned by guilt, shame and self-
doubt. In addition I felt emotionally abandoned by my medical team. This trapped me in a state 
of in-betweenness where I had not been able to close a door on a traumatic experience and so 
could not proceed. I haunted my past like a ghost, returning always to the scene of my crime, 
my failure, my dysappearance. Only when I went onto dialysis could I see that the crime had 
been perpetrated against me, not by me, so long, in fact, that I had become used to that 
ghostly girl, too used to her to be able to exorcise her. And so my liminality persists in other 
ways. 
From my perspective at the time, however, dialysis marked the beginning of hope, for I firmly 
believed I would receive a kidney and that my transplant would work. However, one 
unavoidable fact remains: it also marked a point of no return. No matter what relief dialysis 
brought to my life, it really was a type of waiting room before transplant. Had I not been able to 
have a transplant I would have made the most of dialysis, but dialysis was always only a 
temporary measure before better things.  
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Nonetheless, I must have known intuitively that many people would see dialysis as a harbinger 
of disease and death, because I did not tell many people about it. Or perhaps I had fallen into 
despair in ESRD, knowing that the well would never understand how my life worked. I 
remember taking great pleasure in passing as “normal”. It was easier to do this on dialysis. 
Passing has many meanings: to be accepted as something, to cross over, to attain a standard 
in an exam (but not honours), to die. A pass can be written permission for something or a 
narrow passage in a mountain, often the key route to a country. It can mean that you can at 
last pass yourself off as something you are not: “normal” (Goffman, 1963/1990). Dialysis is all 
these things. I sometimes think that dialysis is where I learned to pass in Goffman’s sense, 
where my most persistent liminal stage began, the one which I have never truly left. I belonged 
in one kingdom, while passing as normal in another more glamorous one (like a pale-skinned 
person of mixed race in the nineteenth century, or a transvestite, or a vampire). 
However, being on dialysis made me feel as if I inhabited a littoral, third space, as if I could 
transgress boundaries between the healthy and unhealthy, between the living and the dead, 
because in terms of natural law I should have been dead. In writing this dissertation I blur the 
boundaries between researcher and researched. I always found it amusing that boundaries 
are seen as “facts” rather than social constructs and that stepping over them or ignoring them 
is seen as breaking some type of divine law. Learning where the line is has the same effect on 
me as “Keep off the grass” signs. 
There are (other) advantages to be gained in appearing well (Belkin, 2008). For myself, when I 
was on dialysis, I felt better than I had in years and could do more. I wanted to make up for 
lost time and to lay by stores of things done, in case I once more lost the ability to do them.  
My strength amazed me and others who knew me. It was admirable and it is so much better 
being admired than being pitied. Finally I could be passable. 
However, while one passes on dialysis, one can render oneself even less visible than ill 
people usually are (Belkin, 2008; Faber et al., 2003). You would not want to be seen as sick, 
but if you actually are sick and pass yourself off as well, the real you is not seen at all. Also, if 
you remove yourself – your real self – from daily life and replace it with a false self, who do 
you become? A ghost? A memory? Do you pretend to be well so that you can exist in a 
society in which there is no place for the ill? These tensions remain unresolved for me. 
5.6.4 Some last thoughts on my narrative 
Process is something you go through, rather than something that is done to you or on you. For 
this reason dialysis can open up a discursive space in which the person experiencing it is 
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dynamically positioned. The narrative that results from an awareness of this changeable state 
should reveal a complex, “hard-working” narrative of the sort found in studies of cancer 
patients (Jordens et al., 2001).  
I am struck not only by the complexity of my dialysis narrative, but its frequent ironies. Perhaps 
that is one of its hallmarks. There is something ironic about the entire process, something 
paradoxical, ambiguous, liminal and unstable.  
What I had originally hoped for was a narrative that deconstructed other narratives. Instead, 
what I found was that my narrative changed from one that constructed dialysis as an improved 
way of life to a more conventional narrative of dialysis as “waiting room”. I found that through it 
I became a conventional dialysis patient who was keen to have a transplant and put dialysis 
behind her. That period after bronchitis when I realised my body had started dying (or, 
possibly, carried on dying after a brief respite) was very frightening and destroyed my sense of 
safety. I began to feel once again as if my health was beyond my control and that larger forces 
than me were going to decide my fate. In writing about this I had re-inscribed myself in a 
conventional role. I was perplexed. I did not feel that this accurately reflected my experience of 
dialysis and yet I had written it and it was true to what I remembered. 
In some ways my narrative matched those I had read. I had hoped to use my narrative to 
structure my chapter. Its different parts would have been the entry points for analyses of 
different stories and for their deconstruction. Despite my apparent reproduction of other 
dialysis narrative forms, I found my story not similar enough to others’, after all, to provide 
sufficient points of entry to do this. My narrative was supposed to be my argument, the lens 
through which I would see how things were. I did not want my narrative simply to be another 
narrative awaiting interpretation. I wanted my narrative to be a type of analytic lens. And now it 
even had the conventional happy ending/resolution of a triumph over adversity narrative. What 
now? 
But it was not the end. Quite literally. My hopes revived. I realised I had omitted something 
else: what happened next. No narrative is ever complete. Each is part of a larger story. If you 
change the size of the slice, you change the narrative composition. A happy ending is neither 
necessarily happy nor an ending if you say what happened next. A new ending must then be 
found and even that will not necessarily be the real ending. I felt a perverse thrill of satisfaction 
realising the conventional happy ending is only ever a temporary state. Just as the happily-
ever-after ending in fairytales is itself a fairytale (for the lovers will eventually grow old and die), 
a person in an illness narrative might emerge triumphant from their catastrophic illness, but 
one day they too will die. Did this mean that my narrative was tragic? How ironic that I should 
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have felt a sense of control and optimism on dialysis and then had a successful transplant in a 
tragic narrative. 
No – my narrative seemed curiously unsettled. Could it be that I had not made up my mind 
about dialysis despite thinking of it all day, every day for eleven months (something else that 
did not feature in my story) and having the distance of seventeen years? Perhaps dialysis was 
something slippery and unfixed, despite its rituals, something that defied categorisation. 
Possibly I was not a sophisticated or articulate enough narrator to do justice to it. Possibly I 
was torn between artifice and authenticity. Perhaps the narrative of dialysis – my own, at any 
rate – is an unstable narrative by the very virtue of its being itself. 
Or maybe it was that narratives are by nature recursive. A while after drafting this chapter, I 
presented a poster paper on what I referred to as “the discursive space of dialysis” (Richards, 
2009b). In making the poster I inadvertently added to this narrative, because I realised that I 
had evolved my thinking about dialysis again and that my poster was now part of my narrative 
too, like a type of dialysis catheter, attached to the body by a slender connection and important 
to its survival. The recursive and reflexive nature of illness narratives in particular allows the 
narrator to revisit the past in order to move forward. At some level we construct them to go 
back to the past and rewrite them, sometimes over and over, as a ritual, as a temporary 
measure to counteract uncertainty (Frost, 1973). Each time it will be different and yet the 
same. Each time we will be different and yet return briefly to who we once were, purified and 
re-membered. 
To this day, twenty years later, I still maintain hygiene habits I learned while on dialysis, 
because it makes me feel safe. I do think this has helped me reduce my contact with bacteria 
and viruses. I have been, after all, immunosuppressed since transplant. Maybe I am still 
purifying myself ritualistically for reintegration into society, still on the threshold. Or maybe I 
need to keep purifying myself so that I can always go back. 
A last word on liminality: a limner is one who illuminates a manuscript. The silver on a mirror is 
known as the limning. It is this that shows the reflection. I would like to think that my narrative 
could illuminate or at least reflect something for readers as it did for me about the lived 
experience of dialysis. 
I do not want my last word on this subject to be an academic one. Instead I want to include 
part of the narrative that I did not in my earlier story. I hope that it will add another dimension 
to this discussion, as I intended by starting my article with another part of my personal 
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narrative. In life the story came before the analysis and, as in life, I return to the story after the 
analysis. 
5.7 Post script: Leaving dialysis 
But of course, that wasn’t the end of the story. I don’t really remember having my dialysis 
line put in, but I do remember having it taken out. This is partly because it was removed 
under local anaesthetic, while it was supposed to have been removed under general 
anaesthetic. Oddly enough, even though the operation took an hour and a half and I felt 
every second of it, that is not what lives with me most. To some extent I dealt with the pain 
and trauma of the procedure by avenging myself on my surgeon and nurse. When I 
learned 45 minutes into the procedure that we were only half way through and there was 
no chance of a general anaesthetic or sewing me up and removing the line later, I spent 
the rest of the operation telling them in immense detail about the complexities of Classical 
Greek irregular verbs. They were sweating more than I was by the end of it. I’d like to think 
I’d played a part in that. 
What I remember most, even though my new kidney was working so well, was the fear of 
losing my line. Not “of having it removed”, but “of losing it”. I tried to argue with the doctors 
that it should just be left in, “in case”, after all, it had been sealed off, by a type of “blind” 
plug and was now just a few inches long. I could tape it to my body quite easily and it was 
no trouble to me. But nearly four months after transplant, my kidney was clearly settling 
down for a long stay.  
What would happen when the line was taken out? I didn’t know. I also wondered how I’d 
manage my time without the ritual of bag changes. Suddenly there seemed a vast, 
amorphous ocean of time ahead of me and I felt as if I was lost at sea. Nothing was familiar 
anymore. I felt more dread about losing that little bit of plastic tubing than I had about 
anything since nearly losing my transplanted kidney a few months before. I wondered if the 
doctors would let me keep the tube after it was removed. For one thing I wanted to see 
what it looked like. For another I saw that tube as part of me, a type of extra limb and 
judging by how hard it was to separate us, we really had become one flesh. But the doctors 
wouldn’t let me keep it. The titanium plugs and connector were expensive and needed to 
be accounted for. After an hour and a quarter, the doctor dropped them into the kidney 
bowl with a couple of small clangs and a gasp of relief. And the tube…I never found out 
what happened to the tube. 
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CHAPTER 6: LIFE AFTER TRANSPLANT - A STRANGE SORT OF 
LIMINALITY, OR “YOU LOOK VERY WELL FOR A TRANSPLANT” 
6.1 Introduction 
What strikes me about the literature I have read on transplantation is that the vast bulk of it is 
written by people who have not themselves had transplants (some instances are Baines & 
Jindal, 2003; Fox & Swazey, 1978, 1992; Lock, 2002; Scheper-Hughes, 2007; Sharp, 2006; 
Sque et al., 2006). From these writers’ perspectives transplantation means certain things. It 
carries social or ethical significance, but does not often hold (as far as I can discern) subjective 
or personal value. In research transplantation is usually seen from the outside. It looks 
different from the inside. I feel sometimes that my own experiences are missing when 
transplantation is discussed as simply another example of meta-issues in medicine. How does 
one achieve a balance between accentuating the needs of the individual and the various costs 
of treatment? 
I have lived though having a kidney transplanted into my body and have lived with my “new” 
kidney (which is two years older than me) for 20 years, and so transplantation carries a very 
different constellation of meanings for me. I have also found that the meaning transplantation 
carries for me has changed over the years, partly as a result of my own coming to terms with 
what happened to me, partly because my transplant remained stable, and partly because I 
maintain transplantation is a process as well as a procedure. It is the on-going process of 
transplantation that I discuss in this chapter, not the medical procedure itself.  
The quotation that I used in the title of my dissertation and in the heading of this chapter is at 
the core of one of the post-transplant stories I tell in this chapter. “You look very well for a 
transplant” illustrates the unhelpfulness of binaries such as well/ill for people living with my 
condition. It also reveals how a medical narrative can obscure a personal narrative and 
damage further an already-damaged identity.  
Many studies about transplantation are, I have seen, about transplantation as an immediate, 
short-term solution, essentially a medical procedure that is done to you as a patient, not 
something in which you participate. There are few longer-term studies because historically not 
too many transplants have lasted longer than a decade. These days two thirds are expected to 
make that mark (McCauley, 2004), because of advances in medication that target specific 
parts of your immune system according to your needs, so it is important for researchers to look 
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at the long(er)-term experience of transplantation, and to separate the short term from the long 
term experientially. Life after transplant is the topic of this chapter. For the patient the 
transplantation experience does not end with surgery; it begins. I could say that 20 years later 
I am still “having a transplant”. Keeping and sustaining my kidney is an on-going process. 
It is difficult to get away from a medical view of transplantation because transplantation is 
(partly) a medical procedure. But what happens beyond that? Can we – should we – try to get 
away from a medical view? What are the implications of seeing it predominantly medically? 
For the patient it is not only a medical procedure, but the promised land of the rest of their life 
and this is not often explored in medical transplantation literature. Also if the whole 
transplantation experience is seen as a medical procedure, only too easily does the patient 
become identified by the medical procedure. You cease being a person and become a 
“transplant” – a “transplantee” if you’re lucky. 
In this chapter I will describe some significant events that occurred immediately after surgery 
to show how the medical and the personal narratives were battling for supremacy. After that, I 
will describe my reactions to three events that all took place years after transplant. They show 
that my self-perception as a person who has had a transplant is far from straightforward. 
Although healthy and although my transplant is successful, I still see myself in some ways as 
“ill”. Why I see myself this way will be explored through writing about it.   
Finally, as I have discussed before, I shall examine the idea of being ill all one’s life and then 
becoming well. This is different from the majority of illness narratives and its implications need 
to be carefully documented. There is no clearly defined category for people who experience 
this. Similarly, there is no category for people who have survived organ failure and 
transplantation; they are not in the same situation as people living with chronic illnesses. For 
instance, people who are HIV positive, but on antiretrovirals, occupy an unnamed territory 
somewhere between the well and the ill that is not dissimilar to the “land” where people who 
have had transplants live. But it is not exactly the same. The disease that destroyed my 
kidneys is long gone. I am not “HUS positive”. Some conditions that damage kidneys (such as 
lupus and diabetes) persist after transplant, but many conditions don’t. A new category is 
needed that will be a more accurate description of organ transplant survivors. It is likely that a 
new narrative will emerge from this discussion, one that is less the story of an illness, but the 
story of an individual.  
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6.2 Life post-transplant, the medical view and in-betweenness: The search for a 
story 
Perhaps with chronic illness one has the time to understand and accept that one’s life’s course 
is not going to be a simple one of “I was well, then I got sick, then I got well again”. My own 
experience has shown that, although my transplant has been so successful and my life is so 
normal in so many ways, it can never be a life untouched by illness or loss. And yet that life 
touched by illness and loss is my life. Your scars are part of what makes you who you are. 
Taking them away is like erasing your identity.  
When you are looking forward to having medical treatment, there is a temptation to believe in 
restitution stories. You probably would not undergo treatment if you did not hold out some 
hope of its working. In my case, I really did not know what to expect of a healthy life, because I 
had never had one. I did once believe with all my heart that any treatment I could have would 
be better than being in organ failure and that my new kidney would work. In my case it was 
and it has. Other people’s stories have not necessarily turned out so well (as was seen in the 
section about renal narratives in Chapter 2) and I am fully aware that my future is still not 
guaranteed, even twenty years later. I can still lose my kidney or develop dangerous diseases 
as side-effects of my anti-rejection medication. 
Nonetheless, I do not see my story as a restitution story in Frank’s (1995) terms exactly, 
because from my remembered experience I am not back to where I was before the “horrid 
thing” happened. I do not remember such a time, although it existed for eight months before I 
contracted HUS. Retrospectively, I certainly do not see my story as a restitution story. I have 
lived in liminal and littoral spaces too long for that.  
What might have helped me avoid this way of seeing my story is that, institutionally, 
transplants are seen in an ambiguous way. They save lives, but they do not cure kidney 
failure. Not long after I went onto dialysis, my mother and I encountered a renal transplant 
surgeon near the dialysis unit. My mother longed for reassurance that I would survive and the 
doctor told her my prospects were excellent, because I was young and otherwise healthy. He 
explained that transplants could last as long as ten years. I was twenty one. For him that was 
success: a successful transplant could buy me a decade of reasonably problem-free living. 
What would happen next? We did not discuss it. He had to run to see another patient. I tried to 
look grateful, but I felt appalled. 
I subsequently discovered that many transplants did not seem to last as long as 10 years. 
Often my fellow dialysis patients were back on dialysis after failed transplants, not infrequently 
more than one. After transplant, the general ambience did not become much sunnier. Their 
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sojourn with their new kidneys seemed fraught with health problems, the medication being one 
of the major culprits. Worse off than them were the patients who never got kidneys at all, 
because their general state of health was too fragile. I reasoned ten years were better than 
none.  
6.2.1 Medical narratives and being number 548820 
I always felt, after attending my clinics in the awful adult renal unit, as if I had no right to feel 
tired, sick or afraid, because of the suffering I had seen and also because I was a number. A 
number with a diagnosis. Such things do not feel pain, emotional or otherwise. The doctors 
had not diagnosed it or prescribed treatment for it, so it must not exist. On the contrary: they 
had instructed me to lead a normal life. Each time I went to clinic I felt myself taking on more of 
my identity as patient 548820, one number in relation to other numbers. It seemed to saturate 
my bones. Infuse into my spirit. I had a brief respite from numbers in the dialysis clinic for 
eleven months, but the damage was already done. I’m no mathematician, but it seems to me 
as if numbers can only exist in relation to other numbers. You can’t have a 548820 without a 
548819. I have never wondered, until now, who that might have been and what their life might 
have been like beyond being a number. 
Medical narratives compartmentalise you and redefine your identity in terms of your condition 
(Cook, 1996). In a medical narrative you are a case and not a person. Before transplant I was 
a “kidney failure due to HUS”. Afterwards I was a “renal transplant”. My problems beyond my 
renal situation did not exist. I was defined as being part of a larger narrative of kidney disease, 
while my experience was that kidney disease was part of me. The human experience of illness 
and disability (Charon & Montello, 2002) was ignored. As important and as specialised as 
medical treatment is, doctors ignore human experience of it at a cost (Kleinman, 1988).  
My donor had an identity too: cadaver donor 938, but I did not know that when I went into 
theatre. All I knew was that the numbers had a system and it was not what I had thought. It 
was not the anonymous, relative system of “Nothing Matters”. It was the infinitely worse 
system of “Something matters, but we’re not telling you what it is” or even, “Something is in 
control of all of this and it is not who you think”. 
6.2.2 A doctor steps out of the medical narrative 
The head of the transplant unit was not technically my specialist. He did, however, have the 
last word on any procedures I underwent and so he came regularly to my isolation ward to 
check on my progress. I had always seen him as a strange and cold man who lacked charm or 
a decent bedside manner. We had had a few run-ins and personality clashes over the years. 
However, once I was admitted, he came into his own. Not long after my transplant he came to 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
154 
 
ask me how I felt and what I experienced. I tried my best to explain how much better I felt, but 
could not quite put it into words to my satisfaction. I half expected him to tell me how he had 
decided it would be, but he did not. Instead, he put his head on one side, like a dog listening 
hard to a sound not audible to human ears. 
“I wish,” he said, “that I could experience it for myself. It’s the one thing my science cannot tell 
me – what it’s actually like afterwards.” 
“It’s wonderful,” I told him. 
“You do understand,” he said after a moment’s hesitation, “that your transplant is not going to 
fix everything else in your life?” 
Of course I did. The transplant fixed my kidney problems and gave me a chance to fix 
everything else in my life. What else are second chances for? I did not tell him that I had every 
intention of making my new life perfect and that I believed I could by virtue of my suffering. I 
felt I had paid it forward and that my narrative could indeed be a type of restitution narrative. 
And yet his remark niggled at me. Nearly two decades later I still recall our conversation 
because what he said jarred so much with the plot I was covertly sketching out in my mind. I 
knew literally that a transplant would not fix anything other than kidney problems (and maybe 
not even that), but, possibly because of my miraculous launch into my new life, I expected 
strange and wonderful things to follow as a matter of course. I secretly believed it could really 
be perfect.  
I had already made myself a few promises about my new life. I was not one for making 
promises – I put too great a store on honouring them. They were simply these: 
1. I would only ever eat what I wanted, when I wanted it 
2. I would never diet again ever 
3. I would do everything in my power to keep my kidney 
4. I would only do what I wanted to do and spend my precious time on things that were 
meaningful to me 
I have honoured all of them, except the last. I have fallen miserably short with that. I squander 
(in my mind) vast tracts of time on often repetitive things that gratify other people or that fulfil 
bureaucratic requirements, but that I find utterly stultifying. Friends tell me this is what normal 
is. Maybe normal people believe themselves to be rich enough in time to waste it this way, but 
I don’t and it causes me terrible anxiety. 
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Every day counted so much more when I was ill. Every sensation was so much sharper. The 
purpleness of flowers broke my heart. I could not pick them and be responsible for their death. 
Death flavoured everything, not with decay, but with an acrid poignancy. Since then the 
urgency of mortality has left me somewhat, other than the inevitable feeling of vulnerability 
about my own health. That is one locus of familiarity with my previous dispensation. 
6.2.3 Kidney success, story failure 
Despite the overwhelming evidence that it does not exist, we do still long for a just world. We 
need to believe that there is a reason, a pattern, that it makes sense. We try to work out what 
the numbers mean, but we are not mathematicians or even numerologists. None of the 
numbers in my life seem especially significant, not even in relation to each other. And so we 
tell stories instead. We hope that someone will listen. People do not always listen if they do not 
hear what they want to hear: a narrative that fits into their world view. Sometimes we do not 
listen to ourselves, because we cannot bear to see what the narrative shows.  
After many years of a medical story that in some ways was not quite my own and yet was 
entirely mine, entirely the story of my body and its treatments, I found myself transplanted and 
alone in a strange new world, with no story, no way of explaining my new circumstances to 
myself. The tattered remains of my old story did not help me: I had a kidney condition that was 
deteriorating and I would need a transplant. It was the doctors’ story and, now that I had had 
my transplant, they seemed to feel that they had done their job. Everyone was smiling. The 
procedure had been a success. All the contact I had with them now was fleeting clinic visits in 
which they adjusted my anti-rejection medicine. We barely spoke other than to repeat ritually 
the narrative that I was healed.  
Of course that was not quite true and I knew it. I could not be healed. Kidney failure is 
irreversible. A transplant is merely a therapy and must be sustained artificially by medication. 
But everybody likes a happy ending. And what is better than a tragic plot that has miraculously 
become a comic one? It took me ten years to come to terms with the sword of Damocles that 
still hangs over my head: that transplanted organs mysteriously fail, reject or die, often without 
warning. Every moment after my surgery has felt like borrowed time, although I have now had 
my kidney for almost half my life. I have never, in all these years, discussed this with my 
doctors. They would merely recite numbers to me: odds, probabilities, chances, statistics. 
They could not help me. I knew no one who could. All the transplantees were in the same 
position. We would discuss it while waiting in clinic. None of us knew what to do. And the 
sword fell for many of us. You could not help but notice, even though the doctors never 
mentioned it. I had come to doubt their narratives over the years and now I felt they had failed 
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me completely. But I had nothing with which to replace them, other than some strange, small 
tales of marvellous coincidence. 
There are various ways to heal a broken narrative. All of them involve bringing new and 
powerful meaning to it (Bauby, 1997; Brody, 2003; Bury, 1982; Frank, 1995). Often this takes 
the form of encounters with the mysterious. This has been seen as a desire for both “healing 
and the miraculous” being “represented and made real” (Good & Good, 1994, p. 841). I kept 
reminding myself that despite not having a mobile phone or pocket pager, I had been 
miraculously “found” on campus on time by the nurse and social worker when my kidney 
“came up”. This showed me that I was meant to have it and surely this meant I was meant to 
keep it too. I did not share this with the doctors. For one thing, it deflected attention from their 
medical procedures and onto the nursing sister and social worker’s resourcefulness and 
initiative. The doctors seemed not to be so smiley when that happened. Their expressions 
seemed to become pursed-lipped if I alluded to divine intervention. They would drop their eyes 
to my file and start reading it until I stopped speaking about my extraordinary good fortune. I 
needed them to be on my side, so I learned to choose what I told them (Frank, 1995; 
Weingarten, 2001). But my being found was miraculous. If this happened in a story, it would 
be seen as a very unlikely coincidence. But it happened in real life, so it must be true. 
6.2.4 Turbulent times and an undecided narrative 
Nonetheless I nearly lost my kidney three times in the first three weeks and, after being 
discharged, I was at bed-rest for two months because of a virus I had after all contracted from 
my kidney that affected my heart. My body was a turbulence of medications. My blood 
chemistry was haywire as I battled the side effects of my new immunosuppressant drugs – my 
appetite increased to gargantuan proportions, I lost hair from my scalp, while it sprouted from 
my face, chest and back, I broke out in a rash of pimples that I had never had in adolescence, 
my moods rollercoastered – and, most weirdly, I started to grow in height again, although I 
was in my twenties. I no longer fitted my clothes. My trouser legs were too short. I had to give 
away the contents of my wardrobe and get new clothes for the first time in years.  
Between the ages of 13 and 18 I had looked much the same, scarcely changing in height or 
weight. I got thinner in my late teens as I became sicker. Now for the first time I no longer 
looked like myself or felt like myself. I no longer knew what to expect of myself. I was no longer 
static. I was changing so rapidly I could not keep up. Was this what normal was? I doubted it. 
My body became monstrous to me, huge, hot and hungry, unwieldy and perverse. I felt like a 
werewolf crossed with the Pillsbury Doughboy and I had an overwhelming love of red meat. 
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Of course I resisted it all strenuously (except the red meat which I ate voraciously). It was as if 
I had lived in a cave all my life and then had been transported to a rain forest. Light was 
brighter, sounds were sharper. I could hear properly for the first time in years. My senses were 
overloaded. And I was off beta-blockers for the first time since I was 9, so the world around me 
was no longer flattened and two-dimensional. 
My narrative was not broken so much as shattered. My identity was in ruins. I was battling a 
monster and it was me. My body had never been “normal”, but now it seemed truly aberrant to 
me. It rebelled against me. It became an “inappropriate/d other” (Haraway, 1992). At any rate it 
was to me. I dysappeared to myself (Leder, 1990). I was filled with shame and cortico-steroid-
induced rage. I could not see myself and hence I could not, would not, see my story. There 
must be something wrong, I decided. Transplant stories all seemed to lead to normality or 
back to kidney failure. None went where I was going. 
Despite this, my doctors were delighted with my (as they seemed to see it) normalisation. In 
my clinic transplantees were told constantly that they could lead “a normal life” (although we 
weren’t told what that meant or how to achieve it) and shown examples of other transplantees 
doing (apparently) normal things, such as holding down jobs, getting married and having 
children. I had never planned on the latter two, but I now felt pressured to cooperate. Without 
any discussion of what I wanted to do with my new lease on life, I was lectured on the joys of 
natural childbirth during one consultation (admittedly the doctor was preoccupied with her own 
pregnancy). The same doctor in the next breath began expounding on why I needed to have 
contraceptive injections whose effects would last half a decade at a time, “because accidents 
happen”. The ward sister warned me that I should not experiment with having children, despite 
what some of the doctors might say, because it never ended well. All of this added to my 
confusion.  
While the medical team chattered on and on, I remained mute and stymied, unable to speak 
the language of “normal”, not wanting to learn it. My refusal left me powerless and unstoried. 
My narrative, always rather tenuous and clinging to a medical narrative of illness, like ivy to an 
oak, tried to attach itself to the new medical narrative of health, but could not take to such 
ambiguous and contradictory support and shrivelled miserably. I needed narrative certainty in 
those days. 
It took five years for my physiology to stabilise, although objectively I must say that I improved 
from year to year. Each year I was surprised to feel more well than I could ever remember 
feeling and much stronger than I ever had been. I never knew from one point to the next how 
my life would be. My life had stagnated for so long that I could barely keep up with myself. I 
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was left breathless and panicky, dazzled by my good fortune and distracted by the 
smorgasbords of previously forbidden foods. My life was a maelstrom of sensations (and also 
until-recently-forbidden chocolate, cheese, chips, meat, milk and seafood). No one had told 
me about the sheer visceral impact of becoming healthy. I should have been warned about the 
gut-punch of well-being. It shocked my system more than anything ever had on my long, slow, 
steady decline into ESRD. In that instant that I greeted the social worker and nurse when they 
found me in a university library, my life changed irrevocably. 
6.2.5 I decide on a course of narrative action because of a narrative cut short 
Various writers about illness narratives have alluded to the way we learn about illness through 
the stories of others (Couser, 1997, 2004, 2009; Frank, 1995; Good & Good, 1994; 
Weingarten, 2001). Before my transplant I craved stories of life after transplant. My mother and 
I would go to great lengths to find (non-medical) people who could tell us first-hand how they 
had experienced it. One man we spoke to invited us to his home for tea and regaled us with 
stories of how he completed his Master’s degree in Architecture, brought up his children, even 
had a third child and played hockey, (although he wasn’t supposed to because it was a contact 
sport). He seemed so free. He had had his kidney for seven years. Even now “Master’s 
degree” means “surviving kidney failure” to me. I have a Master’s degree too. I felt, once I had 
obtained it a couple of years post-transplant, that I had made it. 
However, what I didn’t notice until now about my choice of narrative was that all of the stories I 
chose to listen to then involved life after the event, not the event itself. I always wanted to 
know about the life hereafter. People should remember when they want to know about the 
afterlife that they actually have to get there first and getting there isn’t ever pretty. At this stage 
I tried to bypass the medical narrative of transplantation by ignoring it completely. The medical 
narrative was not my narrative, I thought. I am, after all, not a medic. The medics would 
perform the operation – that was their responsibility – but I would live with the results. I hoped 
they’d do their job properly, nothing more. In my reasoning, if they did what they were 
supposed to do, I could live without them and their narratives for the rest of my life, however 
long that would be. My narrative would be my own at last. 
Of course, it didn’t work that way. Your narrative is never entirely your own and other 
narratives that are imposed on you are never truly entirely other. If you have lived so long and 
so intimately with a chronic medical condition, your narrative is perforce partly medical. If you 
undergo a medical procedure, you are changed by it. It is written on your body forever. It is in 
your blood and even in your RNA, if what the inserts on my immunosuppressant medication 
says is correct about the level of change it causes. It is in your psyche. Part of who you are is 
what happens to you. 
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But part of the difficulty of medical narratives is that they are so piecemeal and incomplete, 
only ever showing tiny parts of oneself. This is of course gratifyingly postmodern, a fractured 
and partial lens that shows only fragments of a picture (Charon & Montello, 2002; Cook, 1996; 
Garro & Mattingly, 2000). The problem is that these bitty and partial narratives are seen as 
reality and whole, leaving no space for any other story. I found that I had to accept the medical 
version of me and my life to an extent. I wanted, after all, to live. I wanted to be healthy, 
because I had strength and vitality for the first time in years and I could finally eat what I liked. 
I did not want more surgery or more invasive medical treatments. I wanted to be left alone. 
And so I was a very compliant (as doctors like to call it) patient. 
To be compliant in those days (and, I believe, now too) meant you obeyed blindly the advice 
you were given. The doctors are the authorities and you are not. Not only that, but you are 
viewed as too stupid to learn or understand, so you must not question what they say or ask for 
clarity. You must certainly not posit any suggestions of your own or attempt to interpret your 
own symptoms. Sometimes the doctors are very young and inexperienced. Often even the 
older, more experienced ones have seldom worked with your disease for as long as you have 
lived with it. Seldom does anyone have the time to listen to what you have to say. Often their 
advice would make 180 degree turns without warning (Kleinman, 1988) and what you had 
been told to do last time would now be “wrong” and you would not be told why. 
People outside your condition might be sympathetic or curious, but they do not understand 
how it is living with this new situation. I told an English professor how I found life after 
transplant and he was quite dismayed and confused. He had thought transplantation was a 
cure, not a therapy and did not want to hear that I must live daily with the threat of rejection. I 
learned to pick my narratives carefully (Weingarten, 2001) and not to tell that story to non-
renal people. 
Patients understand and we spent the long, cold, dreary hours waiting in clinic for our 15 
minutes with the specialists comparing notes and drawing our own conclusions about our 
lives. Generally we were a fearful lot, living under a shadow of rejection and facing a life of 
medical treatment. We couldn’t help noticing how many of us had more than one transplant 
and how many of us did not survive. The doctors never alluded to the disappearances, I 
suppose in the hope of preventing panic. Perhaps they believed we were too stupid to notice 
and would not see unless they enlightened us, because they seemed to think that they chose 
the narratives and we lived them according to their diagnosis and predictions. We did not talk 
to them about the deaths. Perhaps that was easier for us too. 
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As patients we needed considerably more emotional and psychological support than we 
received. What little we received came from some of the dialysis nurses, with whom we 
remained in touch because we relied on them for information and advice. It was from one of 
these nurses that I learned that Eddie Davidson (my fellow paediatric patient who had daringly 
written about urine and whose poem I used in Chapter 4) had died. He was 25. He had died of 
a heart attack induced by his antirejection medication. The nurse explained everything to me, 
trying to console me and I tried to be consoled, but I could not be. She thought I was 
distressed because I was afraid for myself. This was partly true, but I was actually more 
distressed because I had lost someone I had known (albeit strangely and from a distance) all 
my life. I had cheered on his transplants and mourned his rejections since I was 8 years old 
and he was nine and a half. 
Although Eddie and I had never met, we had shared doctors for almost our entire lives and 
had the same disease. I felt as bereaved as if I had lost a sibling and as terrified as if I were 
next on the list. Perhaps he was 548819. I never knew his number. I could see his picture in 
my mind, from photos on my paediatric doctor’s walls. I could see his brave poems on yellow 
cards. I had never seen a picture of him next to other people, but the nurse showed me one of 
him next to his mountain-climbing friends. He was barely shoulder-high next to other adults. I 
am a normal height, although smaller than I would have been. Eddie was more stunted by his 
illness.  
At least he did not disappear completely, although his narrative was cut short. His picture 
remained on the wall in the dialysis unit and everyone spoke warmly of him. As horrified as I 
was by his short and pain-filled life, its gruesome similarity to my own and his alarming, 
warning-free death, I was envious of him for one thing: those bits of yellow card. Years after I 
had seen them their words still echoed in my mind. He had done something I had desperately 
wanted to do but had never been able to achieve: he had told his version of events. I vowed to 
myself never to forget his rhymes or his story. I tried to tell the nurse about the yellow cards, 
but became too tearful to speak. She did not understand what I was trying to tell her and nor 
did I, until now. 
6.2.6 What happened next: Another identity, another number 
I got another number shortly after discharge – a Medic Alert identity number on a stainless-
steel oval disc that announced in tiny engraved capitals my condition (“renal transplant on 
steroids”) and my allergies (Adalat, Maxolon, Stemetil, Vancocin). You had to tilt it against the 
light to read it. On the other side was Medic Alert’s name and insignia (a savage serpent 
twined symmetrically around a staff, imprinted and painted red). It was like getting a grown-up 
identity document. Of course, for general (or General) purposes I was still 548820. 
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I had an identity – I was a renal transplant, for medical purposes anyway. But who was I to 
myself? I still went every three months to clinic, had many blood tests, charted my urine and 
took medication every day. I lived in a turbulent body of side-effects. And I had found no way 
of creating a narrative of my own in the face of an all-pervasive medical story. I fell between 
stories, my old medical narrative and my new one. I seemed not to fit either, but I had not 
found anything that would replace them. Moreover, since they were so pervasive, I wondered 
whether they should be replaced. I depended on medical treatment for survival. I could not 
pretend otherwise. The medical narrative was still valid to an extent. 
6.3 Three stories of life post-transplant 
A gap of several years follows after I was “awarded” my Medic Alert bracelet. To give an 
impression of some experiences from many years later, here are three personal stories: one is 
of a scholarship interview, one is of a public lecture, and the last is of a patients’ group in 
Mowbray, where the personal finally becomes public. All of the experiences I have used 
involved other people and my relationship to them. Together they form a short social anthology 
or anthropological essay of life post-transplant.  
Advances in medical science lead to increasing numbers and types of subjunctive situations. I 
exceeded the expected amount of time with my new kidney. The doctors didn’t expect my 
kidney to last after the rejection episodes, but it did. With the advances in medical science and 
a little bit of luck you might keep your new organ quite a considerable time. It might take a little 
longer for shared cultural models to develop that adequately explain this new state of 
extended living through transplantation. Possibly part of the liminality one feels many years 
post-transplant is a verbal deficiency for a condition or state that is far beyond 
“transplantation”.  
“Post-transplant” is a term like “postmodern”, not especially helpful in that it only tells you it 
comes after something else and it really needs a term (and identity) of its own. Because the 
state of being itself is so paradoxical, I am undecided about whether it is a term whose 
meaning eludes being pinned down by naming or a term that needs stabilisation.  
It is strange to find you have a potentially long future when you always saw it as shorter.  The 
subjunctivity continues. This is not the land of possible, even probable death, but rather the 
land of possible, even probable life. Nonetheless meaning is still contingent. It goes beyond 
“what it means to be healed when one will always be disabled” (Mattingly, 1994, p. 814). I 
zigzag between being a patient and a non-patient, and am by no stretch of the imagination ill. 
My transplant gave me health and strength on a scale I had never previously enjoyed. Five 
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years after transplant I realised, in my late twenties, that I had not felt so good since the age of 
12 or even younger. I seemed to improve from year to year, while my always-well peers were 
experiencing a slow decline from a glorious youth, complaining of aches and pains, weakness 
and vulnerability. They longed to be 18 again. I did not and do not even now at 42. So now 
that I have been transplanted so long ago, who am I? What am I called? What is my 
condition? Who am I when I am at home and is it different from who I am when I appear (or 
otherwise) in public? 
When people ask me for official purposes (insurance, travel, study) if I have any medical 
complaints or illnesses, I don’t know what to tell them. I have to tell them I have had an organ 
transplant, but that is not an illness. If it happened in the distant past, is it really a condition? 
That presupposes that there is an on-going medical complaint and there is none. No, I need 
new vocabulary. I suspect I may have to make one. 
6.3.1 Story 1: (Dys)Appearance and reality 
“You look very well for a transplant,” said the doctor. 
She peered at me as if I were a specimen of some sort. She even leaned closer to 
examine me better. We were at a cocktail party. I wondered what the right response was to 
a remark like that. The ones that crossed my mind were clearly wrong. 
You see it wasn’t just any cocktail party. It was part of a scholarship interview process that 
included meeting the interview panel “for drinks”. I don’t drink alcohol. I never have. So as 
a non-drinker I find that expression exclusionist. I’m like that with words. I take what they 
mean very seriously. That whole cocktail party was designed around a certain way of life 
that wasn’t mine. 
To fit into it, you had to dress a certain way and perform certain conversational rituals. You 
had to have aspirations of thriving and expanding. Survival is for other people. Healthy 
people don’t understand what it means to struggle to survive or how much effort it takes. 
They take it for granted as if it is the beginning, not the end. 
For them everything is neatly packaged in an orderly world. Of course my world overlaps 
with theirs, just as my medical condition includes health. When we all met for drinks it was 
1997 and I had had my kidney (and my Medic Alert bracelet) for six years. 
The doctor was a member of the scholarship panel. Clearly she felt she had some special 
insights into my condition, although I wasn’t her patient and she wasn’t a nephrologist. The 
following day she and the others were going to interview me. So I realized I shouldn’t say 
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what I wanted to say. Instead, I said, “Thank you.” She had passed her verdict, I thought. It 
is customary to thank judges. It is a modern form of obeisance. Would this mean I’d get the 
scholarship? I hoped so. It was a prestigious scholarship to Oxford.  
I had wanted to study at Oxford since I was a teenager. Many of my favourite writers had 
studied there. I loved the history of the place and the architecture. I had dreamed and 
drooled over the possibility of one day actually being there. I had practised filling out the 
application forms for the scholarship for several years. I had never been well enough to 
apply until now at 28. I had written away in previous years to as many of the Oxford 
colleges as I could and had requested their prospectuses. I had a whole drawer full of 
them, glossy, full-colour booklets with beautiful pictures. When I had moved with my 
mother to the other end of the country, I had had to throw away many things, but I had kept 
the prospectuses. 
Through all those long years of kidney failure I had somehow always kept going. I had 
things to live for. My “things to live for” took me through fear, pain, depression and 
powerlessness. Oxford was one of the things I lived for. Reading, writing, studying and 
dreaming were things I could do when ill and I was ill for so very long. Oxford was going to 
be my crowning achievement – proof that I had not wasted my time and that I had 
something to show for my long years of solitude and deprivation. I twisted my Medic Alert 
bracelet on my left arm while I waited. Fidgeting helped alleviate the anxiety. 
I did not get the scholarship. While the scholarship panel was explaining their choice to the 
rest of us, I looked down at my arm and noticed that I had twisted my Medic Alert bracelet 
so much that it had broken and fallen off my arm. And for the first time in my life I was truly 
crushed. I went home. At first I cried, but soon I could feel nothing and so I stopped. 
Numbly I took all those bright, shiny prospectuses, threw them into a black bag and put 
them out with the rubbish. All my Herculean efforts to keep going to class and to hand in 
my assignments, no matter how ill I was, were all for nothing. Nobody understood how hard 
it had been or what I’d had to go through to get as far as that scholarship interview. I never 
fixed the bracelet or wore it again. And in so doing I took the first step away from a medical 
narrative and towards my own. 
When I had been ill I had often been struck by the barrier between me and the rest of the 
world. Everything I did that other people took for granted, like eating meals, taking baths, 
just getting through the day, had required planning and commitment on a scale they 
couldn’t even begin to conceptualise. I had fought relentlessly for my place at university 
and I had kept it, despite everything. I had never failed anything, never had to rewrite 
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anything, never asked for a single extension. It was a matter of honour. None of that 
counted. No one knew or cared. Once again I felt like a veteran returned from a distant war 
to live among people whose lives were completely unaffected by it.  
My mother realised how not getting the scholarship had affected me. She even offered to 
sell the house she had struggled to keep for so long, to pay for my fees. A year’s study at 
Oxford would cost R100, 000. Our house was worth only three years’ study, probably not 
enough for a degree. The exchange rate was not in our favour. (When I first wrote “favour” 
I “accidentally” wrote it as “failure”.)  
I decided to continue with my doctorate at a local university, but I couldn’t. I was completely 
unable to continue with anything academic, although I made a number of false starts. You 
might say I entered into another liminal period, this time of academic existentialism, where 
nothing had any value and nothing mattered. It took me 10 years to get over that and to 
become a phenomenologist again.  
So for 10 years I did nothing academically. It was easier to do that than to reflect on how 
different my life might have been had I not been so ill for so long. I cannot, even now, bear 
to think about how different my life could have been and how much richer. I dare not 
wonder at what my achievements might have been, because then I have to admit I am 
probably leading a shadow life. I so badly wanted CKD not to matter to me. After all it 
seemed no to matter to anyone else. 
Before dialysis and transplant, at university, when I was so frail I couldn’t climb stairs 
anymore and was sleeping for 14 hours out of 24, the Disabled Students’ Programme told 
me I wasn’t disabled enough to deserve any help from them. While I was waiting for a slot 
on dialysis, my father (a medical doctor), who was dragging my mother through 
maintenance court with monotonous regularity (eight times in 15 years) told me that I 
should get a job and support myself, since I was over 18. The postgraduate supervisor told 
me she couldn’t be bothered to re-set an exam for only one student and if I didn’t think I 
could manage I shouldn’t register. My doctor told me to get on with my life and not let 
ESRD hold me back. His message seemed to be that it shouldn’t hold me back and if it did, 
it was due to some inherent weakness of my own character. Their stories of my life were so 
powerful then. 
I did not want to be weak. I wanted to do what others did. I also really wanted to use my 
second chance at life. So when I had my transplant, I decided to push on with my plans. At 
last I could. In all honesty, during all those years of debilitating ill health, I hadn’t thought 
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much beyond getting a doctorate, possibly because deep in my heart I knew that I was 
dying. 
When I failed to get the scholarship I felt as if my entire world’s foundations had been 
destroyed. Everything I believed in collapsed and my second chance suddenly seemed 
very long and very empty. I saw no point in it at all. I had been judged and found wanting. I 
had not been told how or where I had failed, just that I didn’t make the grade. ESRD and its 
treatments were such a large part of my life that I could only understand my failure in those 
terms: I was too defective to study further. 
Only now a decade later am I able to commit to a doctoral topic. Only now can I bear to 
study anything again. I am registered at a local university and I have been awarded a local 
scholarship. I would not consider applying to study abroad again. In fact I have refused to 
do so, although I have been assured I have as good a chance as any of getting funding. I 
know better than to believe that. I am convinced that I got the local scholarship I did 
because in the documentation I had to fill out I never told the trustees that I have had a 
transplant and I kept any description of my topic vague and general. Although well (“well”), 
I did as Antonio Batista did on dialysis (Hutchinson & McCallum, 2000): I kept my condition 
a secret so that I would not be penalised. 
It’s better not to tell. I had told the first scholarship panel that I had had a transplant for two 
reasons: a) I thought it transparent to do so, and b) I thought it showed what I had 
achieved against the odds. I did not take into account that having a transplant may have 
meant something different to me than it did to people who had not had one. 
6.3.2 Story 2: The past is foreign country 
The past may well be present, but it is in a sense irretrievable. It is gone and known only by its 
effects. You cannot go back there. Unless you have a visa. With chronic illness or conditions 
that require life-long tertiary care you always have a visa to return. The visa is expensive, but 
life-long. You are expected to use it regularly to attend clinic, have blood tests, buy monthly 
medication.  
No, let’s be honest. It isn’t a visa, as much as we might like it to be. It really is a second 
passport – or in my case, a first passport. I immigrated after transplant to (I thought) the land of 
the well, but it is not my country of origin. People usually hold dual citizenship, but don’t know 
it until something goes wrong (Sontag, 1978). For those of us who have never enjoyed robust 
good health, however, we experience this to an extent in reverse. It can be quite a surprise to 
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discover that the citizens of the other land view you as one of them, when you expected to 
look foreign. 
But if you belong to both countries, the land of the ill and the land of the well, then you don’t 
truly belong to either. You certainly don’t belong fully in your new country. In some ways you 
still live in your old country. I am reminded of that in little ways even now all these years later. 
It is not (usually) my new fellow citizens who remind me of this. When we have functions at 
work and the food is laid out in a buffet, I can’t get enough of it even now. Chicken wings are 
my weakness and cheese, cold meats and olives. I eat as much as I possibly can and hope no 
one notices. These were forbidden foods when I was growing up. The cakes, scones and 
puddings often have cream, especially the scones. I take the cream and leave the rest. I’ve 
learned not to do this when people are watching. I sneak into the kitchen afterwards and help 
myself to spoons of whipped cream from the bowl. Sometimes it’s Orley Whip. I cannot 
describe my disappointment when I taste its familiar oily nastiness. Then I have to flick what’s 
left on my spoon into the dustbin and rinse out my mouth. I cannot believe that people can eat 
that awful stuff willingly. 
I have started taking “holidays back home” again after all these years. When I left 
Johannesburg in 1995 I left behind the transplant world and my connections to it. I never 
formed new links with the transplant and dialysis community in the Cape. Until now. When I 
started my research I contacted various medical kidney groups to see if anyone else was 
doing similar work to mine. This led to my giving a paper at the South African Congress of 
Nephrology. This in turn led to my being invited to give a talk at a patients’ group in Mowbray. 
It meets bimonthly. I’ve been attending it on and off ever since. 
I was also invited to attend a talk by a visiting American renal transplantee and motivational 
speaker, Lori Hartwell. She has a site (http://www.lorihartwell.com/) and a book, which she 
uses as resources to inform healthcare professionals and patients about renal issues and the 
experience of renal disease. I extended the invitation to a friend I had made at the nephrology 
congress, Minette. She had her transplant in 2008 and we had both given a paper at the 
congress. She travelled all the way from the Eastern Cape to hear the talk. 
I met Minette at the Waterfront and we drove together to the lecture. The talk took place in one 
of the lecture theatres at Groote Schuur. It was attended primarily by patients, but a number of 
nurses attended too. I didn’t see many doctors there. I wrote about Lori Hartwell’s talk and my 
reaction to it afterwards in my journal: 
I was struck as I listened to her by how similar in many ways her story is to mine: she was 
born about two years before me and fell ill in the year I was born. Her kidney failure was 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
167 
 
caused by something that can be a factor in what caused mine (HUS) – e-coli. I bounced 
back more because I was younger. Babies are more resilient than children, even toddlers. 
We fell ill in the same year. 
We grew up ill. She did ice-skating. I did gym. She had three transplants. I had one. Her 
last one was the year before mine. She takes me up to my shoulder. 
Watching her and hearing her tell her story I thought, “But for the grace of God go I”. Then I 
realised that basically her story was my story. And I realised I had protected myself from 
that fact. 
 (Richards, Research journal, 2008) 
What I realised in attending Lori Hartwell’s talk was that until then I hadn’t really seen my own 
story. Seeing a similar story through someone else’s eyes made me realise paradoxically how 
fortunate and how unfortunate I had been. Lori Hartwell had three transplants, compared with 
my one. Two of hers failed and she had to live twice through the misery and trauma that 
follows. I nearly lost my kidney after transplant. I had two acute rejection episodes and one 
chronic one, which almost cost me my kidney. Waiting for your transplanted organ to die is the 
worst feeling in the world. But my transplant survived. Because of this I was only on dialysis for 
11 months, instead of years. 
She’s taking the same immunosuppressant medication as me because our transplants are of 
the same vintage. Transplants these days are treated with new medication. My nephrologist 
explained that the meds I (we) take are like firing cannon balls at your immune system. They 
take out many parts of your body’s natural defences. These days the new medications are 
more like snipers. They target specific parts of your system and leave the rest alone. My 
nephrologist pointed out that I am on half the prescribed dose of my meds, and that they work 
well and are cheap, so he is loath to change them. I trust him. He’s taking them himself for 
another condition, so he has intimate knowledge of their side effects. This is the only time in 
my forty years of medical treatment that I have ever had a doctor who really understands that.  
Lori Hartwell’s growth was stunted by her illness. I remembered Eddie. I didn’t realise we were 
so ill. I finally understood why my paediatric doctor had spent so much time poring over my 
growth chart and discussing how close to the edges of normality my growth cusp was. It had 
been pretty borderline, from what I could see across his desk. As a child I thought that meant I 
was just small or growing slowly. Now I see that was so, but paradoxically I was tall, really tall, 
for my condition. 
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Although I am a normal height for an adult woman, I am smaller than most people in my family. 
In fact a recent family picture makes that laughingly clear. Their heights range between five 
foot eight and six foot five. I am five foot four. So I’m a normal height for an adult, but not 
normal for an adult in my family. After my mother’s death I had wanted to keep some of her 
clothes to wear, but they were all too big. I thought nothing of it at the time. Mom was always 
bigger than me. 
When I saw Lori and realised she was so small because of her medical history, I was grateful 
that I had not turned out the same. I managed to defer dialysis and my transplant until I was in 
my early twenties. I even grew a couple of inches after transplant. That was strange: after 
being the same height for years, I suddenly found myself too long for my clothes and looking 
down on people I was at an eye-level with before. 
My story is not identical with Lori’s, but it is similar enough for me to have to confront once 
again how serious my condition was and in some ways still is. Now it seems I have been doing 
the same thing my doctor did – telling myself for years that all is well, while walking on a knife-
edge between sickness and health. Despite seeing Eddie’s smallness in that photograph all 
those years ago, I still didn’t see. I could not afford to see then. And yet both stories are true. 
On the one hand, I am well (“well”) and I can lead a normal life. On the other, my 
circumstances are anything but normal. I could not talk about Lori Hartwell’s talk for a day 
afterwards. I could not discuss it, not even with Minette. I felt drained and shaken as if I had 
been in an accident. 
I felt myself going numb. For the rest of the day I was tired and dazed. I withdrew into 
myself. A deep part of my mind was processing something. I did not know what it was. 
When driving Minette back to the Waterfront I spaced out at a traffic light, but can’t say 
what I was thinking about. 
I didn’t talk about it until the following evening when a young colleague stopped to talk to 
me and as I told him about the previous day I found myself choking up and tears flowed 
down my cheeks. It was a strange way of crying, because my heart rate didn’t go up nor 
did my chest hurt. It was as if I could feel around my core, but not in it – as if that core was 
protected and veiled from me – or that I was protected from it. I felt numb and alienated 
from myself, as if I had recognised my alienation at last. 
(Richards, Research journal, 2008) 
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Was this dysappearance? I felt ashamed of my tears, although my colleague assured me that 
they did not bother him and that my reaction was normal. So I did not dysappear completely, 
although I could not stop crying, which embarrassed me. 
6.3.3 Story 3: The return of the native 
Another absence. I didn’t write anything about this in my journal. And I still don’t name it in the 
heading of this section. Is it so unspeakable to me? The first support group meeting I attended 
was an end-of-year party.  
When awaiting a place on dialysis I longed for a patient group so I could hear how others 
managed the monstrous situation in which I found myself. While on dialysis I found myself 
running (very briefly) a patient group on request of my doctor. The social worker and I 
devised a questionnaire which the patients filled out and from this we discerned (amongst 
other things) that a group was needed. We only held one meeting before I was called to 
transplant. As a transplantee I again longed for support, but by then was feeling well 
enough to create an informal support structure with other patients as we whiled away entire 
days waiting in clinic to see doctors. Then I moved away to the Cape and didn’t connect 
with the transplant groups here. 
By then it had been a few years post-transplant, I felt well and enjoyed not having too 
many reminders of my condition. My clinic visits became fewer, from every three months to 
once a year. My medications were reduced. I lived outside the city where my clinic visits 
were. At Groote Schuur I didn’t even have to see a doctor unless something was wrong. 
Nursing sisters took all my readings, did all my tests and made all my appointments. I didn’t 
see a doctor in over a decade – the only nephrologist-free decade in my life. For the first 
time ever I didn’t have a specialist. I felt wonderfully transgressive. 
By the time I joined the patient support group I had already acquired a new nephrologist, 
but I had not seen another renal transplantee for over a year. I had only glimpsed them in 
clinics since 1995. I arrived early at the first meeting in Mowbray. I wasn’t sure I’d find the 
Town Hall easily, but I did. It was in the Main Road, in between the First National Bank and 
the library, just as Nadeema had told me. I had met her at the congress. She was a renal 
nursing sister with 40 years’ experience. She started in the year I was born, so she has as 
much renal experience as I do, although of a different sort. 
As I pulled into the parking lot I noticed the Town Hall was next door a building that 
permanently housed a cancer support facility. The library and cancer support building were 
closed. Everything was damp. It had been raining. The tarmac of the parking lot was 
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crumbling. I could hardly see the parking bays because the paint had worn off. Little pools 
of water lay in holes, amid weeds and long grass. Red-winged starlings chattered in the 
coconut palm. The place smelt of wet tar, pollen and exhaust fumes. 
The Town Hall itself stood apologetically off to one side of the property, as if scuffing its 
shoes and whistling nonchalantly. It was smaller than the small library and much smaller 
than the cancer building. In fact it was smaller than the little town hall of the small town 
where I live. Its gesture towards Cape colonial vernacular looked mouldy. The beige paint 
was peeling and the wooden doors and window frames were rotting. Outside in the street, 
beyond the iron railings, walked dubious personages dressed in hoodies. Some walked 
quickly as if running late for a crime spree. Others loitered and peered at me from beneath 
their brows. I hoped the car would be safe. I hoped I’d come at the right time and that the 
long drive would be worth it. 
A single car was parked in front of the building whose yellow wooden doors were open in a 
gap-toothed welcome. A small, bedraggled group of people stood on the cement steps. 
They peered at me too. They looked as if they were waiting for a lift. I drew closer and 
peered back. 
I recognised them although I had never met any of them before. They looked like me. We 
came from many different racial and cultural groups but we all looked the same. Cortisone 
does that to you. You develop a very distinctive facial shape and a certain type of facial 
hair growth. The closer I got to the group on the steps the more like an extraordinarily 
cosmopolitan family portrait they seemed. They recognised me too although they had 
never seen me before either. 
Inside, lots of dark red plastic chairs had been set out facing a small stage. The room itself 
was painted yellow, with white trimmings and the stage had voluptuous rose-pink curtains 
festooning it from floor to ceiling. The ceiling was very high and moulded, although the 
paint hung from it in strips. The walls were stained as if the room had been filled with water 
at some point. There was a little gallery at the back of the room. No one was in it. Instead 
everyone crowded into the area with the chairs. I wondered why as there was no air-
conditioning.  
My question was soon answered. After a short talk advertising future events and thanking 
people responsible for various things during the year, Nadeema invited us to enjoy tea and 
refreshments. These had been laid out on several trestle tables in a side room that led into 
a small decaying kitchen.  
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It was a feast of epic proportions. A team of Malay caterers had poured their hearts and 
souls into the mountain ranges of coconut-covered tartlets, twee gesiggies8, ystervarkies9, 
spring rolls, samoosas, miniature chicken pies, milk tarts, lemon meringue pie, 
koeksusters10, coconut-dusted doughnuts, curry-filled pastries, fragrant baby vetkoek11 
stuffed with mince, miniature vanilla cakes with different coloured icing (green, pink and 
yellow) and homemade butter biscuits with shards of glacé cherries on top. Foothills of 
pretzels jostled with highlands of potato chips. Lakes of boiled sweets twinkled between 
promontories of whole fruits. Rivers of tea, coffee, juice flowed into landfills of paper cups. 
The patients fell upon the tables like children at a party. They had been waiting for this for 
some time. Even really sick-looking dialysis patients with external shunts stitched into their 
necks perked up and grabbed plates piled high with goodies. Amid the mêlée I saw two 
dialysis patients I had been sitting next to during the talk. They were wolfing down lemon 
meringue pie and paper cups of fizzy drinks. 
“Are you guys allowed to eat this sort of thing these days?” I asked naively. 
“No,” said Martin thickly through a mouthful of pie. “But ‘s okay.” 
“We dialysed longer this morning so we could have lots of cold drinks too,” Mary explained, 
tossing off her second paper cup of cola. “Did you get some of the chicken pies, Martin?” 
A whole room full of people who ate just as I did. For once I didn’t have to worry about 
looking greedy. I didn’t have to resist that aching need to grab as much of the food as I 
could and to devour it as if there was no tomorrow. I had a cup of tea and nibbled a heavy, 
crumbly butter biscuit. Somewhere in the thick of the feast one of the caterers had handed 
me a yellow plastic plate heaped precariously with goodies from apparently every platter.  
For once my own uncontrollable appetite had deserted me.  
It didn’t matter whether we were in ESRD, on dialysis or post-transplant. We’d always be 
starving. I noticed several people carry away platters for afterwards. I knew what would 
happen to it too. It would stand on the kitchen counter until it went stale and then after days 
of deliberating it would be heaved into the dustbin. But they’d wait until the bitter end 
before parting with it, just in case it miraculously became unstale again. Just in case they 
deemed it all right to eat forbidden treats. Just in case no one was watching...  
                                                    
8
 Twee gesiggies (literally “two little faces”) are little square sponge cakes with icing in two colours. 
9
 Ystervarkies (literally “little porcupines”) are lamingtons. 
10
 Koeksusters (no meaningful translation for this) are deep-fried, twisted dough saturated with sugar syrup. 
11
 Vetkoek (literally “fat cake”) are savoury doughnuts. 
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The familiarity of it all shocked me. We looked alike. We behaved alike. I knew exactly why 
they did as they did. The world made sense again and in realising this I realised that it had 
not made sense for a long time, although I had inhabited it without truly noticing. I felt as if I 
had come home. I felt as if I had never been away. 
6.4 Recursiveness: The return of 548820 
What a bleak heading after such a long experience and such lengthy supporting narratives. 
Have I come all the way through ESRD, dialysis, transplantation and a long healing process 
only to return to a condition I resented and that dehumanised me? That is not a comic plot. It is 
also not the purpose of autoethnography, which attempts to redefine situations and to capture 
the in-betweenness of life that is so elusive. In life and in narrative you cannot really go back to 
what you used to be. I am, of course, myself now and number 548820 (if it has not been 
destroyed) only exists in some file morgue in the bowels of the Johannesburg General 
Hospital, because I am no longer a patient there.  
The recursiveness to which I refer is that sense of recognition of my fellow transplantees, 
understanding lives that are similar to mine in ways that non-renal people never can. It is the 
belated recognition of my own trauma and distress, and seeing it clearly for the first time from 
a distance of years was devastating. Autoethnographic writing allowed me to do that because 
it allowed me to write about my feelings and to be analytical, against a context of renal 
narratives and other illness writing. It forced me to look more closely at these, instead of 
looking away. It made me see my disablement and name it. But it also made me see my 
power. It allowed me to go back, because it provided a contained way of doing that. 
As painful as these three stories were to relate and as distressing as the experiences were to 
experience, writing about them in this way allowed me to see past other stories into my own. 
And I was amazed at what I saw. 
6.4.1 Dysappearance and reappearance 
Writing about the doctor who told me I looked very well for a transplant, I was at first filled with 
shame. I felt once again the feelings I had experienced when she said those words to me. I 
was forced to see from a distance of years and through older eyes that her narrative, a 
medicalised narrative, had the effect on me that it did because I bought into it. My internalised 
narrative had been so rudimentary and so damaged that I had resorted to seeing myself 
though a medical narrative instead. 
When I wrote my story – the first time I had actually committed it to paper – I was so filled with 
anxiety and alarm that my palms sweated and my hands shook. My heart was in my mouth. 
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What would I see? I could not bear to look more closely until I wrote the next two stories. The 
“liminality” I experienced, the in-betweenness, did however start to niggle at me. I had tried in 
previous years to overlook it, because it was painful and left me feeling as if I had failed at 
being normal. Often transplantees want to return to normality if they have experienced it 
before or to attain it if they haven’t (Crowley-Matoka, 2005). 
I look normal, especially now that my cortisone dose is down to 2.5 mg a day. But I have had a 
transplant. At some level I am not “healthy”. I was reminded of this after the emotional 
rollercoaster of lowering my cortisone by 2.5 mg for the first time in more than 10 years. I had 
flashbacks to what I used to feel many years ago when I had first had my transplant: a dread 
like vertigo, and the realisation that you know you are walking along a cliff and dare not look 
down. I get the same feeling when reading about people whose transplants have failed, such 
as that of Kristine Shapiro in Hutchinson and McCallum’s anthology (2000). So much depends 
on those little white pills. My doctor was cautious too; he had me lower the dose in increments, 
with frequent blood tests, so we could nip any problem in the bud. And yet I am not really ill. I 
survived the 2.5 mg drop in my cortisone and continue to flourish. 
The “liminal” state in which I find myself is one that has been sustained and persistent 
(Crowley-Matoka, 2005; Little et al, 1998) now for nearly twenty years. It is an in-between 
condition, but it is not really liminality as defined by Van Gennep (1960) or Turner (1969). It is 
not a ritual condition to mark the advent of a new identity. It is not even a waiting period 
between two states, as it seems to be constructed in literature. It is something else. 
It is a different state from when I was on dialysis (Richards, 2009a, 2010). Liminality on dialysis 
was the result of protracted, severe illness mitigated by life-support and was a waiting room 
between succumbing to a fatal disease and receiving therapy that might save my life. I am well 
and yet I depend on tertiary health care to sustain my health. I am sometimes reminded of how 
fragile that health is. I am between sickness and health in a way I find difficult to pinpoint. I 
occupy a third space now, but it took me some time to understand this. 
6.4.2 Haunted by other people’s words and a medical narrative 
And then of course there was the little matter of the words themselves that the doctor at the 
cocktail party used. In her eyes, I was a transplant, a medical procedure and nothing more. I 
was the sum total of what her science could do. I think I had been so distracted by what the 
words meant that I had not seen their deeper meaning. 
It took me a while to understand what the doctor meant when she said, “You look very well for 
a transplant”. She meant I was not supposed to look well. I was supposed to look ill, because 
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in her eyes I was ill. I had something “wrong” with me. All I could ever be was a pathology. All 
that medical care, only to continue to be ill. 
Years later, when I first saw my private nephrologist, he explained that, contrary to what the 
ebullient surgeon had told me near the lifts nearly two decades before, when I had had my 
transplant, only twenty percent of transplanted kidneys were expected to last as long as ten 
years. At the time of the interview I was already in year six. I imagine the panel took that into 
account. It doesn’t sound like such a bargain if you pay thousands for a student to get a 
degree overseas only to have her come back and go straight into kidney failure in year ten. 
Statistically speaking, I was a high risk. 
But of course, I am a person, not a statistic. In year six my kidney had settled down well and 
all my results were normal as if I were a person who had never had any kidney problems. 
Twelve years later they are unchanged. I am not a procedure either. There is so much more to 
me than what doctors can do to my body. I have always known this, but their narratives still 
affect me. 
In writing about the experience I came to see that unwittingly and ironically I had begun almost 
immediately recomposing the story of looking very well for a transplant. The story itself was 
ironic, about looking well, although not being well, and of not looking how you are meant to 
look when transplanted. I enacted wellness ironically. With so much irony to cope with, it has 
taken me years to deconstruct it and reconstruct it. Her story enraged me. But I could not 
altogether reject it for it was in some senses true. I had had a transplant and I did, indeed, look 
well. It took many attempts and retellings over many years to wrestle that particular demon into 
submission. Living past year ten and every subsequent year with a healthy kidney has made 
me stronger.  
6.4.3 Lori Hartwell and narrative breakdown 
My ironic narrative came to an abrupt end when I attended Lori Hartwell’s talk and was forced 
to see that some of us don’t look well at all. Lori’s life was in many ways so similar to mine that 
recognising her otherness made me confront my own, although mine was less visible. A 
narrative of looking well and being ironically not what I was meant to be was clearly not 
adequate for my circumstances. It had to evolve. 
It was at this point that I went the other way. I stopped trying to pass (Goffman, 1963/1990) 
and labelled myself disabled. At first I only write this in my research journal, to give myself 
courage, but then I started saying it out loud. An article I reviewed for a journal confirmed this. 
It was about transplantation in Spain where people who have had transplants are categorised 
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as being between 17% and 24% disabled. At this point I “came out” as a transplantee. Once I 
had started I could not stop. I dragged my condition into everything. My stock opening phrase 
for any conversation became, “As an organ transplantee...”  
Although I had become a conversational bore, this allowed me to try out a new identity in 
public. Most of my friends and colleagues went along with it, although I could tell it wore on 
their patience after a while. Labelling myself as “disabled” bothered them a lot more. The 
reactions range from fascination to puzzlement to viewing it as inappropriate. This amuses me. 
At first I thought that those few who view it as inappropriate found it too personal. Instead I 
came to see that they found it too medical, too biological and too “dirty”. Talking about such 
things breaks a social taboo (Douglas, 1966). It should only be done by people authorised to 
do it (such as doctors) and only about other people. Serious medical treatment and 
terminology are reserved for the “disabled” and “abnormal”, those who are not like “us”, those 
who are spoken about, but who do not do the speaking. Well, I am not like “us”.  
One friend tried to convince me that I should not see myself in that way. A colleague, like the 
Disabled Students’ Programme from long ago, maintained that disablement was for conditions 
such as blindness, deafness or paralysis. I ignored them. The more often I described myself in 
these ways and told the story of my condition against this background, the more comfortable I 
felt with it. But this too was not adequate. My notes at the time show me wrestling with the 
unsatisfactory nature of liminality and a longing to belong somewhere. My story was evolving 
without my realising it. 
6.4.4 Safe to go back 
At first I attended the patients’ support group because I had been invited to give a talk. I felt 
reluctant going there. I had stayed away from such things for so long, more than a decade, 
and I had not missed them. Now I attend sporadically because I want to show my fellow renal 
patients support. I find it emotionally draining, but in their company, I am with people who are 
like me and that offers me a curious type of validation. 
I would not have been able to do this a decade ago. Perhaps it is the distance of time and a 
successful transplant that allows me to participate as I do. I always leave remembering how 
lucky I am. Most of the regular group members are very unwell and experience a lot of 
complications. I have noticed that those of us who are healthy come less often. And then there 
is the usual amount of dying. Twenty years later that seems to continue unabated. 
So my story remains partly medical and partly personal experience. I do think, however, that it 
is more my own now. I started attending the patients’ group some months after I attended Lori 
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Hartwell’s talk, so I was primed to identify with the group members and to see myself as 
disabled. In the group, however, I have had to oscillate between being well to the seriously ill 
patients (who ask me longing questions about what being well is like) and ill to the medical 
people and social workers (who ask me how I am doing under the circumstances). All our 
conversations seem to begin with what caused our conditions and what our creatinine levels 
are. 
This had made me realise that this is what my identity is. I am comparatively well and 
comparatively ill, sometimes at the same time. I am always, however, double and always in 
“transplant land”. I have come to see that this is not liminality exactly. 
6.5 Littorality not liminality: A never-ending story 
Acknowledging the extent of my own disablement from ESRD and its repercussions on my life 
and on my psyche has taken me my whole life until now. Even now as I write about it I can feel 
my attention wilfully wandering off to think of better things. When I first acknowledged it in my 
research journal, I cried (research journal entry, 30 June 2008). I tried to write about it, but did 
not succeed until a few days later (3 July 2008). My disablement means stigma, vulnerability 
and otherness. It means marginalisation. It means being simultaneously visible and invisible. 
In other words, it means dysappearance. 
It is an in-between state from which no amount of ritual can retrieve you. Once you’ve crossed 
over there you’re like Eurydice, lost forever. If you’re lucky you’re more like that boundary-
crosser, Persephone, who can sometimes return to the sunlit land of the living from the 
obscure, infernal regions (Lionnet, 1989). But you always have to go back. This is described in 
some of the literature as liminal (Crowley-Matoka, 2005; Little et al, 1998). Is such a condition 
truly liminal? Liminality is, by definition, transient and bounded (Turner, 1969; Van Gennep, 
1960). It cannot be protracted. It represents anti-structure, but is not itself anti-structure. By its 
very attempt to reinvent anti-structure, it interprets and orders it, controls it and tames it so that 
it can safely be passed through from one structured state to another. 
Liminality, in short, is part of a ritual that allows people to explain how a person moved from 
one status to another in society–- how a woman moved from being single to being married, or 
how a boy became a man, or a novitiate a priest. Illness and disability are not part of a ritual 
condition, although they can be contained and represented or even understood by one to 
some extent. 
Writers such as Brody (2003), Crowley-Matoka (2005) and Little et al. (1998) speak of 
extended or sustained liminality very compellingly. But I wonder if that is truly what they are 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
177 
 
describing in chronic illness. The conditions they speak of seem less like liminality and more 
like limbo. Limbo, however, is usually an in-between state too. It ends when you have done 
your penance. Maybe all I need is a good ritual of reintegration (Van Gennep, 1960). If I 
underwent such a ritual successfully then I could return to society in a new guise and occupy a 
different and elevated role. I would have a new identity too. But here I falter. What would my 
new identity be? And what if I have had it all these years, but have not had the right name for 
it? “Transplantee” does not truly capture who I am, because I am more than a person who has 
undergone a medical procedure. 
Perhaps I can best describe myself as littoral. I prefer this because it extends beyond medical 
procedures into my life as a whole. In life one is usually on the way to something else or 
oscillating between identities, but this is clearer than ever when you are living with chronic 
illness. Finding this word, this new, clean term, uncluttered with psychic baggage and 
unburdened with metaphor has been extremely useful to me in understanding where I am 
today and who I am. The stories in this chapter are part of my journey to attaining an 
understanding of my post-transplant identity. Each experience and each version of the stories 
allowed me to move towards a sense of identification that was complex enough and nuanced 
enough to meet me where I am now. 
I am fully aware that if my condition were to change I would change my perception of my 
littorality. If I were to return to dialysis and re-enter a liminal place, I would have to redefine the 
last twenty years, because the littorality would be bounded and would in retrospect seem more 
liminal than it does now. Similarly, if I were 20 years older than I am now, my perception of the 
forty years since my transplant might cause me to have a different view of my littorality, which 
at this point I can’t even imagine. If miraculously a cure could be found for kidney failure and 
my “old” kidneys could regenerate, I might look back on life post-transplant as a waiting room. 
If I chose to regenerate my “old” kidneys. I feel a certain loyalty to my “new” one and would be 
reluctant to dispose of it. 
But as things stand now, I see that I can be both “well” and “ill” and something else. My body 
changes as normal people’s do. I may always be Other to some, but I am no longer Other to 
myself. I know who I am. I have reappeared. I have come home. I would not have been able to 
do this without conducting an autoethnographic study. I must grudgingly admit I would not 
have been able to do this had I not been propelled into taking this journey through a series of 
unfortunate events, starting with a mortgage company that refused me health insurance. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION: INHABITING THE LITTORAL ZONE 
7.1 Introduction 
Writing my story, making and telling it, has led me to this literal and metaphorical place, both in 
my dissertation and in my life. Malinowski (1922/1984) recommended that, when carrying out 
an ethnographic study, one should try to see what the indigenous people saw of their own 
world, but as an outsider. One should not “go native”. But I was (and am) an insider and 
writing this story has helped me find that again. At least sometimes I am on the inside and 
sometimes I am on the outside. My situatedness changes when I least expect it.  
When I tell the story I am an outsider, while when I live it (and am told about) I am an insider. 
As an outsider I flee from identity, while as an insider I flee towards it. As an outsider I 
dysappear, while as an insider I reappear. My story does not have a first- and third-person 
narrator, but in effect I too move towards and away from cultural place and identity (Buzard, 
1999). I want to be seen as myself, but I also want to be seen as a product of a certain set of 
experiences. I am not who I would have been without them. I need to find where my 
dysappearance can be prevented, where I can reappear.  
In writing an autoethnography about my experience of chronic kidney disease and its 
therapies, I moved between two writing cultures, academic (different types of qualitative health 
research) and biographical (illness narrative). Although ontologically very different, they are 
related in terms of certain epistemological goals. This can be seen particularly in writing about 
individual experience of medical conditions, interpreting the meaning in such a way that the 
experience can be shared with a broader audience (whether academic, medical or people 
living with the condition) to raise awareness and provide insight or at least a discursive space. 
My intention was that my autoethnography would be a métissage of these two cultures and 
would emerge as a type of third space where writing about CKD and life post-transplant could 
be explored. Writing this way gave me a new understanding of the complexity of my life pre- 
and post-transplant. It allowed me to reconceptualise the binary of well and ill so that I was 
able to find a strange and shifting third space that I could inhabit: the littoral zone. It allowed 
me to reflect on my own writing as well as that of others who had addressed the subject of 
renal disease and illness narrative. Doing this has increased my conceptual repertoire about 
kidney disease and has shown me that much more work can be done in this area. 
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I have found my autoethnographic journey to be both theoretical and pragmatic. Sometimes 
the bricolage-like quality of working with the resources at hand (my few artefacts, my 
memories, my narratives, other people’s writing and research) left me feeling rather 
destabilised and longing for epistemological certainty. But this very uncertainty was a most 
fertile area for developing new ideas about ambiguous or even contradictory situations 
(Shildrick, 2002). The practical aspect of using writing as method of discovery can prevent 
theory being privileged over experience, if the writer remains aware and self-reflecting.  
For instance, in recognising my otherness – my “disability” – and by making it visible I had to 
change the story of my self. Paradoxically by making my identity and my story visible I made 
myself dysappear (Leder, 1990). My self became monstrous to me, because it “confounded 
normative identity” (Shildrick, 2002, p. 5). I felt ashamed of being disabled and this at first 
caused me to see myself as monstrous, as only my “abnormality”. Then I felt perturbed 
because my identity did not fit into a normative category, being between well and ill, able-
bodied and disabled. Normative categories tend to be absolute. As I negotiated the experience 
of being disabled and other and seeing myself being disabled and other, the old version of my 
perceived self disappeared and was gradually – still is – being replaced by a new version that I 
am coming to understand. 
At first I thought this instability of identity occurred because I had had a transplant. My 
circumstances are, have been and will continue to be so very changeable.  But I have come to 
see that the standard body is unstable too (Shildrick, 2002); it changes, it grows, it heats up, 
cools down, has scars, has wounds, heals, hungers. In this (postmodern) way my well/ill 
positioning is standard now, even if my physiology is not (yet). 
And so we are back where we started again. While writing my dissertation I have continually 
been struck by the non-linear nature of my narrative. The past is always present on so many 
levels. And the present is the lens through which I see my past. Both past and present are 
palimpsests (Derrida, 1978). It is almost impossible to write this story in chronological order. 
The previous chapter was meant to be about what happened after the transplant and yet in 
certain ways it is so much about my identity before. But I can’t write the past in the past. I 
found that when I tried to take snapshots of all those years of CKD and ESRD. I have to write 
it from an ever-changing present. I notice too that in so doing I am starting to inscribe for the 
first time a tentative (if immediate) future. 
In this chapter I draw together some of the threads of my dissertation and braid them into a 
conclusion of sorts about my autoethnographic experiences. 
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7.2 Boundedness and thresholds, breakthroughs and openings 
Rituals create boundaries. They structure experience and demarcate it so that it can be 
contained and understood. They give it a beginning and an end. Narratives are ritualistic in this 
sense. I was keen to write my narrative because I needed a ritual that would structure and 
contain my renal experiences and (I hoped) provide me with closure, so that I could leave the 
past behind. Of course it did not work this way. 
When I started writing the chapters in my research I had wanted to tell “the whole story”. I saw 
writing the dissertation as my opportunity to be able to unpack forty years of experience, to 
analyse it and finally to be able to make sense of it. I leapt right in. I came to see, despite 
every effort not to, that I was not going to be able to tell the whole story after all. The story 
itself was not whole. It was certainly not complete, because it was not finished – I am, after all, 
still alive. I suspect that even when I am not, the story will still be incomplete, ragged-ended, 
patchworky and parti-coloured. 
I could not escape telling some version of the medical story (although I had badly wanted to 
avoid it, because it had dominated my life for so long and had stifled my own personal story), 
because without it my own story could not make sense. I felt ambivalent about this revelation. 
On the one hand, I felt that my story was connected to a greater whole and that, while the 
greater narrative influenced me, in some small way I might influence it as well. On the other 
hand, I felt alarmed that the very narrative I was trying to escape followed me like my own 
shadow. 
Most perturbingly, the narrative was not really one story at all. It splintered, fragmented, 
reinvented itself, even sometimes contradicted itself. I was forced to accept that this was how it 
was and, after this, it seemed artificial to make it one neat package. But time was short and so 
was life. I did not have forever to write the story and was certain that readers would not have 
forever in which to read it. And so, because of all of this, I demarcated the edges of the story.  
In the telling and the retelling of it, its postmodern nature re-emerged. I found some ways of 
crossing boundaries, some changeable spaces that remained in my new-found fearful 
symmetry. Something that paradoxically simultaneously ordered and disordered my narrative 
was the presence of the past. Another was the presence of the present in the past. Narratives 
are multi-layered. You cannot write only about yourself in the past, because the narrating you 
is in the present and you come from the past of which you write. You are part of both. 
I found in those spaces that in-betweenness can be the effect of such structured spaces, not 
only the cause. Life cannot be contained by a narrative, other than momentarily. Story 
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expresses and commemorates a change in experience (Clandinin & Connolly, 2000). Because 
of this, writing about illness is a type of modern ritual of reintegration, even more than an act of 
reintegration. Narrative control is an illusion and narrative can be a highly ironic way of 
expressing yourself.  
7.3 What the different parts of my story showed me 
Writing is an experience in itself. I do not think we need to fear being trapped in an endless 
circle of interpretation (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). When we write, we are not interpreting an 
experience so much as reinventing it by giving it structure and form. We are making something 
new and sometimes that something is ourselves. 
Interestingly one of the patients in Russ et al.’s study only found acceptance of his lot when he 
could say out loud, “This is my life” and the dialysis technician could reflect that back to him, 
“Yes, this is your life” (2005, p. 321). The patient found that “sometimes the words come first” 
(p. 321). In writing about the shifts in identity and in narrative, sometimes the words do indeed 
come first. This was my experience in discovering littorality. Autoethnography can help a 
researcher to unlock this potential by creating the space for the words. It became a threshold 
of conceptual transformation (Meyer & Land, 2005), which allowed me to extend my 
understanding and my vocabulary and to cross some boundaries of my own. 
In my dissertation the academic writing deconstructs the personal narratives and vice versa. 
Sometimes the personal and academic combine in a type of third space where something 
different can be born. Sometimes the tension between them creates a third space of 
uncertainty and multiple possibilities (Reed-Danahay, 1997; Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005). 
This can contain “troublesome knowledge” (Meyer & Land, 2005, p. 373), so that it can be 
safely considered. I treated each chapter differently because each concerned a different 
period in my life. However, this allowed each chapter to teach me something useful and 
unexpected. Sometimes these things concerned narrative. Sometimes they concerned me and 
my perceptions. Sometimes they concerned my medical condition. 
7.3.1 CKD and ESRD 
My chapter on CKD and ESRD was the most difficult to write. At first I thought this was 
because the events I was writing about were from so long ago. Although they had taken so 
much of my childhood and adolescence, had been so much of each day’s routine, they 
became curiously elusive when I began to write about them. Because so little is written on the 
childhood experience of CKD, I could find little stimulus in other academic work. I began to 
wonder why others had not written much about their own circumstances – youthfulness, 
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depression, physical disability, fear, grief or shame? This forced me to confront the truth about 
why I hadn’t written about my condition growing up. I hadn’t wanted to, for all of the reasons I 
attributed to other youngsters in the same circumstances. 
Those ancient dreads began to surface in the journals I kept and the initial pieces I wrote that I 
found so unsatisfactory. My feelings about ESRD were no easier to deal with many years later. 
As an adult I was forced to see through older and more experienced eyes some grim realities 
about my life growing up with CKD and I was to notice the residue of this in every other part of 
my narrative, like the trail of a comet that has long ago burnt out. 
I had originally hoped to achieve a compact, contained narrative of this period that would 
explain it all to me and provide me with closure. In my mind’s eye this would be a typical illness 
narrative of organising chaos and restoring a damaged identity. To some extent it was, but I 
was shocked by the identity I saw – a vulnerable child living with a terminal condition, trying 
very hard to control it through following the prescriptions of medical science. From this I could 
see how the medical narrative had become the defining one in my life and I could also see 
how that narrative had silences, ambiguities and contradictions. My care providers tried not to 
alarm me, but they could not protect me forever. When my condition deteriorated, my belief in 
the medical version of events deteriorated too, leaving behind chaos, confusion and silence.  
For instance, even in reconstructing that narrative, I did not tell (and still hesitate to do so 
because, even thirty years later, it makes me so anxious) of my doctor’s recommendation that 
I stop school sport permanently when I was thirteen. School sport was compulsory. You could 
only stop it if you were seriously ill. I insisted on continuing with school sport throughout high 
school, not because I loved sport. I loathed school sport. Nor did I doggedly continue with so-
called “games” lessons because I was courageous and filled with fighting spirit, but because I 
was terrified and preferred to live in denial about my condition. I could not bear being the only 
girl in the entire school who was so damaged that she was booked off sport permanently. 
I was adrift without a narrative that even today I struggle to replace. I move away and towards 
an identity of vulnerability and terminal illness. The long liminal period between 8 months and 
21 years had periods of littorality, an identity of its own distinct from life before and afterwards, 
with its own fluctuations and combinations of relative health and illness, but in retrospect was a 
waiting room for dialysis, transplantation or death. 
7.3.2 Dialysis 
The chapter on dialysis presented a different type of perturbation. I believed my story about 
dialysis to be straightforward: it had saved my life and worked well for me. I thought that it 
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provided a cheerful counter-narrative to the gloomy tales one generally encounters in 
qualitative health research about dialysis. I wrote up a brisk version of my narrative and set 
about explaining it in more detail. Imagine my confusion when I back-tracked to extract some 
quotes from my narrative, only to find that I had two contradictory narratives and both were 
accurate depictions of my view of dialysis. I also came to see that once I included different 
snippets of information about the experience, the picture changed further. I moved away from 
and towards the experience. I identified with being the compliant patient, following my exercise 
and treatment routines, running as hard as I could from the encroaching vulnerability.  
I also had to see that my predominant narrative was still medicalised. Internal colonisation is 
difficult to identify and to eradicate (Marquard, 1957). The medical narrative was easier to 
embrace here, because it made me feel as if I could control my fate, while towards the end of 
ESRD the medical narrative had left me feeling powerless. However, the price in toeing the 
medical narrative line was that I denied myself the chance of having a narrative of my own. 
Seeing for the first time the contradictoriness of my experience and the in-betweenness of my 
life on dialysis allowed me to start conceptualising the experience as much more emotionally 
complex than I had at first been able to see. The gaps, silences and omissions were 
sometimes the result of saving time in the telling, sometimes the result of not being able to 
face what had happened to me. I came to see that they were all part of the story. Was this 
liminality or littorality or both? Was I well or ill, or becoming something else entirely? Unlike 
during the years of my adolescence, I felt really well on dialysis, even though my kidneys had 
atrophied and I had a permanent abdominal catheter for which I used to perform four sterile 
bag-changes a day. For me dialysis was only ever a stop-gap (and hence liminal) and yet it 
gave me my first taste of what being well (or “well”) must be like. So perhaps it was littoral too. 
And then there was the story I omitted about how I came to study part-time on dialysis. When I 
explained to the postgraduate supervisor that I was on dialysis and was waiting for a 
transplant whose date I could not predict, her response to me was to tell me that if I didn’t think 
I could manage the course, perhaps I should not register for it. As with high school sport and 
for the same reasons of dread and denial, I registered anyway, but I did it part-time, so that if 
my kidney came up I would be able to have the transplant and still get my degree (which is 
exactly what happened). I needed to believe that I was well. This story of dialysis continues to 
be ruptured. 
7.3.3 Transplantation and life post-transplant 
For the part about transplantation and the life afterwards I had initially wanted two chapters, so 
that I could clearly show the difference between the phases. I wrote up two chapters and 
realised belatedly that I was relapsing into the old, familiar medical narrative of transplantation 
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as a medical procedure, just as qualitative health research, sociology and anthropology often 
treat it, with the transplant recipient a passive recipient of another’s organ, while the weighty 
philosophical and ethical battles rages on around one. I came to see that this was not my 
story. 
At first I felt ashamed that I was bored and irritated by the dramatic narrative of transplantation, 
so much so that I did not explore it in my chapter about life after transplant. I felt drawn to a 
more traditional story of gratitude for my new lease on life, gratitude to my doctors, gratitude to 
my donor and his family. But I came to see this was not truly my narrative either. While I do 
indeed feel grateful, my role in both these traditional narratives is a passive one. I was more 
interested in a narrative in which I could play a more active role, where I could participate in 
making meaning out of the events in my own life. I committed the ultimate transgressive act 
when I dropped the chapter on transplantation from the story of organ failure, transplantation 
and life afterwards. But in so doing, I think, I left that liminal state forever. In rituals of liminality, 
the participants who are moving from one identity to another are passive (Kirschner, 2006). 
This gave me a different perspective on my narrative. I came to see that it was very difficult to 
escape from these narrative forms, but that I had to, because my narrative was about dealing 
with liminality post-transplant, not fighting ethical battles around organ donation. In terms of 
understanding my post-transplant identity, this was the most empowering narrative event that 
has ever happened to me. From the beginning of my research my concern has been that 
much research on transplantation is really not about the qualitative experience of individuals’ 
lives, but about larger abstract issues. In this type of research the individual’s experience is 
lost. As important as policy and ethics are, as wonderful as medical science can be, illness is a 
human experience. It happens to individuals, not to systems. Its meaning is important to 
individuals, not to policies. And yet here I was doing the same thing. 
The first timid draft of my own story began to emerge and it was as tenuous as my narrative of 
ESRD had been. I had never really told it before. Wellness was traumatic for me; I was 
completely unprepared for it. My identity was in ruins. I had no narrative to sustain me. All I 
had were some disconnected shocks visited on me by an environment of wellness in which I 
seemed not to belong. I came to see that I shifted between society’s perceptions of well and ill, 
and that I had internalised this binary, unhelpful as it was in understanding my condition. I 
began to carve out a new and often painful narrative in which I came to see that I was not well 
or ill, but something else, as I had been on dialysis, but with some differences. I used the term 
“littoral” for this, because it was more helpful than merely being in-between one state and its 
opposite. This new narrative is not medical. It captures how I understand my identity now. It 
has been influenced by the successfulness of my transplant so far. It may well change in the 
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future. But for now I feel sustained by it and through it I can see my past in a different way: a 
journey through a dangerous and difficult terrain and one that I am still traversing. For the first 
time I see a possible future too. Littorality is something I can live with. 
On 21 August 2011, for the first time in 20 years after having a transplant, I attended a 
memorial and dedication for organ donors. I did this because at last I could. And I was 
surrounded by people like me (although no one I spoke to had had their transplanted organs 
for more than a decade). “We are a family here,” one man told me. I have not had a family for 
a very long time. 
7.4 Learning to inhabit the littoral zone by using autoethnography 
Autoethnography is “dangerous” and invites perturbing self-questioning (Ellis, 2004, 2009). 
This is partly because in any reflexive activity one might be forced to confront things one would 
rather not. I was alarmed at my vulnerability because I had worked very hard my entire life to 
make myself as invulnerable as possible in my medical condition. Vulnerability for people like 
me can mean death. Some of the perturbation, however, is narrative in nature. Hollway and 
Jefferson (2000) show there is a link between ambiguous representations and people’s 
experience. Some experiences and one’s reactions to them are ambiguous by nature, but we 
find that difficult to accept and aim to resolve the tension if we can. If we can’t, we fear we may 
not have achieved closure. The desire for closure, for resolution, for ending tension can 
override our ability to use narrative to increase our understanding of certain experiences. From 
my own experience I can assure you that it is frightening telling your story of persistent in-
betweenness. You might fear that you are living in-between worlds like that because you are 
doing something wrong, instead of seeing that this in-betweenness could be a rich and 
exciting experience. 
For instance, I started as the Romantic writer, hoping to be heroic, unique and omniscient and 
to show the truth to the world (Denzin, 2009). I became the ethnographic writer, representative 
in some senses and exploratory. The writing became the experience as I negotiated my way 
from the peripheries to the centre and back again. I had a perception of myself that changed 
while writing my chapters. My identity was based in concealment and passing (Goffman, 
1963/1990). When I started to become more like the person I actually was, I had to begin to 
stop becoming the person I thought I was. The past me I uncovered was different from the 
past me I remembered. In doing this I had to reconsider the (then) present me.  
Everything remained dynamic in my research and this was a challenge. I managed to explore 
my own alterity to some extent and to discover a third space through métissage that allowed 
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me to articulate who I am in my various selves. But even now I have an urge to wrap it all up 
neatly and tie it with a bow of theory, so that it will be finished, even though life and its 
narratives go on. 
7.4.1 How autoethnographic was it? 
I still ask the eternal question: “Is it autoethnography yet?” Perhaps I have not changed as 
much as I thought. So I have decided, methodolatrously and against what I asserted in 
Chapter 3, to do a checklist. Criteria for assessment of autoethnography may vary somewhat 
(Ellis, 2000; Hudak, 2007; Richardson, 2000; Sparkes, 2000, 2001), but they usually cover the 
following:  
a. Has the work made a substantive contribution? 
b. Is it aesthetic? 
c. Is it reflexive? 
d. What type of impact has it had? 
e. Does it express lived experience? 
Some of these criteria worry me, since they are somewhat subjective. They do, however, 
capture the more affective side of autoethnography and remind me of the importance of 
emotion in lived experience and in how we tell the story of that experience. 
a) Has the work made a substantive contribution? 
Whether or not my research has made a substantive contribution to research into the 
understanding lived experience of kidney disease is largely up to other researchers and 
people living with it to decide. For my own part, it has made a substantive contribution to my 
own understanding of living with kidney disease by revealing complexities and nuances of 
which I had previously been unaware, and by allowing me to confront, in a contained way, 
some of the experiences I had previously found too distressing to contemplate. This also 
allowed me to accept and assimilate my otherness and to understand that this was partly due 
to occupying a littoral space. 
This was not merely therapy. In doing this I came to understand that some of my distress was 
caused by my own (mis)perceptions of my condition and by the narratives I persisted in telling 
myself. Some of these narratives were narratives I had acquired or inherited through my 
relations with family members, doctors, friends and associates. Writing this way allowed me to 
examine and contextualise my narratives within a particular postmodern framework and to 
reconstruct them from a new perspective that afforded me a more accurate view of my own 
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circumstances. My autoethnography is one of very few book-length discussions of kidney 
disease and, because my autoethnography is about my lived experiences of life-long kidney 
disease, it offers a unique perspective. Furthermore, it provides an alternative way of telling 
the story of kidney disease, where littorality is more flexible and dynamic and less stigmatised 
and less anxiety-producing than liminality. 
b) Is it aesthetic? 
There are too many different theories of aesthetic value for this criterion to be more than 
subjective. Perhaps I can frame this within a more limited range of whether or not I used 
emotional and sensory imagery to help achieve a thick description of the experience of kidney 
disease, and whether this thick description allowed me to interpret more meaning from the 
narrative than I would have, had it not been there. I found that allowing myself to write as 
freely as possible about the experiences and to remember that a reader may need to have the 
experiences described precisely permitted me to tell an emotional truth about them that I had 
sometimes even hidden from myself. In addition to this, writing this way allowed me to escape 
conforming completely to a medicalised narrative of facts and figures, which can only ever be 
part of the story. Of everything I learned during this research, I found this last point the most 
valuable and liberating. 
c) Is it reflexive? 
Nothing I wrote about would have been of any use had I not reflected constantly on the 
process of writing about it. The aesthetic part of my work could only achieve what it did 
because I reflected on what it meant. Making my story – this version of it anyway, because it 
will change the next time it is told – has compelled me to go back. I have had to reassemble 
memories. It has also made me go forward and to think about the future.  
Reflecting in this way forced me to examine very closely my own perceptions and the ways in 
which I constructed my own narratives: my metaphors, my imagery, my influences. There is a 
lot of death in there. In Chapter 5, for instance, the first narrative fragment sets up a metaphor 
of Death as a cowboy. This metaphor is not unpacked and remains conceptually elusive, as 
one’s own death is. Likewise a theme of myths involving death and life-in-death (Osiris, 
Persephone) runs through my narrative, dead-alive supernatural beings who occupy more 
than one realm exist in my story too (ghosts, vampires). 
In addition to this, I reflected on the theoretical underpinning of my work and problematised the 
methodology. In Chapter 5 again, an academic introduction follows the cowboy story, taking a 
different and more rational tack and prepares you for the longer narrative about my experience 
of dialysis. In the academic discussion of the narrative I note how I was in two minds about my 
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story to the extent that I held two opposing versions of it in my mind. I also omitted large parts 
of it in the narrative, some of which I discuss in the academic section. The chapter ends with a 
different fragment of narrative that tells a different, and yet equally true to me, version of 
events. The chapters take different forms, depending on what needs to be said. Sometimes 
academic and narrative are blended, sometimes kept separate. I had to choose carefully how 
to do this in order to create certain types of effects. 
Being constantly reflexive meant that I also had to deal with a surprising amount of emotion 
around writing about events that occurred very long ago. A perpetual battle raged in me 
between anger and rationality, between being swept along in a tumult of powerful emotions 
while having to step back and contemplate what this meant to me. Great sadness was more 
difficult for me to cope with and so was the ghostly remnant of great fear. The presence of the 
past and my death grip on some of it were issues I was not able to resolve. I live with 
vulnerability still, but in writing this way and having a narrative that is more my own, I have 
come to see that this is simply how my experience of kidney disease is. It is not right or wrong. 
Ironically, being (self-) reflexive forced me to confront my anxiety about being narcissistic. After 
all, in some senses, the research is all about me. In confronting this I came to understand that, 
because it scared me, I had avoided focusing on my own story for much of my life and that this 
had consequences for me and my story. I also came to see that my story could have value for 
others by providing them with an alternative and more nuanced way of narrating and 
understanding the experience of transplantation and chronic illness.  
d) What type of impact has it had? 
The impact on me of writing autoethnographically has been profound. I do not think about 
kidney disease the same way as when I began. My view on organ transplantation is quite 
different too. This research has allowed me to embrace hidden parts of myself and to reclaim 
parts of my identity as an organ transplant recipient and as a person who does not represent 
the norm. I can even accept that I am in some senses disabled. Doing this has been a relief. 
But doing this was also a route to a more subtle understanding of how I tell my story and 
where I place myself in it. Postmodernism allowed me a more flexible way of managing 
ambiguity and led me to see that the binaries of well/ill and even the idea of liminality do not do 
justice to life post-transplant.  
e) Does it express lived experience? 
Does my research reflect the lived experience of kidney disease and the life post-transplant? It 
reflects my experience. It took a long time and much rewriting to reach the point where the 
narrative was more mine than other people’s. Nonetheless I could not tell my whole story. I 
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had to choose what to include and what to leave out, because I had decided to write about a 
life-time’s experiences. While I feel satisfied that I captured certain events quite clearly and 
that I chose to write about events for their significance and the way in which they fitted in with 
other events in the narrative(s), I am painfully aware of how much I have had to omit. I must 
conclude that what I have told reflects some of the experience of kidney disease and organ 
transplantation. 
7.4.2 Working with the methodological challenges 
Through reflexivity I was able to remain aware of my on-going pull towards traditional 
methodologies. I had to remind myself constantly that while I was working with meta-issues, I 
was not looking for generalisability or statistical verification of my findings. However, the tug 
towards empirically-based methodologies was powerful. I also had to remind myself that my 
narratives weren’t data, but a means of developing and structuring knowledge. This left me 
feeling off-kilter during my research, constantly doubting the worthiness of my work. As 
unpleasant as this was, it was beneficial, because it kept me critical of my findings and 
methodology. The uncertainty that I experienced was itself a type of littoral space, where I 
oscillated between epistemological complacency and serious doubt. Not only was this 
performative and postmodern, allowing me to question power and perspective, including my 
own, but it allowed me to develop my ideas further. 
Representing the Other was a more troublesome challenge. This challenge would show up 
unexpectedly where I had medicalised parts of my earlier narrative versions. It emerged when 
I slipped back into traditional ways of using narratives as data. I experienced it as the greatest 
challenge when writing about myself as a child. Looking back to those times as an adult was a 
sobering experience and I found it extremely difficult to avoid writing about myself then as a 
pitiable victim. I had never been able to afford to see how devastating CKD and ESRD had 
been to me or to my family, nor could I afford to see how powerless I had been as a child in 
those circumstances. I found myself attempting to redress this by writing about ways in which I 
had gained control of my medical situation (for example, being responsible for my own 
medication from the age of 9). I do not think I completely avoided othering myself, but I do 
think that I managed to move between othering and not othering myself, and that this in itself 
may show a more nuanced picture of how I perceive my situation. 
This was a type of métissage, because, by combining these different points of view and ways 
of telling, it liberated me from the place from which I began to speak (Buzard, 1999) by 
providing me with a more empowering and sophisticated alternative story. My focus changed 
from anger and victimhood, pity and fear and I began to speak of other things, such as finding 
more subtle ways of defining my position. I may still be trapped from time to time in certain 
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discourses, ontologies and epistemologies, but being aware of this propensity has allowed me 
to reflect on and change my position. I now think, along with Reed-Danahay (1997), that we 
should not aim for a freedom we may not be able to achieve, but we should rather keep 
moving and not let any identity clothe us for too long, nor to become too much at home in one 
or other position. In this way I experienced my research as truly autoethnographic. 
While autoethnography has allowed me to inhabit the messiness and contingency of life to an 
extent, the urge to order and structure is impossible to resist when writing a narrative, because 
the very act of doing so is a way of ordering events to gain meaning. This was an on-going 
tension, especially pronounced when I had to choose what to put in and what to leave out. 
Again reflexivity allowed me to make sense of these choices and, paradoxically, to 
acknowledge the imperfect nature of my work. 
This tension emerged also in the dialectics of the personal and the academic, and of 
rationalism and rhetoric, theory and practice. I had to rework parts of my dissertation to 
achieve a better balance between anger (particularly) and rationality. Journaling helped me 
with this, especially when reading research that filled me with so much fury that it prevented 
me from being objective. This forced me to examine why I felt as much anger as I did towards 
some researchers. I had to conclude that it was usually because they were outside the issue 
they were examining, were not involved with the everyday lives and needs of the people they 
were studying, and could leave any time they wanted, while I could not. Two particular 
instances are those of Fox and Swazey (1992) and Scheper-Hughes (2007).  
Occasionally I realised that I felt contempt for those whose conditions were not as serious as 
mine, but who were, nonetheless, writing about them autoethnographically and were deeply 
affected by them (Ettorre, 2005; Oakley, 2009). I had to remind myself constantly that these 
researchers had every right to feel affected by their circumstances and to conceptualise them 
within their chosen theoretical frameworks. Their work had academic merit. At the heart of this 
and of my anger for these researchers lay a melancholy truth: I saw myself as trapped and 
victimised by my condition and had conferred upon myself as consolation an heroic mantle of 
having earned my right to speak about serious issues. This mantle was extremely difficult to 
remove. 
In holding onto this idea that I was more injured and therefore more deserving, I ran the risk of 
polarising not only the identities of these researchers and of othering them, but also of 
polarising my identity as ill person and my identity as researcher. This can prevent one from 
seeing what one has in common with other researchers and with other circumstances. It can 
also prevent one realising the implications of multiple intersecting identities, one’s own and 
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others’. Although one doesn’t want to generalise, it is possible to abstract if one keeps a 
balance between indignation or outrage and intellectual inquiry. As I came to see, we are all 
subjects, all situated somewhere in our own and others’ narratives (Richards, 2008). One type 
of inquiry does not negate others, nor does one method of inquiry. This was a challenge to 
remember as I became more deeply immersed in my own work. 
I came to wonder if autoethnography might not be a way of countering dysappearance and 
ritually ending a liminal state, instead of perpetuating one. Accepting that one inhabits some 
type of borderland (Pratt, 1992), more specifically, a changeable littoral zone, instead of 
moving through porous borders between one state and the other might be a more helpful way 
of seeing one’s chronic condition. Where did I position myself? I had to accept that I did not 
always live in a borderland, but sometimes travelled between lands, not really a citizen of any 
that I temporarily inhabited. I was both researcher and researchee. There is no borderland 
there, only dual citizenship.  
In the case of inhabiting the kingdom of the well and the kingdom of the ill post-transplant, 
however, it becomes more complex and this is what I spent considerable time writing about: 
you can be well or ill or neither or both, and you will be all of these at different times and some 
of them at the same time. But that does not necessarily grant you a country of your own. 
Autoethnography as métissage can create a dynamic third space, a littoral zone, for capturing 
those ideas, expressing them or understanding them, even if it is only a space that is 
changeable and impermanent. In this dynamic littoral zone I was able to explore my feelings 
through writing about them and by so doing I was able to move beyond merely representing 
them and objectifying them. 
I may write in a certain confident (academic) tone, but my intention is that this should not belie 
my inherent uncertainty. I do not intend that my identity become fixed or that my ideas become 
merely ideas. For them to be of value to me, they must be in some way embodied and 
debated. They must argue with you the reader as they must remain unsettled in my own mind. 
That way they – and I – remain alive. 
7.5 Postmodernity and narratives of chronic illness 
The insider’s view of life post-transplant has not been much explored in literature and 
especially not in book-length narratives. Life long after transplant has received very little 
attention, as has childhood experience of chronic kidney disease. Because of the seriousness 
of kidney disease and the paucity of narratives, I have found much space for exploration of the 
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narratives one might tell, but I have also found how to tell them rather more complex than 
might at first have been expected and hence I resorted to using a postmodern paradigm. 
Postmodernity can be a useful paradigm in qualitative health research, especially when 
working through the messiness and contingency of everyday life in chronic illness. I have 
found that moving away from the urge to obtain closure or neatness, and moving towards 
ambiguity, ambivalence and contradiction can allow one to claim a voice for oneself and a way 
of expressing some of the complexity of living with a chronic condition.   
The blurring of genres and roles that occurs when pursuing a postmodern view of research 
can go part of the way towards redressing power imbalances or at least to drawing attention to 
them. In this way attention can be paid to the positioning and identity of the Other and even 
perhaps to how the Other positions and identifies herself (Lionnet, 1995). Doing this can allow 
the centre to shift and those on the peripheries to move inward. This can be useful to take into 
account when including patients’ voices in research. 
Using a postmodern paradigm is one way of creating a space in which to consider narrative 
more closely and to problematise the ways in which it functions in writing about chronic illness. 
This is because it allows one greater awareness of the text and of one’s own role as one tells 
a story and mediates experience. My use of autoethnography allowed me to problematise the 
outsider/insider perspectives and to re-evaluate my understanding of my own positioning in 
this regard. I also had to consider the curious position of writing an illness narrative about not 
being ill. Autoethnography is a type of academic subjunctive that can capture the subjunctive 
experience (Good & Good, 1994) of chronic illness. 
Many illness narratives take the form of a quest or restitution. Some are chaos narratives, but 
this tends to leave people longing for order and closure. At first I tried to flee from these forms, 
but I came to see that I could not. Instead I found that the forms I used changed during the 
narrative. Because of my autoethnographic approach I was aware of this and needed to 
consider its implications for my narrative.  
This also allowed me to reconsider the typical transplant narrative of a disruptive illness 
exorcised by a miraculous gift, or the narrative of great loss and a permanent medical 
condition delivering hidden gains. Both of these types are essentially comic plot narratives. 
The pull to write this way is strong and the imperative to do so seems almost moral. But within 
the intellectual framework that autoethnography gave me I was able to explore the 
complexities, tensions and uncertainties that my narrative showed. 
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Although the doctor-patient relationship has changed over the last few decades, people living 
with chronic conditions can find themselves caught up in a medicalised version of their lives. 
Possibly a reason I have never been able to write my story until now is that my prognosis, the 
story plotted out for me by a doctor about buying another decade of life, haunted me. It left me 
feeling as if I was waiting for the end and that it was nigh. I hoped that it would not be true. 
Also, the doctor’s plotting out of my story, no doubt to speak the truth and bring comfort, made 
me feel that it had already been told. But it had not been told by me. I shall have to tell my 
story many times, I think, to make it real. 
As for many people living with chronic conditions, my medical history is a large part of who I 
am. Through autoethnography and an exploration of illness narratives I see that now. It has 
been part of my life on every level since I was 8 months old. Kidney failure didn’t change my 
life. It has been in my life always, like a secret sharer. It has helped create my identity, my 
choices, who I am. And I want people to know who I am.  
7.6 Unanswered questions, unresolved issues and future research 
My research is only a small inroad into the lived experience of CKD, transplantation and the 
life afterwards. The few snapshots I managed to gather give only a glimpse of what is there to 
study. Much useful work can be done on the experience of dialysis and there is a lot of scope 
for work on the experience of transplants that reject. Likewise much can be done on the 
childhood experience of CKD. As time goes on and if I am fortunate enough to keep my 
kidney, work could be done on the experience of transplantation 40 years down the line. 
A number of other issues can be explored. One is the roles of narcissism and anxiety in 
creating narratives of chronic illness. This might be pursued through a focus on narcissistic 
wounding, shame and bereavement or vulnerability and an urge to force closure. 
Another topic to investigate further is the taboo narrative. What becomes of stories that go 
against what society dictates, for instance, how a dysfunctional family affects the choices and 
the narratives of a person with a chronic medical condition (and vice versa)? What types of 
taboo narratives does one find? Few families are fully functional and a lot of resentment, anger 
and feeling burdened by others’ problems seethes beneath our socially acceptable facades, 
even when a family member is dying. 
The tension between self and other, specific and general is difficult to sustain in narrative. In 
the end, if one produces a narrative of one’s own life for an audience, it needs to mean 
something to others and to be useful to them. They must either be able to relate to it (i.e. as 
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patients) or to use it (as academics). This ways that this is achieved may usefully be further 
explored in research about the experience of chronic illness. 
Further understanding of criteria needed for research that blurs the boundaries of the personal 
and the academic could continue with specific reference to the use of autoethnography in 
chronic illness. It is possible that chronic illness autoethnography may need its own criteria. 
There are times to read stories and times not to read them. These times vary from person to 
person. Reading a story of uncertainty might help or harm a person with a chronic illness. 
They might need to master challenges of day-to-day living and the new realities of their 
condition. They might need the little certainty they can find before they learn to live with 
uncertainty, whether the uncertainty of continued relative health or the uncertainty of a 
miraculous, but undependable cure. This could bear further research. I contend that to some 
extent we create stories we require at the times we need them. They are true for us then, but 
may change as our needs develop. 
One’s medical history is always part of one’s life, even if one has always been robustly well. In 
that case one’s “lack” of medical experience informs one’s life and attitude to sickness and 
health. One’s view of “normal” is what one mostly lives. A study I would like to see is how 
obscene good health distorts one’s body image and gives an unrealistic perception of what life 
is really about, thereby causing one to respond adversely to people from whom one is different 
to to experience illness as disruptive instead of merely part of life. Difference, like beauty, is 
after all in the eye of the beholder. 
7.7 Some concluding remarks 
I have recently discovered on the internet that HUS can be caused by eating salad that has 
been washed in water contaminated by e-coli or that one might come into contact with it if one 
interacts with feral swine. I feel that neither of these options really helps me to establish how I 
encountered it. I did not eat salad at the age of 8 months and I certainly did not play with feral 
swine. So, as always, I am not closer to establishing how I did encounter it. I do not feel a 
sense of urgency about finding out. Amongst the people I know, including all the 
transplantees, I am the only one to have suffered from it. After all these years I doubt I will 
encounter it again. 
My illness, like God’s agency, is only known by its effects. Everything that happened to me 
afterwards was as a result of an illness that had long burnt itself out of my system. I am 
indelibly imprinted by it almost to the extent that it is who I am, as if it were a third parent 
contributing to my gene pool. 
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As for Glissant’s “perpetual becoming” (2002, p. 292), I have been “becoming” for my entire 
life and yet I still am here (so to speak). I have realised in telling my story that I do not any 
longer truly experience liminality and Santiago’s “space between” (Pratt, 2002, p. 32). When I 
did, it was disquieting because I did not have a narrative for it. Now I occupy a littoral space. I 
may have inhabited it for a very long time without knowing it, because I did not have a story for 
it. I also realise, after spending some time trying to find “the” story of my life, that my story 
keeps changing. It is itself always in transition. It shall continue to become. I cannot and 
should not try to fix it. A story is a bridge from here to there. It can give the illusion of being 
eternal, but it is not. My narrative is a palimpsest of other stories and other identities that affect 
the present in my long road through chronic illness. Things change and return. Identities 
oscillate. We must cope with ambiguity and even learn to embrace it. 
Now that I understand this better, I am not alarmed by it. It no longer perturbs me. For years I 
did not have a story, but instead a mosaic of story fragments that were my own and other 
people’s, because I was afraid to write my own narrative. The liminality scared me and I did 
not think I could justify my experiences that seemed so distant from the other stories I 
encountered. Maybe now I can begin (again) to tell my story, knowing that my identity is littoral 
and postmodern. I am not a blend of well and ill, or a splicing together of different types of 
narratives. My identity is a type of métissage. I am no longer trapped in the place from which I 
began to speak. I have dismantled the narratives that colonised my life for so long. In the 
meantime, I shall pause this text and leave it here.  
7.8 One last story: The fate of numbers 
Patient 548820 does not exist anymore, except as a file somewhere in a neon-lit 
basement. I left the Johannesburg General Hospital in 1995 and I plan never to return. In 
my black A4 notebook, where I have religiously charted my blood pressure, blood results 
and allergies since the early nineties, I wrote under the last set of blood results from the 
Gen, “Never coming back!!”  
When I moved to Groote Schuur I got a new number. I was no longer 548820. Like my 
original identity, my new one was printed on a white sticker, but this time, instead of being 
stuck on an endless succession of forms, prescriptions and requests for blood tests, it was 
stuck to a green card on which I was supposed to write the dates of my appointments. I did 
it for the first three appointments in the first year and then I stopped. I know I still have the 
card somewhere (one tends to keep one’s identity documents safe), but significantly I don’t 
know where it is. I don’t know my “new” hospital number either. I have had it for 15 years.  
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I moved a couple of years ago to a private specialist, but I didn’t close my file at Groote 
Schuur and the nursing sisters suggested that my specialist update them each year so they 
can update my file. I do not expect trouble, but just in case. Just in case I am too poor to 
afford private treatment. Just in case I develop complications. Just in case my transplant 
fails. Just in case I need to use my other passport again or I am deported when the 
authorities realise my papers aren’t valid and I’m not really “one of us”. My specialist has a 
number for me too and a file. His is a shorter number: RIC0003. He never calls me by it. 
938 only exists in the dusty filing cabinets of my heart. And in a note on the cover of my 
black notebook, written in by my mother, underneath my General Hospital sticker. 
The story of 548820 resides in me, but is not all of me. I am also partly 938 now. And I am, 
on occasion, RIC0003. I am not sure if I should add or multiply these numbers. If they are 
added, multiplied or laid together end-to-end, they do make an impressive total. I am not 
sure I can live up to it (or remember it). And yet I suspect that the sum is greater than the 
parts. 
And yet all of us will always exist. 548820 has lived amongst these pages and every time 
they are opened she breathes again. I have written about her and contained her. But I 
have also almost managed to set her free. She has lived so long that she almost has an 
identity of her own. Even if she can’t manage without me, I am half convinced that I cannot 
manage without her, especially when I need to remember to take my medication, keep to 
some sort of diet and attend to doctors’ visits. She is as much a part of me as 938. She is 
my secret sharer too. And when things go wrong or I find myself back in a large hospital, 
we change places. 
I haven’t worn or renewed my Medic Alert bracelet since it fell off my arm the day I didn’t 
get the Oxford scholarship. I have it still. It exists, with its broken chain in a wooden box on 
a high window sill in my bedroom. Its red lettering has almost been effaced, but you can 
still read its number: 327959*. My number is so short and so old it needs an asterisk to 
complete it. It has become a liminal thing, isolated from polite jewellery, its traces of identity 
besmirched. But it will return. They always do. 
You see, I am considering wearing it again – or having a new one made. Recently I fell 
seriously ill in Canada. I was so far away from home and so sick I could almost not speak 
for myself. All I managed to croak deliriously when the ambulance men questioned me 
about my health was “kidney transplant, kidney transplant”. I wished I had worn my Medic 
Alert bracelet then. I still have my kidney. And I keep forgetting to follow up on the bracelet. 
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